U.S. National Security and Military News Review

The D Brief: Seoul declares martial law; Biden rushes to arm Ukraine; Meet Aleppo’s conqueror; Last soldier to leave Kabul will get 4th star; And a bit more.

Ben Watson and Bradley Peniston — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 11:27:03 -0500

De patriota chino a espía estadounidense: la insólita vida de John Leung

Mara Hvistendahl, Joy Dong and Adam Goldman — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 10:51:11 -0500

Había sido aclamado por los medios de comunicación estatales chinos como un modelo por sus esfuerzos para promover los intereses de Pekín en Estados Unidos. En realidad, era un informante del FBI.

What Kash Patel Could Do to the F.B.I.

Garrett M. Graff — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 10:10:50 -0500

The true danger is almost less about the pick and more about what it says of Trump’s approach to his second term.

Proposed rule would bar sale of Americans' financial data to adversaries

David DiMolfetta — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 09:00:00 -0500

Consumer-protection agency aims to limit what data brokers can sell to foreign rivals and cybercriminals who seek intelligence and profit.

Deployment of the U.S. Military for Immigration Enforcement: A Primer

Elizabeth Goitein — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 08:31:09 -0500

President-elect Donald Trump has promised to carry out the largest deportation operation in American history. While he has provided few specifics about how his administration would accomplish this, Trump has indicated that he will declare a national emergency and that he will invoke both the Insurrection Act and the Alien Enemies Act. A common theme in almost all of his statements is his intent to deploy the military.

The prospect of heavy military involvement in immigration enforcement has generated alarm in many quarters. But the authorities that Trump might summon—and the hurdles he might face in using them—are not widely understood. This article seeks to identify and elucidate them. Starting with the baseline constraint on military participation in law enforcement, the Posse Comitatus Act, the discussion below sets forth the relevant statutory authorities in escalating order of potency and identifies potential constraints on their use.

This article is intended as both a primer and a reference (i.e., readers can skip to the particular authorities about which they may have questions). The authorities covered may be summarized as follows:

Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code has several provisions allowing federal armed forces (including active-duty forces and federalized National Guard forces) to assist with law enforcement, including through the provision of military facilities and equipment, without directly participating in core law enforcement activities.
A declaration of national emergency under the National Emergencies Act could provide additional resources for military assistance to law enforcement but would not permit federal armed forces to participate in core law enforcement activities.
32 U.S.C. 502(f)(2)(A) allows the president to request (but not require) that governors deploy their states’ National Guard forces to perform certain federal missions, free from the constraints of the Posse Comitatus Act—i.e., Guard forces could participate in core law enforcement activities.
The Insurrection Act, generally regarded as the primary statutory exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, allows the president to federalize National Guard forces and to deploy them and active-duty armed forces anywhere in the country.
The Alien Enemies Act does not itself authorize military deployment, but when combined with the Insurrection Act or other authorities, it could permit the militarized deportation of immigrants lawfully in this country under specified conditions.

More on all of these authorities can be found on the Brennan Center’s “Domestic Deployment of the Military” and “Outdated and Dangerous” webpages.

1. Posse Comitatus Act

What Does It Prohibit?

The Posse Comitatus Act embodies a long Anglo-American tradition against military involvement in civilian affairs. It prohibits federal armed forces from acting “as a posse comitatus or otherwise execut[ing] the laws”—i.e., from participating in civilian law enforcement activities, whether criminal or civil—unless “expressly authorized” by Congress or the Constitution.

The Department of Justice has concluded that the Constitution gives the president the “inherent” power to unilaterally deploy the military for law enforcement purposes in some circumstances—for instance, to protect federal personnel or property. A straightforward reading of the Constitution, however, reveals no express authorization for such deployment. Accordingly, any military action that relies solely on these “inherent” powers should be deemed to violate the Posse Comitatus Act, and should be sustained only if it falls within the president’s “conclusive and preclusive” sphere of authority (per Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer).

What Are the Limitations?

As set out in a recent Brennan Center report, there are multiple exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act and significant gaps in its coverage:

The law applies only to federal armed forces. It does not bind the National Guard unless the Guard has been called into federal service. As discussed below, the National Guard may perform federal missions (such as border security) under Title 32 without being federalized.
Courts have construed the Posse Comitatus Act to prohibit only direct participation in core law enforcement activities, such as arrests, searches, and seizures. A wide range of indirect support to law enforcement—including conducting reconnaissance, sharing intelligence, and providing/maintaining military equipment—remains fair game, even if such support is integral to a law enforcement operation.
Courts also have held that the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to actions that have a primarily military purpose, regardless of any incidental benefits to civilian law enforcement authorities. Trump conceivably could try to invoke this doctrine based on his characterization of unlawful migration as an “invasion.” Any such attempt should fail given the absence of an armed attack by a foreign power (see Alien Enemies Act discussion, below).
There are many statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act—most importantly, the Insurrection Act, discussed below.

2. Title 10 Chapter 15 (Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies)

What Does It Permit?

Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code (which includes the 1981 Military Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act and other authorities) authorizes a range of federal military assistance to law enforcement agencies, but does not authorize direct participation in core law enforcement activities. Most notably:

10 U.S.C. § 272 allows the Secretary of Defense to make available any military equipment, base facility, or research facility to any federal, state, or local civilian law enforcement official for law enforcement purposes.
10 U.S.C. § 273 allows military personnel to provide training to federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement officials in the operation and maintenance of equipment, and to provide expert advice.
10 U.S.C. § 274 allows military personnel to maintain equipment on behalf of federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement, and to operate such equipment in specified situations and for specified purposes.
10 U.S.C. § 284 authorizes certain types of military support for counterdrug activities or activities to counter transnational organized crime of any federal agency or any state, local, tribal, or foreign law enforcement agency. In the case of domestic agencies, the permissible types of support include:
- Maintenance and repair of military equipment;
- Transportation of personnel, supplies, and equipment;
- Establishment and operation of bases of operations or training facilities;
- Training of civilian law enforcement personnel;
- Detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air, land, and sea traffic within 25 miles of the geographic boundaries of the United States;
- Construction of roads and fences and installation of lighting to block drug smuggling corridors across international boundaries;
- Establishment of command, control, communications, and computer networks for improved integration of law enforcement, active military, and National Guard activities;
- Provision of linguist, intelligence analysis, and planning services; and
- Aerial and ground reconnaissance.

These authorities have long been used to enable Department of Defense support of the Department of Homeland Security’s activities at the southern border.

What Are the Limitations/Potential Legal Challenges?

Title 10 Chapter 15 includes an express statement (10 U.S.C. § 275) that its provisions do not authorize military participation in arrests, searches, seizures, or similar activities. In other words, they are not exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act.
Title 10 Chapter 15 also prohibits the provision of support to civilian law enforcement agencies “if the provision of such support will adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States” (10 U.S.C. § 276).
A significant constraint on these authorities is resource availability and funding. Although the Department of Defense has some flexibility to reprogram the funds allocated by Congress, that flexibility is not infinite—and neither are the resources available to be reprogrammed. In a recent Lawfare article, Professor Chris Mirasola adeptly summarized the authorities for, and limitations on, shifting funds within the Department of Defense.

3. Declaration of National Emergency

What Does It Permit?

The National Emergencies Act of 1976 authorizes the president to declare a national emergency. That declaration unlocks enhanced authorities that are set forth in roughly 150 statutory provisions, which the Brennan Center has identified and catalogued. These authorities span almost every area of governance, including military deployment, commerce, transportation, communications, agriculture, and public health.

Trump has indicated that he plans to declare a national emergency, but he has not specified which emergency powers he intends to invoke. (Although his aides reportedly believe an emergency declaration will permit the use of military bases and planes to detain and deport immigrants, military bases and planes would be available without an emergency declaration under Title 10 Chapter 15.) Indeed, it is unclear whether Trump’s advisors have determined—comprehensively and accurately—what authorities might be available. This article will not do that work for them.

Instead, it is instructive to review recent uses of emergency powers for immigration enforcement:

In 2021, President Joe Biden declared a national emergency to address international drug trafficking. In 2023, pursuant to that declaration, Biden invoked 10 U.S.C. § 12302, which allows him to call up members of the reserve components of the armed forces, including the National Guard. At the time, there were already 2,500 federalized National Guard forces assisting the Department of Homeland Security at the border, and they were soon joined by 1,500 active-duty armed forces. It is unclear how many reservists, if any, were mobilized under the emergency declaration.
In 2020, under the national emergency declaration for COVID-19, Trump invoked 19 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(1)(C) to close off a large portion of cross-border traffic. That provision allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to temporarily close, relocate, or modify the services provided by any customs office or port of entry during a national emergency.
In 2019, Trump invoked 10 U.S.C. § 2808 to secure funding for the southern border wall. The law applies during a national emergency “that requires use of the armed forces.” It allows the Secretary of Defense to undertake military construction projects that are necessary to support such use of the armed forces, using unobligated funds appropriated for military construction projects that have been canceled or downgraded. As other observers have noted, Trump might invoke 10 U.S.C. § 2808 again to construct or adapt military bases to serve as immigrant detention facilities.

What Are the Limitations/Potential Legal Challenges?

None of the emergency powers that Trump might invoke authorizes direct participation in core law enforcement activities. Military personnel could not search, arrest, or detain immigrants under a national emergency declaration.
The emergency authorities identified above primarily provide additional resources to carry out activities that are otherwise authorized, rather than expanding substantive powers. Even 19 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(1)(C) is not as significant an expansion of power as it might seem, given that another subparagraph of 19 U.S.C. § 1318 permits the same actions without a national emergency declaration “when necessary to respond to a specific threat to human life or national interests.” Generally speaking, when it comes to immigration enforcement, a national emergency declaration is more likely to serve as a resource amplifier than a way to access broad powers that are otherwise unavailable.
Because the National Emergencies Act includes no definition of “emergency” and no substantive criteria for declaring one, courts will likely be deferential to the president’s judgment that an emergency exists. However, courts can—and do—probe whether the government’s actions are authorized under the specific emergency powers invoked. Most recently, the Supreme Court struck down President Biden’s use of emergency powers (pursuant to the COVID-19 national emergency declaration) to forgive student loan debt.
- During the first Trump administration, some courts struck down Trump’s use of 10 U.S.C. § 2808 to fund the border wall. These rulings were stayed on appeal and the Supreme Court ultimately vacated them when Biden terminated the emergency declaration, but similar challenges will no doubt occur if Trump invokes emergency powers for immigration enforcement. (Robert Taylor, former Acting General Counsel at the Department of Defense, has explained some of the key limitations on the reach of 10 U.S.C. § 2808.)
- The use of 19 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(1)(C) (or the parallel non-emergency provision) to close off the border would be an overreach under the reasoning set forth in the Supreme Court’s student loan decision—i.e., if Congress intended to authorize complete closure of the border, it would have said so specifically, rather than permitting temporary closures of individual ports of entry.

4. Deployment of the National Guard Under Title 32

What Does It Permit?

The National Guard may operate in one of three different statuses:

In “State Active Duty” status, National Guard forces perform state missions with state funding and operate under the command and control of the state’s governor.
In Title 10 or “federalized” status, National Guard forces temporarily become a part of the federal armed forces and operate under the command and control of the president until returned to state status.
In Title 32 or “hybrid” status, National Guard forces perform activities specified by Congress or the federal government and are paid with federal funds, but as a legal matter they remain under the command and control of the state governor.

In Title 32 status, even though Guard forces may be performing a federal mission, they are not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act because they are at least nominally under state command and control. Relevant authorizations under Title 32 include:

32 U.S.C. § 112 authorizes funding for the National Guard to carry out drug interdiction and counter-drug activities that serve a state law enforcement purpose, in accordance with a federally approved state plan.
32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(2)(A) authorizes the National Guard to perform “operations or missions undertaken … at the request of the President or Secretary of Defense.”
32 U.S.C. § 902 authorizes funding for National Guard forces to conduct homeland defense activities approved by the Secretary of Defense. “Homeland defense activities” are defined as activities undertaken for the military protection of U.S. territory, population, or infrastructure from a “threat or aggression” against the United States.

Section 502(f)(A)(2) has played a major role in the increasing militarization of the southern border. Under Presidents George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump, thousands of National Guard forces were deployed under this provision. (Trump also deployed active-duty armed forces; Biden did the same, and he federalized the National Guard forces at the border.) Although National Guard forces in Title 32 status are not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act, they have not directly participated in core law enforcement activities during these deployments. Instead, they have provided support to DHS in the form of surveillance, transportation, provision of equipment, and the erection of barriers.

Trump could seek to expand the use of National Guard forces at the border under Title 32 by involving them directly in the apprehension and detention of migrants. He also could request that governors use their National Guard forces to assist with immigration enforcement in the interior of the country.

What Are the Limitations/Potential Legal Challenges?

State governors, not the president, decide whether to deploy their National Guard troops under Title 32. Under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(2)(A), for instance, the president or Secretary of Defense may “request” deployment of troops for a federal mission, but the governor is free to refuse the request.
- In 2020, Trump requested that 15 governors send their National Guard troops to Washington, D.C. under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(2)(A) to join forces with the D.C. National Guard in quelling protests against the police killing of George Floyd. Eleven governors complied with this request; four declined.
Under Title 32, a governor may not send the state’s National Guard into another state without the latter state’s consent, even to perform a federal mission. Although the issue has not come before the

On the United States, China, and COP29: Assessing the State of International Climate Progress After Baku

Mark Nevitt — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 08:27:47 -0500

The annual climate summit, the 29th session of the United Nations Conference of Parties (COP29), concluded this week in Baku, Azerbaijan. After days of intense negotiations, nearly 200 exhausted nations reached a $300 billion agreement on climate finance. The Baku Agreement, called the “New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance,” stated that developed country Parties would take the lead in providing developing States with “at least $300 billion per year by 2035” for climate action. This fund can be derived from a “wide variety of sources,” including private investment or multilateral development banks loans. The Baku Agreement encourages developing nations to make contributions on a voluntary basis.

The Azerbaijani government immediately characterized the Baku Agreement as a “historical decision,” while activists assailed the deal as inadequate in addressing the needs of climate-vulnerable States. The two-week Baku conference itself was chaotic in contrast to last year’s comparably more organized conference in Dubai. Last year’s COP28 chairman, Emirati Sultan Al Jaber, exhorted the delegates to “work harder, work faster, work smarter” in corralling nearly 200 nations to reach an agreement to transition away from fossil fuels by 2050.

As the dust settles in Baku, international climate progress appears to have lost some of the slow but steady momentum set in motion by the last three COP conferences in Glasgow, Egypt, and Dubai. The Glasgow–Egypt–Dubai trifecta established a novel loss and damage fund and shepherded the first “global stocktake,” an assessment of the international response to climate change, as required by the Paris Agreement. Perhaps most importantly, in Dubai all 195 nations committed to transition away from fossil fuels by 2050, marking the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era.

To be sure, Baku faced significant geopolitical headwinds and, perhaps, any climate agreement was a welcome relief after two intense weeks of negotiation. And Azerbaijan, a petrostate heavily reliant on fossil fuel extraction (with a troubled human rights record to boot) was a controversial choice to host any climate summit. Climate negotiations were further undermined by (1) continual mistrust between wealthy and poorer states over who pays for climate adaptation and loss and damage; (2) fierce pushback from petrostates on firm commitments to transition away from fossil fuels; (3) ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine; and (4) the sobering realities of a forthcoming Trump presidency — an administration that has promised to renege on the United States’ international climate commitments.

Climate Finance: Achieving a Modest Deal on Aid to Developing States

Over 50,000 people flocked to COP29, dubbed the “Finance COP,” in Baku with the hope of making substantive progress on climate finance and building on the muted success of COP28 in Dubai. To achieve these objectives, poorer developing States — which are disproportionately suffering from the effects of climate change — had to firm up commitments from their wealthy, developed counterparts. There were hopes that a new constituted body, the Independent High-Level Expert Group (IHLEG) of Climate Finance, would help achieve a breakthrough sum of $1.3 trillion dollars a year of funding. The Finance Group was tasked to assess the state of the global climate finance system, and to make recommendations to deliver on the specific finance goals set forth in the Paris Agreement. But a comprehensive, finance breakthrough was a challenging proposition under any circumstance. After several rounds of back-and-forth, climate negotiators settled on a far more modest sum of $300 billion dollars per year while calling on all actors to work together to provide $1.3 trillion per year to developing countries by 2035. This financing will pay for a “laundry-list” of climate action items for developing nations. This includes helping them transition from fossil fuels to clean energy, assisting with climate adaptation and resilience, and providing aid for disaster preparation and response.

Ongoing Divisions Between Developed and Developing Nations

The modest climate finance agreement brought to the fore the historic divide between developed and developing nations. As a general matter, developed nations have a higher expectation and firmer legal commitments to aid developing countries. This higher expectation is consistent with the legal principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” between developed and developing nations. There is consequently a strong political incentive for countries to remain characterized as developing in the context of climate commitments.

But how does one make this critical delineation, and who is the final arbiter of developed nation status? The answers to these questions remain unclear, and this uncertainty was on full display in Baku. Thirty years after the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change was negotiated, the international community has failed to reach a consensus on which States are considered developed and developing. The 1992 Framework Convention divides the world between developed nations (known as “Annex nations”) and developing nations (“non-Annex nations”). The United States, Europe, Japan, and other wealthy nations were initially classified as developed in 1992 and clearly possess that status today. But China, India, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil were classified as developing nations in 1992 — does that status still apply in 2024?

Indeed, emissions patterns and who is emitting have changed dramatically since the original Framework Convention was signed. Today, China is the second largest economy in the world, and now emits more greenhouse gas emissions than any other nation by a wide magin. Saudi Arabia is a petrostate whose economy is inextricably linked to fossil fuel extraction. In contrast, Europe and the United States achieved peak emissions in 1979 and 2005, respectively. Clearly, the United States and Europe Union members are developed nations that should pay their fair share, but shouldn’t China or Saudi Arabia be required to chip in?

Tragically, the Framework Convention lacks a clear legal mechanism with clear metrics on when a nation “graduated” from developing to developed status. This inflexibility creates continual friction at the climate negotiation table, as displayed in Baku, when China, India, and other non-Annex nations fought to maintain that status and avoid legally binding commitments.

In a clever — albeit somewhat cynical — diplomatic move, China allied with developing nations in proposing that the United States, Europe, and other large polluters contribute up to $1.3 trillion per year in climate financing. That figure is a non-starter and unrealistic given both geopolitical and energy market realities. With the war raging in Ukraine and Western nations shifting away from Russian oil and gas, Russia has found new fossil fuel markets in India, China, and the developing world. The $1.3 trillion climate finance number was changed to $300 billion per year by 2035. The Baku Agreement’s text merely invites China and other developing countries to make additional contributions. With the ink still drying on this agreement, no one—particularly poorer nations—seems satisfied with this number.

Some 15 years ago, developed nations already committed to pay $100 billion a year towards climate financing. But achieving that more modest goal has proven to be challenging. Even with the ink barely dry on the Baku Agreement, it is unlikely that the incoming Trump administration will embrace any new international climate finance commitments. This is particularly true when the United States is held to a higher standard than China, its leading competitor and “pacing challenge.”

Limited Progress on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels

At last year’s climate summit in Dubai, the international community achieved what was widely perceived to be a breakthrough: all 195 States agreed to transition away from fossil fuels by 2050. Yet since Dubai, the world is collectively pumping more fossil fuels into the atmosphere than at any point in human history. The Paris Agreement’s goal of keeping global temperatures below 1.5 degrees Celsius appears to be out of reach, despite the Baku agreement reaffirming the world’s commitment to achieve it. Indeed, greenhouse gas emissions must fall by 42 percent by 2030 just to have a chance of meeting this Paris Agreement’s benchmark — yet global emissions continue to increase.

China, India, and other nations continue to build new coal-fired power plants, a move out of step with the transformational action needed to avert irreversible, catastrophic climate harm. There is already a widely–known greenhouse gas emissions gap—the difference between current emissions and emissions required to avert irreversible catastrophic harm. Baku highlighted the growing implementation gap that exists between theoretical commitments and actions on the ground. In the runup to Baku, several notable climate leaders — including former Executive Secretary of the Framework Convention on Climate Change Christina Figueres and former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon — urged COP reform and a renewed emphasis on implementation over rhetoric:

28 COPs have delivered us with the policy framework to achieve this. However, its current structure simply cannot deliver the change at exponential speed and scale, which is essential to ensure a safe climate landing for humanity . . . . [w]e need a shift from negotiation to implementation, enabling the COP to deliver on agreed commitments and ensure the urgent energy transition and phase-out of fossil energy.

But timelines, specific goals, and firm implementation commitments were routinely thwarted at Baku. Saudi Arabia, for example, challenged efforts to establish firmer timetables and commitments to reach the transition goals. One attendee labeled Saudi Arabia’s actions as akin to a “being a wrecking ball.”

The Trump Effect at Baku

Baku’s climate negotiations were somewhat reminiscent of the 2016 Conference of Parties held in Marrakesh, Morocco (COP22). COP22 took place after Donald Trump’s 2016 victory over Hillary Clinton, and was also criticized as heavy on rhetoric but light on substantive progress as fossil fuel lobbyists were granted observer status. In a case of déjà vu all over again, Baku shared many commonalities with Morocco.

While China has overtaken the United States as the world’s largest annual emitter, it remains the largest historical greenhouse gas emitter. Despite other countries looking to the United States for climate leadership, Trump has said that he will withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement, similar to his decision in June 2017. The Paris Agreement remains the key international climate agreement that drives future climate negotiations. A possible “Paris withdrawal 2.0” could undermine U.S. leadership, cracking the door open for China and other nations to fill the leadership vacuum. As the largest economy and largest historical emitter, U.S. leadership and participation in international climate negotiations is a virtual prerequisite for substantive climate progress.

Early Edition: December 3, 2024

Weronika Galka — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 08:10:33 -0500

Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the past 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

SYRIA’S REBEL OFFENSIVE

Russia and Iran pledged “unconditional support” for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad yesterday, with Syrian state media reporting that Russian and Syrian fighter jets struck targets in rebel-controlled territory. The strikes killed at least 18 people in Idlib in northern Syria, according to local opposition-run civil defense forces. Vivian Yee reports for the New York Times; Ruth Michaelson reports for the Guardian.

Hundreds of Iran-backed Iraqi militia fighters crossed into Syria yesterday to help the government fend off rebels who seized Aleppo last week, Syrian and Lebanese sources said, adding that Lebanon’s Hezbollah does not currently plan to join the fight. Suleiman Al-Khalidi and Maya Gebeily report for Reuters.

Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed “the escalating situation” in Syria with President Masoud Pezeshkian, the Kremlin said yesterday. Meanwhile, Syria’s opposition leader told Reuters yesterday the Lebanon truce “opened the door” to the rebel offensive in Aleppo. Jonathan Spicer reports.

SYRIA’S REBEL OFFENSIVE — U.S. RESPONSE

The United States and the United Arab Emirates discussed lifting sanctions on Assad if he distances himself from Iran and cuts off Hezbollah weapons routes, sources say. The discussions took place before the start of the current rebel offensive in Aleppo. Maya Gebeily, Parisa Hafezi, and Alexander Cornwell report for Reuters.

ISRAEL-HEZBOLLAH CEASEFIRE

Israel and Hezbollah blamed each other for violating the ceasefire while maintaining they are committed to the agreement after exchanging fire late yesterday. Hezbollah said it fired rockets in a “warning defensive response” to “repeated” ceasefire violations. Israel responded with a round of airstrikes, which killed 11 people, according to Lebanon’s health ministry. Annabelle Timsit and Abbie Cheeseman report for the Washington Post; Barak Ravid reports for Axios.

The Biden administration is worried the Lebanon ceasefire could unravel, with top U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein expressing concern about Israel’s ongoing strikes to Israeli officials over the weekend. Separately, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller yesterday said the United States is “engaging” in a mechanism “to investigate and address reports of violations” of the truce. Barak Ravid reports for Axios; Maya Gebeily and Adam Makary report for Reuters.

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR

The U.N. aid agency for Palestinians (UNRWA) is suspending aid delivery through the main crossing into Gaza because of “breakdown in law and order,” the agency’s head said in a statement on Sunday, blaming Israel for failing to provide a safe passage route. Liam Stack reports for the New York Times.

The Israeli military has expanded its presence in central Gaza in recent months, fortifying military bases and demolishing Palestinian buildings, according to Israeli officials and a New York Times analysis. The move suggests Israel “may be preparing to exert long-term control over the area.” Aaron Boxerman, Aric Toler, Riley Mellen, and Patrick Kingsley report.

An Israeli drone on Saturday shot dead a well-known Palestinian chef who ran one of northern Gaza’s few remaining soup kitchens, according to eyewitnesses. The IDF said it is “still working” on a comment on the incident. Miriam Berger reports for the Washington Post.

Palestinian medics said Israeli bombardment killed at least 25 people in northern Gaza yesterday, in what residents describe as “a campaign to scare people into leaving.” Nidal Al-Mughrabi reports for Reuters.

A U.S. citizen thought to have been held hostage in Gaza since Oct. 7, 2023 was killed on the day of the Hamas-led attacks, the Israeli military said yesterday. Joanna Slater, Annabelle Timsit, and Lior Soroka report for the Washington Post.

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR — U.S. RESPONSE

President-elect Trump yesterday threatened there will be “hell to pay” for those responsible if hostages taken in the Oct. 7 attack are not released before his inauguration in January. Ephrat Livni reports for the New York Times.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

The Pentagon yesterday announced it will send Ukraine an additional $725 million in military assistance, including landmines, drones, anti-aircraft missiles, and anti-tank missiles. John Ismay reports for the New York Times.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

The Senate yesterday voted to approve the promotion of a general who oversaw the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan after Sen. Markwayne Mullin (R-OK) lifted his block. Frank Thorp V reports for NBC News.

Several Democrats criticized President Biden’s decision to pardon Hunter Biden, with Sen Michael Bennet (D-CO) saying he placed “personal interest ahead of duty.” White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre yesterday said Biden decided to issue the pardon as “raw politics infected the process and led to a miscarriage of justice.” MJ Lee, Paula Reid, and Michael Williams report for CNN; Rebecca Shabad and Sarah Dean report for NBC News.

Chinese-made LiDAR sensors could expose the U.S. military to hacking and sabotage during conflict, a Washington think tank said in a report calling for a ban on their use in defense equipment. Stephen Nellis and Michael Martina report for Reuters.

A staffer of Rep. Joe Morelle (D-NY) is no longer employed following an arrest on suspicion of bringing ammunition into a U.S. House office building yesterday, Morelle’s chief of staff said. Andrew Solender reports for Axios.

U.S. PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION AND NEW CONGRESS

Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY) yesterday offered to cooperate with Republicans in considering Trump’s cabinet choices if the G.O.P. adheres to traditional Senate vetting standards. Carl Hulse reports for the New York Times.

Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) urged Biden and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to issue a policy directive that could temporarily limit Trump’s ability to deploy U.S. military troops domestically. Courtney Kube reports for NBC News.

GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

The French government is teetering on the brink of collapse after both left- and right-wing opposition parties filed no-confidence motions following Prime Minister Michel Barnier’s use of special powers to force through his budget without a parliamentary vote. Laura Gozzi and Amy Walker report for BBC News.

Police arrested a prominent Georgian opposition leader yesterday amid ongoing protests over the government’s decision to suspend EU accession talks. The Guardian reports via Reuters.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania yesterday imposed sanctions on Georgia’s ruling officials, citing the violent crackdown on anti-government protesters in Tbilisi. Dato Parulava reports for POLITICO.

The International Court of Justice yesterday began hearing evidence in a major case on governments’ legal responsibilities concerning climate change, with the court’s opinion expected in 2025. Matt McGrath reports for Reuters.

The International Criminal Court president yesterday said that threats facing the institution “jeopardise its very existence,” pointing to possible U.S. sanctions and Russian warrants for staff members. Anthony Deutsch and Stephanie van den Berg report for Reuters.

The Brussels Court of Appeal yesterday found the Belgian state guilty of “crimes against humanity” for kidnappings of mixed-race children in Congo under colonial rule. Ketrin Jochecová reports for POLITICO.

Extremist rebels linked to the self-styled Islamic State group in eastern Congo killed at least 10 people and abducted an unspecified number of others, a military spokesperson said yesterday. Jean-Yves Kamale reports for AP News.

Swedish prosecutors yesterday charged three men with preparing a terrorist crime in the name of the Islamic State group in Sweden. Anna Ringstrom reports for Reuters.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Biden administration yesterday announced new restrictions on the exports of semiconductor chips and chip-making equipment to China. Ellen Nakashima and Eva Dou report for the Washington Post.

The post Early Edition: December 3, 2024 appeared first on Just Security.

New Report Documents Russia’s Systematic Program of Coerced Adoption and Fostering of Ukraine’s Children

Oona A. Hathaway — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 07:29:32 -0500

(Editor’s Note: The authors contributed to the legal analysis in the report described in this article and consulted with Yale University School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab throughout the report’s preparation.)

Today, the Yale School of Public Health Humanitarian Research Lab released a new report detailing evidence of Russia’s system of coerced deportation and naturalization, reeducation, fostering, and adoption of Ukrainian children. The researchers at the Humanitarian Research Lab – which uses open-source information to document humanitarian crises throughout the world – drew on a variety of sources, including commercially available satellite imagery, verified open-source media, Russia’s own child placement databases, and Russian government documents and communications. Based on this information, the researchers identified 314 individual Ukrainian children that Russian officials transferred from Ukraine to Russia for coerced adoption and fostering, acts that constitute grave violations of international law.

In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for the war crimes of unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children against Russian President Vladimir Putin and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova. The new Humanitarian Research Lab report adds evidence that the Russian Federation has engaged in the systematic, intentional, and widespread coerced adoption and fostering of children from Ukraine. The evidence could lead to additional charges against Putin, Lvova-Belova, and other officials involved in the extensive forced relocation program for war crimes and crimes against humanity. While the acts described in the report likely would not provide the sole basis for criminal charges of genocide, the report’s findings could, together with additional evidence, support a broader case of genocide. The actions also likely violate Russia’s obligations as a State Party to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

New Details on the Coerced Deportation of Children from Ukraine to Russia

The new report builds on the Humanitarian Research Lab’s prior report, released on Feb. 14, 2023, describing the Russian effort to carry out the systematic deportation of Ukraine’s children. (The February 2023 report was followed in November 2023 by a report on Belarus’ collaboration with Russia.) The February 2023 report found that more than 6,000 children between the ages of four months and 17 years had been transported to 43 Russian-operated camps and facilities since the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022. The transferred children underwent political reeducation and in some cases were prevented from returning to Ukraine. The February 2023 report was almost immediately followed by ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan’s announcement that the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC had approved arrest warrants for Putin and Lvova-Belova – the first warrants issued in the ICC investigation into the situation in Ukraine.

Today’s report is among the most detailed and comprehensive public efforts taken to date to track Ukrainian children subject to Russia’s systematic deportation. It offers new details tracing the framework of governmental actions, laws, procedures, and systems that have enabled Russia to relocate children from Ukraine to Russia in a targeted program of coerced adoption and fostering of those children with Russian citizens.

The report identifies and chronicles the experiences of 314 individual Ukrainian children subject to Russia’s program of relocation, guardianship, adoption, and fostering. It tracks their passage from the occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (regions) to midpoint locations in Russia before they were placed with Russian citizens or placed in institutions and listed on Russia’s adoption databases. It shows that Russian Federation-flagged military transport planes under the direct control of Putin’s office transported groups of children from Ukraine. It describes how Russian Federation-controlled databases obfuscated Ukrainian children’s identities, including their nationality, in order to facilitate their placement with Russian families and to conceal the government’s program of coerced adoption and fostering. The Yale Humanitarian Research Lab team created dossiers of each child identified in the report containing detailed identification for the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).

Legal Significance of the Report’s Findings

This latest report has substantial implications for ongoing and future legal accountability efforts seeking to address Russian-perpetrated atrocities in Ukraine. The findings could position the ICC Prosecutor to levy additional charges against Putin, Lvova-Belova, and other Russian officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity. (The ICC has jurisdiction over the situation in Ukraine, because Ukraine accepted the Court’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed on Ukrainian territory with two declarations in April 2014 and September 2015.) The details presented in the report also may provide evidence that could, together with additional evidence, support a broader case of genocide. The unlawful actions also likely constitute violations of Russia’s obligations as a State Party to the CRC.

War Crimes

The ICC has already issued arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova for the war crimes of unlawful deportation of a population (children) and unlawful transfer of a population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. This report provides new and more detailed evidence to support those charges. It also potentially subjects additional Russian officials involved in the unlawful deportation detailed in the report to war crimes charges.

The 1949 Geneva Conventions (GCs) and their Additional Protocols (APs) established an extensive framework of rules and protections intended to limit the collateral effects of armed conflict and protect civilians not participating in hostilities. These protections include a prohibition on the forced movement, transfer, or deportation of civilians in international armed conflicts – subject to limited exceptions under international law. Codifying these principles, the Rome Statute – the treaty that created and governs the ICC – establishes the corresponding war crime of “unlawful deportation or transfer” (Article 8(2)(a)(vii)) under ICC jurisdiction.

The war crime of “unlawful deportation or transfer” involves five elements: (1) The perpetrator deported or transferred one or more persons to another State or to another location; (2) such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; (3) the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status; (4) the conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict; and (5) the perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict. As detailed in the new report, the Russian Federation’s systematic transfer of Ukrainian children to Russian territory to undergo a targeted program of coerced reeducation, fostering, and adoption meets all five elements.

According to the report, Russia has seized at least 314 children in Ukraine. Russia collaborated with occupation authorities to then transfer these children to Russia to place them with citizens of Russia or in State-run institutions where they were later listed on Russian adoption databases. The Ukrainian children in Russian custody qualify as “protected persons” as established by Article 4 of GCIV, which defines protected persons as those persons who “find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.” The targeted program of coerced reeducation, fostering, and adoption took place in the context of the international armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and the officials involved in the program were aware of those circumstances.

The report found that once the children were in Russia, the Kremlin refused to release critical identification information for the children to authorities, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross’ Central Tracing Agency (CTA), and deliberately concealed the children’s national identities. This refusal grossly violates the API Article 78(3) prescription requiring the transmission of identification information to the CTA. The intentional obfuscation of critical identification information and the naturalization of Ukrainian children further contributes to the war crime of unlawful transfer or deportation by facilitating the permanent relocation and absorption of Ukraine’s children into Russia during an international armed conflict – actions undertaken with the Russian perpetrators’ awareness of the children’s protected status within the context of an international armed conflict.

While international law permits narrow exceptions to the prohibition on non-consensual transfers during armed conflict, such as allowing parties to evacuate children for “compelling reasons” of health or medical treatment, Russia’s actions do not fulfill the requirements for these exceptions. By forcibly transferring Ukrainian children into Russian systems of reeducation and coerced adoption and fostering, the Russian government has failed to uphold its legal obligations to relocate the separated children to a neutral country and to prevent family separations in cases where guardians are known – two parameters required by GCIV Articles 24 and 49 as well as API Article 78 (to which Russia and Ukraine are State Parties) for permissible temporary child evacuations.

Moreover, international law requires that the occupying power arrange for the continuation of separated children’s education during evacuations “as far as possible” by “persons of a similar cultural tradition” (GCIV Article 24). The parties must also refrain from changing the child’s personal status, including her or his nationality (GCIV Article 50). In addition, all relocations must be intended to be temporary. The Russian institutions that received Ukrainian children have subjected the children to pro-Russian reeducation programs with the goal of “Russification.” This, in combination with Russia’s naturalization of Ukrainian children to erase their national identity and enable their permanent placement with Russian families, flagrantly contravenes GCIV’s safeguards in cases of permitted child evacuations.

Crimes Against Humanity

Russia is prohibited under customary international law from committing crimes against humanity and its officials are liable for any such crimes committed in Ukraine under the Rome Statute. The United Nations General Assembly, through the endorsement of international legal principles recognized by the Nuremberg Tribunal, and the International Law Commission have incorporated the crime against humanity of deportation as a principle of customary international law. Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity to include the “deportation or forcible transfer of population” if “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” The crime includes the “forced displacement” of people “by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present without grounds permitted under international law.”

The ICC evaluates five elements to determine whether the crime against humanity of deportation or forcible transfer of population has been committed: (1) The perpetrator deported or forcibly transferred, without grounds permitted under international law, one or more persons to another State or location, by expulsion or other coercive acts; (2) such person or persons were lawfully present in the area from which they were so deported or transferred; (3) the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the lawfulness of such presence; (4) the conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population; and (5) the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. As today’s report explains, Russia’s actions meet all five of these elements.

First, Russia has forcibly transferred children through coercive acts without grounds permitted under international law. According to the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, forcible transfer includes both physical force and the “threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment.” The report details 314 children, the majority of which have been taken from institutions in occupied regions and put into Russia’s foster and adoption system. It also reveals how, through coercion and duress, Russia has encouraged and orchestrated the movement of hundreds of Ukrainian children to Russia or Russian-occupied territory. As explained above, despite Russian posturingas a benevolent actor promoting child welfare, there are no grounds under international law that permit Russia’s coerced transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia.

The second and third elements of the crime against humanity of forced population transfer require that the Ukrainian children were lawfully present in the area from which they were deported or transferred; and that the Russian actors involved were aware that their presence was lawful. According to the report, the 314 children deported were Ukrainian citizens and lawfully residing within Ukraine. The Humanitarian Research Lab assessed to a high degree of confidence that these children were from Ukraine and that Russian federal government officials were aware of their Ukrainian origin by reviewing official statements and documents, including public records from Russian adoption databases. Other public actions confirm that those who orchestrated the transfer acted knowingly, including Putin’s decree to expedite and simplify the naturalization of Ukrainian children after government officials identified naturalization as the biggest barrier to adoption by Russian families.

The fourth and fifth elements of the crime require that Russia’s conduct was committed – and that Russian officials knew it was committed – as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. The transfer of the children took place during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, and it was part of a program of widespread or systematic attacks directed against Ukrainian civilians. The program of coerced transfer of children was also itself widespread or systematic, as documented in the report. An extensive Russian bureaucracy created and carried out a program that transferred Ukrainian children to Russia for adoption and fostering with citizens of Russia. That program was facilitated by Russian legal and policy changes designed to enable and expedite the program.

Genocide

Genocide is prohibited by customary international law, the United Nations Genocide Convention, and the Rome Statute, all of which apply to Russia for its actions in Ukraine. As the Internation

From Chinese Patriot to American Spy: The Unusual Life of John Leung

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Trump’s Legal Battles Over Jan. 6 Are Still Alive and Relevant

Adam Klasfeld — Mon, 02 Dec 2024 09:16:23 -0500

President-elect Donald Trump’s electoral victory and its legal aftermath placed an asterisk next to the expression: “No one is above the law.” In the wake of the dismissal of his federal election subversion and classified documents cases, the public and Trump himself will almost certainly never see how jurors would have decided whether he was guilty of the federal crimes charged. That makes the proposition that presidents are not above criminal law dubious at best.

The same does not necessarily hold true for ongoing civil suits or for jurors in those cases who may sit in judgment of President Trump for his efforts to overturn the 2020 election. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long held that a sitting president may be subject to civil lawsuits while in office, and Trump is the defendant in several civil cases alleging wrongdoing for trying to deprive citizens of their votes and for the Capitol riot. Civil lawsuits do not risk imprisonment, but they could result in significant financial awards and in establishing an authoritative record of the events on and around Jan. 6.

Unlike criminal cases, the Jan. 6-related civil lawsuits operate outside the reach of Trump’s pardon power or the Justice Department’s jurisdiction (with one caveat, which we discuss below).*

A Reckoning on “Incitement”

The president-elect is named as a defendant in at least five lawsuits involving Jan. 6th. D.C. District Court Judge Amit Mehta consolidated four of those cases, and D.C. District Court Judge Tanya Chutkan is presiding separately over another.

Among the first four, Rep. Bennie Thompson of Mississippi fired the opening volley. Then, Rep. Barbara Lee of California took over as lead plaintiff after Thompson withdrew from the case, in order to chair the House Select Committee Investigating the Jan. 6 Attacks. Other than Trump, the remaining co-defendants in this case include the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers, far-right paramilitary organizations, and Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio. Rep. Eric Swalwell of California compounded Trump’s possible liabilities by filing a similar lawsuit. The former president’s son Donald Trump Jr., Rep. Mo Brooks, and Rudy Giuliani were dismissed as defendants from both of the lawmaker-led cases.

Two groups of U.S. Capitol Police officers followed, blaming their injuries on Trump. Officer James Blassingame, then a 17-year veteran of the force and a Black man, filed the first of these police-led lawsuits, which described the racist abuse, violence and trauma that he suffered holding back the mob from the Capitol. Blassingame’s lawsuit named Trump as the sole defendant. Officer Conrad Smith, who is also Black, led a group of seven plaintiffs in a related lawsuit, which also sued Trump campaign entities, paramilitary organizations and their members, and other individuals as defendants. Though the lawsuits’ claims and the defendants vary, Trump broadly stands accused of neglect, conspiring to interfere with civil rights, and violating the Ku Klux Klan Act, a Reconstruction-era law originally drafted to deter white supremacist groups from interfering with the civil rights of freed slaves. In 2022, Judge Mehta refused to dismiss the first four cases, in a ruling that went farther than even Trump’s criminal cases in holding him directly responsible for the violent assault on the U.S. Capitol.

In Trump’s federal election subversion indictment, Special Counsel Jack Smith sidestepped potentially thorny First Amendment issues by refraining from alleging that the then-president incited the Jan. 6 insurrection. Instead, Smith leveled four charges that focused more narrowly on Trump’s multi-state false electors scheme and the pressure campaign on Vice President Mike Pence to count those fraudulent electoral votes: conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding, obstructing an official proceeding, and violating a Reconstruction-era civil rights law, drafted originally to protect formerly enslaved people through criminal sanction. The consolidated civil cases against Trump, by contrast, directly accused the former president of inciting the violent mob to descend upon congressional certification of Joe Biden’s electoral victory, and Judge Mehta found those claims plausible.

“Having considered the President’s January 6 Rally Speech in its entirety and in context, the court concludes that the President’s statements that, ‘[W]e fight. We fight like hell and if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore,’ and ‘[W]e’re going to try to and give [weak Republicans] the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country,’ immediately before exhorting rally-goers to ‘walk down Pennsylvania Avenue,’ are plausibly words of incitement not protected by the First Amendment,” Mehta wrote in 112-page opinion. “It is plausible that those words were implicitly ‘directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and [were] likely to produce such action.’”

In making that finding, Mehta had quoted the Supreme Court’s strict test for incitement in the landmark case of Brandenberg v. Ohio — that is, a finding that Trump intended his rally speech to provoke “imminent lawless action.” In his defense, Trump and his supporters have focused on his disclaimer that rallygoers should “peacefully and patriotically make [their] voices heard,” but Mehta found that Trump’s “passing reference” to a more peaceful approach did not “inoculate” from liability alleged incitement in the same speech nearly an hour later. The Brandenberg test remains a demanding one, and Trump will be able to raise his First Amendment defenses again on a motion for summary judgment — and eventually, perhaps, to a federal jury and appellate courts.

[Editor’s note: Readers may also be interested in Tom Joscelyn, Norman L. Eisen and Fred Wertheimer, Dissecting Trump’s “Peacefully and Patriotically” Defense of the January 6th Attack (Feb. 8, 2024)]

The Standout Jan. 6 Civil Case

On a separate track inside the same courthouse, Judge Chutkan has been hearing the civil case that’s most similar to the criminal case over which she formerly presided: Michigan Welfare Rights Organization v. Trump. Civil rights groups and voters first filed that lawsuit long before the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol, but shortly after Trump started his effort to invalidate the 2020 election results. The original complaint accused Trump of violating the Voting Rights Act through a conspiracy targeting areas with large Black populations with bogus fraud claims, particularly in Detroit, Michigan. The NAACP later joined an amended version of that lawsuit, which broadened the focus nationally and also included a claim under the KKK Act. The named defendants also include the Trump 2020 presidential campaign and the Republican National Committee.

Like the four consolidated cases, Michigan Welfare Rights Organization alleges that Trump incited the attack on the U.S. Capitol, but it also alleges a violation of the Voting Rights Act that shows the attack’s pre-Jan. 6 origins. In 2023, attorneys for the plaintiffs emphasized that their lawsuit involved more than speech, including “coercive actions to block vote counting in tightly contested states, threatening state and local election officials to prevent certifying election results, and baselessly challenging the validity of legally cast ballots.” Trump’s legal team argued that this was First Amendment-protected activity.

Next steps

Chutkan has not yet ruled on Trump and his co-defendants’ pending motions to dismiss the most recent complaint, and as a result, this case may be the farthest away from a trial. But Chutkan, in Trump’s criminal case, and Mehta, in Oath Keepers-related criminal cases, have worked quickly, and they likely will continue to maintain a speedy docket in the civil cases, buoyed by the substantial experience and familiarity that they have accrued about the facts and legal issues related to the litigation.

The civil cases could get more wind in their sails or turbulence soon in the form of Special Counsel Jack Smith’s final report on Trump’s criminal cases, which will explain both his charging and declination decisions. Throughout the Jan. 6 criminal investigations, evidence has emerged about the roles groups like the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys played in the riots — and their ties to Trump and his associates. Prosecutors did not accuse Trump of conspiring with these paramilitary groups to attack the U.S. Capitol, conduct that would amount to a criminal conspiracy, not protected speech. The civil cases, however, do include an element of that conspiracy. Smith’s report may show whether prosecutors did not make that allegation because evidence of such a conspiracy did not exist, or alternatively, whether they believed they could not prove such collusion beyond a reasonable doubt. That distinction could prove crucial in a civil case, in which the burden of proof is the lower standard of preponderance of the evidence. The same implications may arise in how Smith’s report addresses why he declined to charge Trump with incitement – with the reasoning favoring one party in the civil litigation or the other.

During the Oath Keepers’ criminal trials, prosecutors showed that the group’s leader Stewart Rhodes tried to communicate with Trump through an intermediary, a U.S. military veteran named Jason Alpers, at a meeting at a garage in Texas. Rhodes, in a recorded conversation, tried to persuade Alpers to convince Trump to invoke the Insurrection Act in the effort to overturn Biden’s victory. Alpers, who later cooperated with prosecutors, testified that he never passed on the message to Trump. Evidence also showed that the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys both had extensive ties to Trump loyalist Roger Stone, who adamantly denied any role in the attack on the U.S. Capitol. Stone has never been charged or publicly identified by Smith with any role in Trump’s attempted subversion of the 2020 election. One of the Capitol police-led civil lawsuits includes Stone, among several others, as a named defendant.

Attorneys for Trump and the plaintiffs did not respond to emails requesting comment.

The Immunity Question

At first glance, any civil immunity Trump could hope for may be narrow. On Dec. 1, 2023, a three-judge panel from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Trump could be sued for allegedly inciting the attack on the Capitol, as long as he engaged in that incitement in his private capacity as an office-seeking candidate rather than in his official capacity as an office-holding president.

As U.S. Circuit Judge Sri Srinivasan wrote, “[w]hen a first-term President opts to seek a second term, his campaign to win re-election is not an official presidential act.” Srinivasan explained, “The Office of the Presidency as an institution is agnostic about who will occupy it next. And campaigning to gain that office is not an official act of the office.”

The D.C. Circuit expressed no opinion about whether Trump’s speech on the Ellipse on the morning of January 6, 2021 was official under its test. But the panel rejected Trump’s maximalist view of his immunity, and the Supreme Court’s majority in Trump v. U.S. approvingly cited the D.C. Circuit’s test for civil immunity in fashioning the high court’s own criminal immunity for some of Trump’s conduct. In light of these previous opinions, the ground for advancing the lawsuits against Trump, for now, appears firm.

Even here, however, Trump has some levers to pull from the presidency. Trump’s Department of Justice may attempt to intervene on his behalf on the grounds of Westfall Act immunity, a maneuver that would substitute the United States federal government for him as a defendant in cases involving the president’s official acts in office. The Justice Department took this position in E. Jean Carroll’s first defamation lawsuit, which held Trump liable for his insulting comments about her at a press conference. The DOJ argued that the president’s duty includes responding to allegations against him to the press, but Judge Lewis Kaplan rejected Trump’s immunity claims, setting off litigation in three courts about what counts as official conduct.

If Trump’s DOJ were to make a similar argument about his alleged 2020 election subversion, it would be a startling reversal. The Justice Department has previously taken the opposite position in relation to Trump’s criminal cases in multiple venues, and there is no guarantee that a court would accept it. The DOJ declined to assert that Rep. Brooks, a Trump loyalist, was entitled to Westfall Act immunity for his own speech at the Ellipse rally, and Brooks was dismissed as a co-defendant in Jan. 6-related civil cases on other grounds. Even if Trump succeeded in substituting the U.S. government for himself as a party, the cases could proceed in court without personal liability for himself, but merely litigating the issue would help succeed in a time-honored playbook for Trump avoiding liabilities: delay.

The 235-Year History of ‘No Man Is Above the Law’—and Its Dismantling

These Jan. 6-related civil cases could provide a test for what levers of accountability still remain for a U.S. president, more than 235 years after the ratification of the U.S. Constitution.

In 1787, in a speech to the Pennsylvania Convention, one of the Constitution’s framers, James Wilson, emphasized his view of what would distinguish the President of the United States from the recently overthrown British king: “[F]ar from being above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character as a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment.” In every century that followed, the Supreme Court echoed those words, in rhetoric if not in practice. In 1882, the Supreme Court expressed the concept this way in United States v. Lee, a case involving the heir of Confederate general Robert E. Lee’s wife: “No man in this country is so high that he is above the law.” In 1997, then-Justice John Paul Stevens quoted Wilson’s words in Clinton v. Jones, establishing that a sitting president is not immune from civil liability for private conduct.

The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision resoundingly affirmed that then-President Bill Clinton could not avoid the sexual harassment civil lawsuit filed by Paula Jones, simply because he was then in the White House.

The Supreme Court’s precedent in Clinton v. Jones proved pivotal for allowing major lawsuits filed against Trump during his first term to proceed, including the dual ones leading to writer E. Jean Carroll’s sexual abuse and defamation judgments totaling $88.3 million. Those awards remain on appeal, and they will likely be adjudicated during Trump’s second term.

Why the 2020 Election Interference Civil Cases Matter

Over the past two centuries, statements of presidential accountability to U.S. laws have gone from credible to doubtful.

At its high water mark, the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in United States v. Nixon released the tapes that sank a presidency, but the post-Watergate era brought new precedents narrowing the circumstances under which a president could be held liable. In 1982, (Editor’s Note: The authors discuss the crimes against humanity treaty developments on the Just Security Podcast here.)

On Friday, Nov. 22, 2024, the United Nations Sixth (Legal) Committee took a pivotal decision to advance toward negotiations on a global treaty regarding the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity. The move is the latest in a series of discussions that has taken place over the past six years and brings States one step closer to finally closing the nearly 80-year-old gap in international law to comprehensively address these grave crimes.

We have been tracking this process together since 2021 in a Just Security series on the potential draft treaty, and in a recent article we chronicled the discussions in October 2024 that preceded this decision. The Crimes Against Humanity Initiative, an effort to analyze the need for a comprehensive treaty and define its elements, directed by one of us (Leila Sadat) has also published a comprehensive report each year cataloging State responses to the proposed treaty. We have observed that over the years, State support for the negotiation of a new treaty has consistently grown as the need for the new legal instrument has become increasingly and painfully evident. With a decision made, we’ll look what it took (and what was lost) to adopt a resolution on the basis of consensus, the process established by the resolution, and the road ahead.

Getting to Decision Day

In September 2024, Mexico and Gambia, as co-facilitators, circulated a zero-draft, meaning a first proposal, of a resolution entitled “United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity” with a view to advancing the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity (the Draft Articles) to treaty negotiations. The zero draft envisaged a streamlined process whereby a Preparatory Committee (Prep Comm) would meet in 2025 to discuss the organization and methods of work of the Conference, which would then be held in 2026 for a three-week period.

After several weeks of extensive negotiations, the text was amended twice. The first time, States agreed to expand the timeline for negotiations and the process by convening a Working Group of the Conference in 2025 to “facilitate consultation on the draft articles, and to enable Governments to prepare formal proposals for amendments” for consideration at the Conference, followed by a Prep Comm in 2026 and treaty negotiations to follow in 2027. Negotiations continued and on Friday, Nov. 15, Mexico and the Gambia as co-facilitators uploaded what they believed to be a final draft (the L.2 Rev.1 draft) of the resolution with 93 co-sponsors. This text expanded the negotiation process to four years, with the Prep Comm meeting for two sessions in 2026, followed by two, three-week negotiations to take place in early 2027 and 2028. The Working Group was retained and would meet for the entirety of the first session of the two Prep Comms in January 2026. The resolution continued to provide for robust civil society participation, although some States were exerting pressure on the co-sponsors to reduce that participation.

Following the tabling of this resolution, work continued among the co-sponsors and other States to develop consensus. As we have noted elsewhere, the consensus tradition of the Sixth Committee, by which any State can block action on a text by refusing to join a resolution taking it forward, is an anomaly in the United Nations where voting is the norm, and has often resulted in blocking projects from moving forward. Indeed, it had blocked the Draft Articles from advancing since 2019. Insistent on maintaining the consensus requirement, the Russian Federation, joined by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Nicaragua formally tabledhostile amendments to the L.2 Rev.1 draft which, among other things, would have kept the Draft Articles in limbo by continuing to debate them in a working group of the Sixth Committee which would meet for three years to “identify the points of convergence and prepare a widely acceptable draft text of a potential convention.” These amendments were unacceptable to the co-sponsors. A Chair compromise proposal, which weakened the draft considerably, was then advanced to try to bridge the gap, which Russia and its allies rejected, not once, but twice. This compromise text again extended the timeline, this time to 2029, and convened the Preparatory Committee to begin in 2026, with the Working Group to meet for the entire first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee and reducing civil society participation by emphasizing the inter-governmental nature of the Conference, deleting a key paragraph on participation and curtailing a provision allowing civil society to address the Conference.

The Weaponization of Consensus

On Friday morning, Nov. 22, the agenda reflected the decision of the co-sponsors and co-facilitators to move forward with their own text, and not the Chair’s compromise text which was considerably weaker. Understanding that there seemed to be no realistic possibility of achieving consensus, a recorded vote had been requested on both the Russian amendments and the draft resolution.

Gambia, who alongside Mexico had been leading this process since 2022, introduced document L.2/Rev. 1, opening the topic with a powerful and moving speech that emphasized the urgency and importance of moving forward to negotiations, and underscoring that over the last two months, that all efforts to reach consensus had been exhausted. The Russian Federation was then given the floor to introduce its amendments. Rather than doing so, it upended the meeting by requesting that the meeting be suspended so that delegates could try to reach consensus on the Chair’s compromise text (that it had already rejected “many times”). Mexico, armed with the rules of U.N. General Assembly procedure, immediately called for a vote on the suspension under Rule 118, which provides that motions to suspend or adjourn a meeting “shall not be debated but shall be immediately put to the vote.” At this point the Committee Chair temporary suspended the meeting in order to consult with the Secretariat and delegations on the way forward. Eventually a decision was made to move on to other items of the Sixth Committee’s agenda, while delegations engaged informally to see if consensus could in fact be achieved.

After several hours of meetings (by WhatsApp message, virtually, and in person), and as the Committee returned for an unplanned afternoon session, it seemed at several junctures that an agreement had been reached. However, even as delegates were sending the message that a compromise had been reached and “white smoke” had appeared, Russia again threw the meeting into chaos by saying it needed instructions from Moscow before joining the text. Many States and civil society organizations perceived this as a sign of bad faith, which unified the co-sponsors, who then quickly reached a consensus resolution by incorporating some elements of the Chair’s compromise text into the L.2/Rev.1 draft. The resolution was gaveled in and adopted around 5 p.m., without a vote, to sustained applause. Russia withdrew its amendments and dissociated from the resolution. The Sixth Committee’s decision will likely be ratified by the General Assembly plenary on Dec. 4, in a process that we largely expect to be a formality.

Following the adoption of the resolution, which was supported by 99 co-sponsoring States, several States expressed their excitement, relief, and joy to finally be moving forward, including States like Eritrea, Iran, and Singapore that had not been supportive of the Draft Articles in earlier meetings. While most of the explanations after the vote were positive, the Czech Republic argued that the Sixth Committee had been “held hostage” by the Russian Federation’s evocation of consensus and compromise, which it had advanced in “bad faith.” And indeed, the drive for consensus resulted in long and exhausting negotiations that produced a text that was weaker than the zero draft, although given the aspiration of a treaty that will achieve universality, the fact that 192 States supported it was extraordinary and augers well for future negotiations (which will attempt to achieve consensus but will not be bound by it).

The Resolution

The resolution that was finally adopted provides for two Prep Comm meetings, one from Jan. 19-30, 2026, and for four days in 2027. The Prep Comm is tasked with two key areas of work. First, to discuss and decide upon the organization and methods of work of the Conference, including the rules of procedure, as well as deciding on the modalities of the participation of NGOs that do not have accreditation from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and other stakeholders. Second, a Working Group to facilitate discussions and amendment proposals will meet for the entirety of the first Prep Comm session. In addition, following the first Prep Comm, States will have until April 30, 2026, to submit proposals for amendments to the Draft Articles to be included in the U.N. Secretary General’s compiled text. These meetings will precede treaty negotiations, now to be held in 2028 and 2029.

Significantly while the zero draft and L.2/Rev.1 included robust language on civil society participation, a last-minute deletion of this language kicks the can down the road on who will be able to participate and how. It should be noted that NGOs accredited by ECOSOC are not affected by this change.

Key Issues for Future Negotiations

A long road lies ahead, and it will be essential to keep up the momentum over this period, and to remain vigilant to ensure that provisions that were added at the last-minute, including a potential delay tactic on the timeline (“unless agreed by the Preparatory Committee”) as well as potential limits discussed above on broad, diverse and meaningful civil society participation.

Timeline

While not ideal, a longer timeline does give the opportunity for States and civil society to meaningfully reflect on the complex legal issues implicated by the treaty, engage in discussion and debate, and develop proposals to ensure that the strongest possible convention is adopted. This can include the production of expert briefs on key issues, including issues of treaty design and definitions of crimes, and intersessional meetings hosted by States and other institutions on key themes. This is envisaged by the text which encourages Conference participants to “organize consultations on issues of substance, prior to the convening of the Conference.”

Civil Society Engagement and Participation

Even as civil society engagement with the treaty process has continued to grow over the last few years, there is a need to build an inclusive and diverse civil society coalition to see the treaty over the finish line. This should include a particular focus on ensuring that those who have often been excluded from such negotiations and processes – including most importantly victims, survivors, and members of affected communities – are meaningfully included. The provision deleted at the last-minute noted the importance of transparency, equitable geographical representation, and gender parity. Even if deleted from the text itself, these principles can and should guide civil society coalition development and action. Civil society infrastructure and resourcing will also need to be built up and reinforced to ensure sustainable engagement.

Civil society will also need to stay vigilant against efforts to curtail participation during the Prep Comms. Certain States have repeatedly used the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs to unfairly block the accreditation of certain types of NGOs or those working in particular geographies; the same could come to bear here. This connection also reinforces the problem with the resolution only explicitly permitting the participation of those who have been able to make it through the arduous process of obtaining ECOSOC accreditation. Civil society has been an essential partner to States and the International Law Commission throughout this process, and their meaningful participation is essential to the successful elaboration of a treaty.

The Way Forward

The adoption of the resolution to convene a diplomatic conference for the negotiation and conclusion of a new treaty on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity is an extraordinary achievement. For the first time in nearly 20 years, the Sixth Committee showed its willingness to vote, if need be, to advance an important product of the International Law Commission and to engage in the progressive development and codification of international law as mandated by Article 13 of the U.N. Charter. In a world wracked by war, despair, and grave crimes, the Sixth Committee’s dramatic finish represented a recommitment – by the entire world – to the values of peace and justice that the United Nations was established to promote.

IMAGE: The United Nations Headquarters, in New York city, on Oct. 18, 2023. (Photo by DANIEL SLIM/AFP via Getty Images)

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Early Edition: December 2, 2024

Beatrice Yahia — Mon, 02 Dec 2024 08:00:35 -0500

Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the over the weekend. Here’s today’s news:

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

President Biden yesterday issued a “full and unconditional” pardon for his son Hunter Biden, who was set to be sentenced this month on federal gun and tax convictions. In a statement, Biden reversed his long-standing pledge that he would not grant such reprieve, saying, “Politics has infected this process and it led to a miscarriage of justice.” Following the announcement, Hunter Biden asked the federal judges overseeing his criminal cases to dismiss them. BBC News reports; Zach Schonfeld reports for The Hill.

A whistleblower report and other documents suggest President-elect Trump’s defense secretary nominee, Pete Hegseth, was forced to step down from two previous leadership positions “in the face of serious allegations of financial mismanagement, sexual impropriety, and personal misconduct.” Jane Mayer reports for the New Yorker.

A former D.C. police lieutenant will stand trial in federal court today, accused of improperly warning Proud Boys leader Henry Tarrio about his impending arrest ahead of the Jan. 6 Capitol riots and lying to investigators about their communications. Spencer S. Hsu, Peter Hermann, and Tom Jackman report for the Washington Post.

At least six Democratic lawmakers, including four from Connecticut, said they were targeted with bomb threats over the Thanksgiving holiday. Police are investigating any potential connections to the treats sent to Trump officials last week, sources told CNN. Zachary Cohen and Holmes Lybrand report.

SYRIA’S REBEL OFFENSIVE

After capturing much of Aleppo on Saturday in a surprise offensive, rebel forces in Syria led by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham captured the city’s airport yesterday, posing the most serious challenge to President Bashar al-Assad in years. Local officials and a British war monitor say the rebels now control a broad stretch of land across the Hama, Idlib, and Aleppo provinces. Muhammed Haj Kadour and Vivian Yee report for the New York Times; the Washington Post reports.

Airstrikes by the Syrian government and Russia killed at least 25 people in the country’s northwest, Syria’s opposition-run rescue service said today. The Syrian army and Russia said they targeted the insurgent groups’ hideouts. Meanwhile, Iran-backed militias entered Syria overnight from Iraq to strengthen Syrian army forces, sources say. Suleiman Al-Khalidi reports for Reuters.

ISRAEL-HEZBOLLAH

Israel’s Air Force said it struck alleged Hezbollah weapons smuggling sites near the Lebanon-Syria border crossing Saturday, claiming Hezbollah violated the recent U.S.-brokered ceasefire agreement. Filip Timotija reports for The Hill.

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR

Israel on Saturday said it had killed a World Central Kitchen (WCK) worker it accused of participating in Hamas-led Oct. 7 attacks. A spokesperson for WCK said an Israeli strike on a vehicle killed three of its contractors, adding, “To the best of our knowledge, no WCK team members are affiliated with Hamas.” Tim Balk reports for the New York Times.

In a fresh ceasefire push, Egypt is in talks with Israel to reopen the Rafah border crossing with Gaza, Arab negotiators say. Summer Said and Omar Abdel-Baqui report for the Wall Street Journal.

Three people were crushed to death outside a central Gaza bakery supported by the World Food Program, the U.N. agency said Saturday. Separately, the U.N. aid agency for Palestinians (UNRWA) announced it is suspending deliveries through the main Israel-Gaza crossing due to security concerns. Vivian Ho and Bryan Pietsch report for the Washington Post; Christy Cooney reports for BBC News.

Hamas released a video Saturday with proof of life from U.S. citizen and hostage Edan Alexander. The footage, which an Israeli official said is a positive sign from Hamas, calls on Trump to negotiate for Alexander’s release. Separately, the IDF today confirmed the death of the missing U.S.-Israeli soldier, Omer Maxim Neutra. Barak Ravid reports for Axios; Jordana Miller reports for ABC News.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

Russian President Vladimir Putin yesterday approved the country’s new budget, including record spending on defense. Claudia Chiappa reports for POLITICO.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz made an unexpected visit to Kyiv today, promising Germany would remain Ukraine’s biggest supporter in Europe and pledging €650 ($683) million in aid this month. Reuters reports.

A Kremlin critic serving time in jail for criticizing Russia’s war in Ukraine was sentenced to an additional three years on Friday. Thomas Mackintosh reports for BBC News.

U.S. PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION AND NEW CONGRESS

Lawmakers have expressed doubt over Trump’s plan to replace FBI Director Christopher Wray with Kash Patel, citing concerns that his appointment could undermine the agency’s independence. Holly Bailey, Mariana Alfaro, and Mark Berman report for the Washington Post.

In the latest appointment news, Trump on Saturday picked Charles Kusher, his son-in-law’s father, to serve as U.S. ambassador to France. Trump previously pardoned Charles Kushner in 2020 for convictions over filing false tax returns, retaliating against a witness, and making false statements. Trump also named businessman Massad Boulous, the father-in-law to his daughter Tiffany Trump, as his Middle East advisor. Lauren Floyd reports for Axios; Zach Montague reports for the New York Times.

GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

Protesters rallied in Georgia’s capital for a fourth consecutive night yesterday, as pro-Western demonstrators opposed the government’s recent decision to suspend EU accession talks. At least 44 people have reportedly been hospitalized. The Guardian reports.

Chad, a longtime Western counterterrorism ally in Central Africa, has announced it is severing military ties with France. The move will likely see some 1,000 French troops exit in the country, where they have been supporting the country’s military in fighting rebel groups. Gabriele Steinhauser and Benoit Faucon report for the Wall Street Journal.

Kenya was fully aware of the plan to abduct and detain Uganda’s opposition leader Kizza Besigye during his visit to the country nearly two weeks ago, Uganda has alleged, citing intelligence correspondence. Wycliffe Muia reports for BBC News.

A Chinese commercial vessel and its crew is suspected of deliberately dragging an anchor for 100 miles to sever two critical data cables along the Baltic seabed. NATO warships have been surrounding the Chinese bulk carrier in international waters over the past week. Bojan Pancevski reports for the Wall Street Journal.

Tanzanian police are investigating the reported kidnapping of opposition youth leader Abdul Nondo, who was taken from a bus station yesterday by unknown assailants after he had been campaigning for his party’s candidates. Alfred Lasteck reports for BBC News.

With community support, Pakistani authorities have brokered a second ceasefire between warring Shiites and Sunni Muslims in a northwestern region bordering Afghanistan following deadly sectarian violence that killed at least 130 people in the past 10 days, officials say. AP News reports.

Mexican lawmakers voted last Thursday to abolish seven watchdog agencies, intensifying fears that President Claudia Sheibbuam is leveraging her sweeping electoral victory to undermine democratic checks and balances. Mary Beth Sheridan and Valentina Muñoz Castillo reports for the Washington Post.

Namibia’s main opposition party on Saturday said it will not recognize results from the recent general election, alleging there had been “glaring and undeniable” electoral “malpractice.” Damian Zane reports for BBC News.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The United States announced Saturday it has suspended its strategic partnership with Georgia over the country’s suspension of EU accession negotiations. Giselle Ruhiyyih Ewing and Gabriel Gavin report for POLITICO.

China yesterday vowed “resolute countermeasures” to a recently approved $385 million U.S. arms sale to Taiwan. Reuters reports.

Canadian officials are bolstering border security following Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s meeting with Trump at his Mar-a-Lago residence, a Canadian source told Axios, days after Trump threatened to impose a 25% tariff on Canadian goods. Rebecca Falconer reports; Freddie Clayton reports for NBC News.

HOUTHI DEVELOPMENTS

U.S. Navy destroyers shot down incoming missiles and drones fired by Yemen’s Houthis that were targeting the warships and three U.S. vessels they were escorting through the Gulf of Aden, the U.S. military said. There were no injuries or damage to the ships involved. AP News reports.

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Schumer Presses for F.B.I. Checks and Senate Consideration of Trump Nominees

Carl Hulse — Mon, 02 Dec 2024 05:02:59 -0500

In a letter, the Democratic leader said members of his party would work with Republicans to consider the president-elect’s nominees — but asserted they should undergo traditional Senate vetting.

Trump Doubles Down on Defiance After the Collapse of the Matt Gaetz Selection

Peter Baker — Mon, 02 Dec 2024 05:02:51 -0500

President-elect Donald J. Trump’s decision to install Kash Patel as F.B.I. director indicates that he remains undaunted by Washington resistance as he appoints ideological warriors, conspiracy theorists and even relatives.

Kash Patel Would Bring Bravado and Baggage to F.B.I. Role

Glenn Thrush, Elizabeth Williamson and Adam Goldman — Mon, 02 Dec 2024 03:30:06 -0500

President-elect Donald J. Trump’s choice to run the F.B.I. has a record in and out of government that is likely to raise questions during his Senate confirmation hearings.

NIGERIA: Nigeria Fights Back

Sun, 01 Dec 2024 19:03:34 -0500

La madre de Pete Hegseth lo acusó de maltratar a mujeres durante años

Sharon LaFraniere and Julie Tate — Sun, 01 Dec 2024 14:09:28 -0500

Penelope Hegseth hizo la acusación en un correo electrónico enviado a su hijo en 2018. El viernes afirmó que se arrepentía del mensaje y que había pedido disculpas a su hijo, el ahora elegido de Trump para secretario de Defensa.

Republicans Express Support Trump’s Pick for FBI, Kash Patel

Michael D. Shear — Sun, 01 Dec 2024 12:56:48 -0500

Several lawmakers expressed support on Sunday for the president-elect’s plan to install a loyalist who has vowed to use the position to exact revenge on adversaries.

Republicans Stand Behind Trump’s Choice of Kash Patel to Lead F.B.I.

Michael D. Shear — Sun, 01 Dec 2024 12:56:47 -0500

Several lawmakers expressed support on Sunday for the president-elect’s plan to install a loyalist who has vowed to use the position to exact revenge on adversaries.

Five Things to Know About Kash Patel, Trump’s Pick to Lead the F.B.I.

Elizabeth Williamson — Sat, 30 Nov 2024 23:24:29 -0500

President-elect Donald J. Trump has long seen his bombastic national security operative as a political “enforcer.” But former colleagues question his fitness for the job.

Trump Says He Will Nominate Kash Patel to Run F.B.I.

Devlin Barrett and Maggie Haberman — Sat, 30 Nov 2024 20:43:47 -0500

President-elect Donald J. Trump turned to a firebrand loyalist to become director of the bureau, which he sees as part of a ‘deep state’ conspiracy against him.

Trump Says He Will Replace FBI Director With Kash Patel

Devlin Barrett and Maggie Haberman — Sat, 30 Nov 2024 20:43:47 -0500

President-elect Donald J. Trump turned to a firebrand loyalist to become director of the bureau, which he sees as part of a ‘deep state’ conspiracy against him.

SPACE: ASAT Antics

Sat, 30 Nov 2024 19:21:25 -0500

SPECIAL OPERATIONS: Israeli Pager Attack Preparation

Sat, 30 Nov 2024 19:20:27 -0500

Digest of Recent Articles on Just Security (Nov. 25-29)

Just Security — Sat, 30 Nov 2024 07:40:26 -0500

Sudan Crisis

Sudan’s War Victims Survived Killings; Now They Face Starvation
by Belkis Wille (@belkiswille)

Symposium: Tech and Atrocity Prevention

Camera-Fitted Drones May Help Locate Graves of Mexico’s Disappeared
by Miguel Moctezuma and Karina García-Reyes

Birthright Citizenship

Birthright Citizenship and Undocumented Immigrants
by Ilya Somin (@IlyaSomin)

United Nations / Reproductive Rights

New UN Guidance Calling for Restraints on Conscientious Objection to Abortion Care
by Cynthia Soohoo (@SoohooCindy) and Jaime M. Gher (@Jay4Rights)

ICC / Disability Rights

Slavery Often Creates Disability – The International Criminal Court Should Address this Overlooked Connection
by Kate McInnes (@KateMcInnesLaw)

Podcast: Crimes Against Humanity

The Just Security Podcast: A Major Breakthrough Towards a Treaty on Crimes Against Humanity
Paras Shah (@pshah518) interview with Alka Pradhan (@PradhanAlka) and Leila Nadya Sadat (@leilasadat1)

The post Digest of Recent Articles on Just Security (Nov. 25-29) appeared first on Just Security.

ATTRITION: NATO Threats Assessment

Fri, 29 Nov 2024 20:52:28 -0500

SPECIAL OPERATIONS: Asymmetric Tools

Fri, 29 Nov 2024 20:51:05 -0500

F.B.I. Checks of Trump Nominees Are Critical for the Nation’s Security

Noah Bookbinder and Gregg Nunziata — Fri, 29 Nov 2024 12:40:49 -0500

With fewer and fewer checks on presidential power, we need rigorous congressional consideration of the incoming president’s team.

El equipo de Trump rechaza un acuerdo de transición que contradice sus promesas de transparencia

Simon J. Levien — Fri, 29 Nov 2024 10:24:55 -0500

El equipo del presidente electo dijo que se comprometía a revelar los nombres de sus donantes y a no aceptar donaciones de extranjeros, pero no está legalmente obligado a hacerlo.

Defense Secretary Takes Control of Plea Deals in War Crimes Cases

Carol Rosenberg — Fri, 29 Nov 2024 10:22:02 -0500

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III stripped his appointee of plea deal authority in a memo on Monday, which the Pentagon has not yet made public.

Justice Dept. Girds for a Test of Its Independence

Devlin Barrett — Fri, 29 Nov 2024 10:13:37 -0500

President-elect Donald Trump’s plans to install loyalists have left officials fearful that he intends to carry out his threats of retribution but hopeful that rule-of-law norms can hold.

LOGISTICS: Russian Wartime Economy

Thu, 28 Nov 2024 19:12:36 -0500

PROCUREMENT: Military Districts

Thu, 28 Nov 2024 19:10:54 -0500

Robert Dixon, Last Surviving Buffalo Soldier, Dies at 103

Trip Gabriel — Thu, 28 Nov 2024 16:48:47 -0500

A member of one of the U.S. Army’s all-Black regiments, formed after the Civil War, he trained West Point cadets in horsemanship during World War II.

Trump Team’s Rejection of a Transition Deal Adds a Wrinkle to Its Transparency Pledges

Simon J. Levien — Thu, 28 Nov 2024 16:43:55 -0500

The president-elect’s team said it would disclose its donors’ names and not take donations from foreigners, but it isn’t legally bound to adhere to those promises.

3 Americans Are Said to Be Freed From China in Prisoner Swap

Adam Goldman, Mara Hvistendahl, Edward Wong and Zolan Kanno-Youngs — Thu, 28 Nov 2024 05:29:29 -0500

The Americans released, among others, a Chinese intelligence officer who was serving a 20-year sentence in the United States.

NBC WEAPONS: Russian Nuclear Weapons

Wed, 27 Nov 2024 19:12:37 -0500

ATTRITION: Regenerating Russians

Wed, 27 Nov 2024 19:02:58 -0500

U.S. National Security and Military News Review

The D Brief: Seoul declares martial law; Biden rushes to arm Ukraine; Meet Aleppo’s conqueror; Last soldier to leave Kabul will get 4th star; And a bit more.

De patriota chino a espía estadounidense: la insólita vida de John Leung

What Kash Patel Could Do to the F.B.I.

Proposed rule would bar sale of Americans' financial data to adversaries

Deployment of the U.S. Military for Immigration Enforcement: A Primer

1. Posse Comitatus Act

2. Title 10 Chapter 15 (Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies)

3. Declaration of National Emergency

4. Deployment of the National Guard Under Title 32

On the United States, China, and COP29: Assessing the State of International Climate Progress After Baku

Climate Finance: Achieving a Modest Deal on Aid to Developing States

Ongoing Divisions Between Developed and Developing Nations

Limited Progress on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels

The Trump Effect at Baku

More Questions Than Answers

Early Edition: December 3, 2024

New Report Documents Russia’s Systematic Program of Coerced Adoption and Fostering of Ukraine’s Children

New Details on the Coerced Deportation of Children from Ukraine to Russia

Legal Significance of the Report’s Findings

War Crimes

Crimes Against Humanity

Genocide

From Chinese Patriot to American Spy: The Unusual Life of John Leung

SPACE: Baikonur Blowout

SPECIAL OPERATIONS: Exploding Pagers

MORALE: Image Management

Kash Patel Has Plan to Remake the F.B.I. Into a Tool of Trump

New AI tool for air defense takes on advanced missiles and drone swarms

Robert Dixon, One of the Last Buffalo Soldiers, Dies at 103

China gains, US loses ground in Mideast arms market

Los nombramientos de Donald Trump son un desafío a Washington

Pete Hegseth’s Mother Accused Her Son of Mistreating Women for Years

Kash Patel, Trump’s Pick for FBI Director, Would Bring Bravado and Baggage to the Role

The D Brief: Jihadists seize Aleppo; Taiwan leader visits Hawaii; More Chinese chip chokepoints; Shipbuilding woes, explored; And a bit more.

¿Quién es Kash Patel, el elegido de Donald Trump para dirigir el FBI?

Trump’s Legal Battles Over Jan. 6 Are Still Alive and Relevant

A Reckoning on “Incitement”

The Standout Jan. 6 Civil Case

Next steps

The Immunity Question

The 235-Year History of ‘No Man Is Above the Law’—and Its Dismantling

Why the 2020 Election Interference Civil Cases Matter

Getting to Decision Day

The Weaponization of Consensus

The Resolution

Key Issues for Future Negotiations

Timeline

Civil Society Engagement and Participation

The Way Forward

IMAGE: The United Nations Headquarters, in New York city, on Oct. 18, 2023. (Photo by DANIEL SLIM/AFP via Getty Images)

Early Edition: December 2, 2024

Schumer Presses for F.B.I. Checks and Senate Consideration of Trump Nominees

Trump Doubles Down on Defiance After the Collapse of the Matt Gaetz Selection

Kash Patel Would Bring Bravado and Baggage to F.B.I. Role

NIGERIA: Nigeria Fights Back

La madre de Pete Hegseth lo acusó de maltratar a mujeres durante años

Republicans Express Support Trump’s Pick for FBI, Kash Patel

Republicans Stand Behind Trump’s Choice of Kash Patel to Lead F.B.I.

Five Things to Know About Kash Patel, Trump’s Pick to Lead the F.B.I.

Trump Says He Will Nominate Kash Patel to Run F.B.I.

Trump Says He Will Replace FBI Director With Kash Patel

SPACE: ASAT Antics

SPECIAL OPERATIONS: Israeli Pager Attack Preparation

Digest of Recent Articles on Just Security (Nov. 25-29)

Sudan Crisis

Symposium: Tech and Atrocity Prevention

Birthright Citizenship

United Nations / Reproductive Rights

ICC / Disability Rights

Podcast: Crimes Against Humanity

ATTRITION: NATO Threats Assessment

SPECIAL OPERATIONS: Asymmetric Tools

F.B.I. Checks of Trump Nominees Are Critical for the Nation’s Security

El equipo de Trump rechaza un acuerdo de transición que contradice sus promesas de transparencia

Defense Secretary Takes Control of Plea Deals in War Crimes Cases

Justice Dept. Girds for a Test of Its Independence

LOGISTICS: Russian Wartime Economy

PROCUREMENT: Military Districts

Robert Dixon, Last Surviving Buffalo Soldier, Dies at 103