U.S. National Security and Military News Review

PARIS—Anduril and General Atomics unveiled full-scale mockups of their fighter drones to the international market this week, pitching customizable weapons and a chance for Europe to help build them.

U.S. Air Force officials helped both companies pitch the program to other countries, executives told Defense One at the Paris Air Show—even though the service has yet to field the drones itself.

“The U.S. Air Force has said: Let's move out. Let's make partners. Let's do co-production. Let's make it happen,” said Dave Alexander, president of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. The U.S. government could approve export licenses very soon, the company added—in “weeks, not months.”

The first increment of the Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft program has been designed for air-to-air missions, but General Atomics and Anduril aim to take their platforms and customize them for European countries, saying the modularity of the drones makes it easy to swap out mission systems.

European nations have expressed interest in air-to-ground missions, executives say, a “fairly straightforward” switch where the companies would take out the air-to-air systems and put in air-to-ground weapons and sensors, and possibly systems developed by the other nations.

“Are there indigenous capabilities that certain host nations want to bring? Maybe they have very good software autonomy or AI, maybe they have very good mission systems or weapons that they want to integrate. So that's [what] we're kind of exploring with each one of the nations,” said Jason Levin, who runs Anduril’s air dominance and strike.

Anduril announced Wednesday at the show that it will partner with German defense giant Rheinmetall to co-develop and produce Fury and Barracuda drones—tapping into the company’s European industrial base to develop different variants of the company’s products. The announcement comes as Europe is working to build out its own industrial base, and to rearm quickly to prepare from potential Russian aggression.

“With the teaming arrangement with Rheinmetall, we can start exploring European variants, and so that might start from vehicles that are produced in the U.S. and exported to Germany, and then basically German-ize and missionize in Germany, all the way to working with Rheinmetall for rate production in Germany, and then for other host nations around Europe,” Levin said.

Anduril hasn’t decided whether it would build new production facilities in Europe or use existing Rheinmetall facilities. Rich Drake, general manager for Anduril UK, said it depends on how much demand there is and what level of in-country localization they want.

The company is also still figuring out exactly what work Rheinmetall would do on Fury. But Levin said Rheinmetall does “excellent composites work” for the F-35, which could be used for Fury airframes, and highlightted to the company’s munitions as well.

General Atomics’ CCA offering is also up for co-production, though Alexander didn’t disclose which parts of the drone fighter could be manufactured abroad, saying it would vary by country.

With their international debut, the two firms are now competing stateside and abroad for CCA orders.

Asked how General Atomics’ offering differs from Anduril’s, Alexander pointed to its internal weapons bay, modular sensors, and “incredible range,” as well as the company’s long-standing experience building drones.

Anduril, meanwhile, is encouraging countries to look at the capabilities of both aircraft and “explore for themselves” what fits their needs, then work with Anduril to adapt Fury, rather than pitch a specific kind of vehicle and use case, Levin said.

Back home, the U.S. Air Force plans to decide whether to build one or both of the companies’ drones after their first flight this summer. The service developed the program to provide “affordable mass” for its fleet, and initial estimates put the cost of CCAs at about a third of an F-35, around $25 to $30 million each.

But General Atomics pushed back on that cost estimate, stating that their offering will be “far less than $20 million” per aircraft. Air Force officials have recently signaled that they want to go even cheaper and less exquisite on the program. Anduril declined to comment on the cost figure.

]]>

Trump’s Rebuke of Gabbard Signals an Uneasy Moment

Julian E. Barnes, Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan — Fri, 20 Jun 2025 16:49:32 -0400

The president’s relationship with his director of national intelligence has become more tense as he considers striking Iran.

Appeals Court Lets Trump Keep Control of California National Guard in L.A.

Charlie Savage and Laurel Rosenhall — Fri, 20 Jun 2025 15:01:04 -0400

A panel rejected a lower court’s finding that it was most likely illegal for President Trump to use state troops to protect immigration agents from protests.

Defense One Radio, Ep. 184: Former Ukrainian defense chief Oleksii Reznikov

Patrick Tucker — Fri, 20 Jun 2025 14:48:24 -0400

Google Pla Apple Podcasts

Guests:

Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov in conversation with Defense One’s Patrick Tucker on the sidelines of the GLOBSEC 2025 conference in Prague.

Defense One is media partner for this year's 20th edition of the GLOBSEC Forum in Prague.

]]>

What Happens if Trump Decides to Strike Iran or Assassinate Its Leader?

Vivian Yee — Fri, 20 Jun 2025 13:55:24 -0400

If the United States bombs an underground uranium enrichment facility in Iran or kills the country’s supreme leader, it could kick off a more dangerous and unpredictable phase in the war.

FORCES:

Fri, 20 Jun 2025 13:25:20 -0400

Estos son los posibles escenarios si Estados Unidos ataca a Irán

Vivian Yee — Fri, 20 Jun 2025 11:39:25 -0400

Si EE. UU. ataca Irán o asesina a su líder supremo, podría dar comienzo una fase más peligrosa e impredecible de la guerra.

As U.S. Considers Using Bunker-Buster Bombs, Here’s What It Takes to Hit Iran’s Deepest Nuclear Site

Samuel Granados, Junho Lee, Jeremy White and Leanne Abraham — Fri, 20 Jun 2025 11:29:30 -0400

President Trump says he’s considering attacking Iran’s underground nuclear site. Here’s what that might look like.

The D Brief: Israel, Iran trade strikes; Golden Dome, questioned; F-35 engine delay; Russian recession?; And a bit more.

Ben Watson and Bradley Peniston — Fri, 20 Jun 2025 11:27:18 -0400

Neither Israel nor Iran are backing down after more than a week at war.

An Iranian missile attack wounded more than 20 Israelis in the north and south of the country on Friday, Haaretz reports. And for the Israeli side, “Fighter jets struck several Iranian missile systems and radar installations in the areas of Isfahan and Tehran, which were intended to target IDF aircraft and disrupt their operations,” the country’s military said on social media Friday, with an accompanying video of said strikes.

Iran’s top diplomat is visiting European officials in Switzerland. “Can they stop Trump joining Israel’s war?” Politico asked in its coverage of that meeting Friday.

Trump: “I will make my decision on whether or not to [join Israel’s war] within the next two weeks,” the president said in a statement Thursday, according to his press secretary. His statement cited “a chance for substantial negotiations that may or may not take place with Iran in the near future.”

Analysis: “That dashed Israeli hopes of a swift climax to the war,” the New York Times reports. “Israel seeks to destroy Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, and its leaders had hoped that Mr. Trump would soon send American bombers to destroy an underground enrichment site deemed largely impermeable to the kinds of munitions in Israel’s arsenal. Now, Israel must decide whether to wait for U.S. military support or use its own, less powerful missiles to attack the site.”

About that special munition the U.S. is sitting on: It’s the GBU-57, or Massive Ordnance Penetrator, the subject of special features by the Times and the Wall Street Journal. “The U.S. military has concluded that one bomb would not destroy the Fordo facility on its own. To destroy the site, an attack [using B-2 Spirit stealth bombers] would have to come in waves, with bombers releasing one after another down the same hole,” the Times writes.

But U.S. defense officials are reportedly considering nuclear options as well, if it turns out Iran’s Fordo underground enrichment facility is beyond the reach of GBU-57s, the Guardian reports. Should the U.S. eventually elect to go the nuclear route, it would likely choose the B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator, arms control scholar Jeffrey Lewis writes. And that would have “a yield of 300 or 400 kilotons. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 15 and 21 kt,” says Lewis.

“Nuclear earth penetrators don't dig all the way down to the bunker,” Lewis explained in a thread on social media Friday. “Instead, they burrow just deep enough to couple the energy from the explosion into the ground, sending a shockwave through the geology to crush the bunker. A few meters is enough,” he says. That’s because “A 300 kt weapon that burrows 3 m into the ground will impart the same energy as an 8 mt contact burst…Moreover, severely diminishing returns on ground shock occur ~10 m.”

The big problem: Fallout. A panel of experts from the National Academy of Sciences “calculated that a 300 kt weapon would need to penetrate ~800 m to fully contain the explosion.” And that suggests, “Depending on which way the wind is blowing and the time of day, you might kill a lot of civilians,” he warns. Read the rest of his thread for details.

Related reading:

“Israel’s War on Iran Is Costing Hundreds of Millions of Dollars a Day,” the Wall Street Journal reported Thursday;
“What Happens if Trump Decides to Strike Iran or Assassinate Its Leader?” the New York Times asked Friday;
“The Supreme Court and the Long-Term Drift of the War Powers,” via national security law professor Steve Vladeck, writing Thursday;
See also, “The Three Dramatic Consequences of Israel’s Attack on Iran,” by former State Department counselor Eliot Cohen, writing at The Atlantic.

Welcome to this Friday edition of The D Brief, a newsletter dedicated to developments affecting the future of U.S. national security, brought to you by Ben Watson and Bradley Peniston. Share your tips and feedback here. And if you’re not already subscribed, you can do that here. On this day in 1963, the so-called “red telephone” was opened linking Washington, D.C., and Moscow.

Around the Defense Department

Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth has not yet completed this year’s defense budget, and he’s weeks behind deadline. But $25 billion Hegseth and Trump want to spend on their conceptual missile-defense system “Golden Dome” is in the reconciliation bill, which only needs Republican support to pass—and would raise the country’s debt ceiling by $5 trillion.

But Golden Dome is a completely unproven system with incredibly ambitious goals, as former astronaut and Arizona Democratic Sen. Mark Kelly stressed in his exchange with Hegseth this week on Capitol Hill. “First of all, is this system designed to intercept a full salvo attack?” Kelly asked. Hegseth eventually replied, “Yeah, it’s not meant to be just one nation.”

“So what kind of reliability are you aiming to build into this system? Are we looking for something like four-9s on intercept success?” Kelly asked. Hegseth seemed confused, so Kelly continued, “99.99% reliability.”

Hegseth: “Obviously you seek the highest possible. You begin with what you have in integrating those C2 networks and sensors. Building up capabilities that are existing with an eye toward future capabilities that can come online as quickly as possible. Not just ground-based but space-based.”

Kelly: “So against future capability too. So do you believe that we can build a system that can intercept all incoming threats? Do you think we could build that system? This is a very hard physics problem.”

Hegseth: “You would know as well as anybody, sir, how difficult this problem is and that’s why we put our best people on it. We think the American people deserve it.”

Kelly: “You’re talking about hundreds of ICBMs running simultaneously, varying trajectories, MIRVs, so multiple re-entry vehicles. Thousands of decoys. Hypersonic glide vehicles, all at once. And considering what the future threat might be, might even be more complicated than that. And you’re proposing spending not just $25 billion, but upwards of—I think [the Congressional Budget Office] estimated this at at least half a trillion; other estimates, a trillion dollars. I am all for having a system that would work. I am not sure that the physics can get there on this. It’s incredibly complicated.”

Kelly also pointed out Hegseth and Trump cut 74% of the staff at the Pentagon’s weapons-testing office, the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. And that’s the same office that would oversee testing of the Golden Dome.

Kelly’s advice to Hegseth: Finish your homework on Golden Dome. “You got to go back and take look at this but I also strongly encourage you to put together some—before we spend $25 billion or $175 billion or $563 billion or a trillion dollars—put together a group of people to figure out if the physics will work,” the senator said. “You could go down a road here and spend hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars with the taxpayer money, get to the end and we have a system that is not functional. That very well could happen.”

Watch the full five-minute exchange (shared via veteran journalist Marcy Wheeler) on YouTube, here.

More reading:

“F-35 engine upgrade hits delay, casting doubt on timeline,” reports Defenese One’s Audrey Decker from the Paris Air Show;
“AUKUS review emerged after talks with counterparts, SecDef says,” Defense One’s Meghann Myers reports off Hegseth’s Senate testimony;
“Johns Hopkins, University of Maryland sue defense department over funding,” the Baltimore Banner reports.
And one more from the Old Line State: “‘Yesterday’s facilities,’ unstable workforce among base commanders’ worries,” by Route Fifty’s Chris Teale.

Europe

Russia is on “the brink of recession.” That’s what Economy Minister Maxim Reshetnikov told the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on Thursday, according to Russian media reports. Indeed, the country may already be in one: “The numbers indicate cooling, but all our numbers are [like] a rearview mirror,” he said, some three years into a war that has drawn international sanctions and focused largely on military spending. AP reports, here.

Meanwhile in Paris, U.S. defense companies—and their congressional backers—chased rising military spending. Trump-European “tension has been notably absent at this week's Paris Airshow, where U.S. lawmakers and arms manufacturers pledged greater transatlantic partnership as Europe ramps up spending on everything from artillery shells and fighter jets to missile defence systems,” Reuters reports.

Runup to the June 24-25 NATO summit:

“Spain says NATO’s anticipated 5% defense spending proposal as 'unreasonable'” AP reports off a Thursday letter from Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez to NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte;
“Sovereign citizens' arrest linked to threat to NATO summit,” Netherlands Times writes in a followup to initial reporting;
And stay tuned for coverage of the summit from The Hague by Defense One’s Audrey Decker.

Troops in the homeland

Update: An appeals court let Trump keep control of California’s National Guard for now. The latest decision (PDF) from the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals keeps in place a hold on California’s request to return the troops back to the authority of Gov. Gavin Newsom, who did not ask for the National Guard’s assistance protecting immigration enforcement officials and federal property. A lower-court judge called Trump’s decision illegal, but the administration appealed the district judge’s ruling.

9th Circuit: “The undisputed facts demonstrate that before the deployment of the National Guard, protesters ‘pinned down’ several federal officers and threw ‘concrete chunks, bottles of liquid, and other objects’ at the officers. Protesters also damaged federal buildings and caused the closure of at least one federal building. And a federal van was attacked by protesters who smashed in the van’s windows,” the court’s three-judge panel wrote in its Thursday decision.

Why it matters: “The court case could have wider implications on the president’s power to deploy soldiers within the United States after Trump directed immigration officials to prioritize deportations from other Democratic-run cities,” the Associated Press reports. “The ruling means control of the California National Guard will stay in federal hands as [California’s] lawsuit continues to unfold.”

Notable: “Newsom could still challenge the use of the National Guard and U.S. Marines under other laws, including the bar on using troops in domestic law enforcement,” Reuters reports.

On the horizon: Trump may try to send more National Guard troops to cities across the country, he said on social media just before midnight Thursday. “The Judges obviously realized that Gavin Newscum is incompetent and ill prepared, but this is much bigger than Gavin, because all over the United States, if our Cities, and our people, need protection, we are the ones to give it to them should State and Local Police be unable, for whatever reason, to get the job done. Thank you.”

Second opinion: “That’s not exactly what the [9th Circuit Court’s] opinion said,” said former U.S. Attorney Joyce Vance. “Although this is a win for Trump, the panel disagreed with him on a key issue,” she wrote Friday. “Instead, they noted that under the caselaw, ‘courts may at least review the President’s determination to ensure that it reflects a colorable assessment of the facts and law within a “range of honest judgment.”’ That language would seem to be a warning to the president not to overstep,” Vance said, and added, “But based on his social media post, it went unheard.”

Next up: San Francisco District Judge Charles Breyer “has a hearing scheduled for later [Friday] on a preliminary injunction request that could reach additional issues like Trump’s use of the Marines and the Posse Comitatus Act, so expect more on this one in the coming days,” Vance said.

This week in masked men with guns: In Los Angeles, a group of men kitted out with body armor, weapons, and no identification tried unsuccessfully to gain entry into Dodgers Stadium parking lots Thursday ahead of an evening game with the Padres. The team believed they were Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, and turned them away.

But who were they? USA Today reports ICE said the agency was “never there” and the Department of Homeland Security claimed the masked agents were with Customs and Border Patrol, though their presence was “unrelated to any operation or enforcement.”

Drawing a crowd: “In recent immigration raids, ICE and other federal officials have sometimes operated in unmarked cars,” the New York Times reports. On Thursday, the cars and masked men eventually attracted protesters to the parking lot, so the LA police were dispatched to remove both the apparent agents and the protesters.

When did masks become standard at ICE? “By law, federal agents are allowed to cover their faces, in order to protect themselves from retaliation by drug cartels and the like. But masked Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents seem to have become the rule rather than the exception,” writes Sam Adams at Slate. “It’s difficult to put a finger on exactly when the practice became widespread, especially since the volume of ICE raids has increased so dramatically so recently (and has received corresponding increased attention). But go back even a year, and it’s relatively easy to find coverage of ICE raids in which the agents’ faces are clearly visible.”

Why it matters: “ICE says it wasn’t them. DHS says they were Border Patrol. But honestly who the hell knows? They’ve given permission for any psycho to put on a ski mask, point a gun, grab people & throw them into an unmarked vehicle,” California state Sen. Scott Wiener wrote on social media.

Rewind: It was less than a week ago that a man dressed as a masked police officer went on a shooting spree in Minnesota this past weekend, killing former Democratic House Speaker Melissa Hortman and her husband, Mark&md

Posse Comitatus Act Meets the President’s “Protective Powers”: What’s Next in Newsom v. Trump

Steve Vladeck — Fri, 20 Jun 2025 11:00:23 -0400

President Donald Trump’s controversial federalization of members of the California National Guard and his deployment of at least 700 active-duty Marines to Los Angeles has raised a series of novel, important, and challenging questions about the scope of the Executive Branch’s legal authorities when it comes to domestic use of the military.

On one hand, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 generally forbids use of federal armed forces for civilian law enforcement unless a statute specifically authorizes it. Although the Insurrection Act has long been understood to be one such statute, Trump has, quite notably, not invoked it here. On the other hand, the Executive Branch (with a bit of help from the Supreme Court) has long claimed inherent power to use military force unilaterally to “protect federal functions,” including the power to defend federal property and federal personnel from violence. Thus, perhaps the dominant question Trump’s military deployment raises is the shape of the Venn diagram created by these two opposing forces. Are they mutually exclusive? If they overlap, which one prevails? Or put more basically, where does this “protective power” end, and (generally prohibited) law enforcement begin?

In our view, there are three possible answers to this question. On the first view, the protective power can include law enforcement—and overrides the Posse Comitatus Act when it does. On the second, the protective power, as an exercise of Article II authority, cannot be understood to include any typical law enforcement activity—and so such activity is unlawful unless specifically authorized by congressional statute. On the third, the answer is somewhere in between—where the protective power does not generally authorize law enforcement activity, but does when that activity is incidental to the protection of federal property and personnel (such as arresting individuals while they are attacking a federal building).

As we explain in the discussion that follows, we think that there are strong arguments to be made in support of both the second and third options—but not the first. More to the point, we think Congress has been far more clear than is widely believed about what its view is—in a way that calls into at least some question what the Trump administration has thus far used federal military forces for in and around Los Angeles.

1. Protective Power as an Exception to Posse Comitatus

The Posse Comitatus Act itself bars domestic use of the military “to execute the laws” “except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress.” Obviously, nothing in the Constitution “expressly authorize[s]” the President to protect federal functions. Instead, such an Article II power is, at best, implicit—derived from some combination of the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause.

By itself, that ought to resolve any debate over whether any protection of a federal function is therefore exempted from the Posse Comitatus Act’s ban, whether it involves law enforcement or not. But there is also plenty of Founding-era history supporting the view that Congress, and not the President, would have broad power to define the circumstances in which the military could be used domestically. Indeed, the Insurrection Act itself derives from statutes Congress enacted in 1792 and 1795, both of which reflected the universal understanding at the time that the President could use military force “to execute the laws of the union” only if Congress had specifically authorized him to do so.

And, to its credit, the Department of Justice in the current litigation over the Los Angeles deployments has seemingly embraced this view. As it argued in its very first brief:

“Plaintiffs’ objection based on the Posse Comitatus Act is equally misdirected. Neither the National Guard nor the Marines are engaged in law enforcement. Rather, they are protecting law enforcement, consistent with longstanding practice and the inherent protective power to provide for the safety of federal property and personnel.” (emphasis in original)

(See also the most recent brief at p. 29).

Thus, not only do we find wholly unpersuasive any argument that the protective power overrides the Posse Comitatus Act; we don’t understand that to be the Trump administration’s litigating position, at least thus far.

Congress has been far more clear than is widely believed about what its view is—in a way that calls into at least some question what the Trump administration has thus far used federal military forces for in and around Los Angeles.

2. Posse Comitatus as a Law Enforcement Ban

At the other end of the spectrum is the argument that the protective power cannot fairly be understood to include any law enforcement functions—that it does not encompass searches, seizures, arrests, or any other activity similarly characteristic of law enforcement. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has interpreted the Posse Comitatus Act to prohibit any direct participation by the military in actions that “subject civilians to the exercise of military power that is regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature.” Thus, on this view, even where what might be viewed as law enforcement activity by the military is necessarily incidental to protecting federal buildings or personnel, it is still prohibited without clear congressional authorization.

Congress put at least a thumb on the scale in this direction in 1981—when it enacted what is present-day 10 U.S.C. § 275. Under that provision,

The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.

Although this provision is focused on military support for civilian law enforcement agencies, the authoritative House Report is much clearer on how Congress understood the relationship between the protective power and the Posse Comitatus Act:

Certain military activities, although otherwise prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act, are permissible if expressly authorized by statute. These permissible military actions are specifically defined and are generally restricted to instances involving civil disorders (10 U.S.C. 331–36), disasters (42 U.S. 4401–84 and 1855), and threats to federal property (see letter from Mary C. Lawton, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Deanne Siemer, General Counsel, Department of Defense, March 24, 1978 at 3; see also United States v. Banks, 539 F.2d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1976). The other specific and “express” statutory exceptions to Posse Comitatus include: (1) 16 U.S.C. 23 and 16 U.S.C. 78 (protection of federal parks); (2) 18 U.S.C. 112(f) and 1116 (protection of foreign officials, official guests, and other internationally protected persons); (3) 18 U.S.C. 351 (crimes against members of congress); (4) 18 U.S.C. 1751 and 3056 (protection against crimes against the president); (5) 22 U.S.C. 408, and 461-462 (enforcement of the neutrality laws); (6) 42 U.S.C. 1989 (execution of warrants relating to certain violations of the civil rights laws); (7) 42 U.S.C. 3756 (loan of services, equipment, personnel and facilities to LEAA [Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]); (8) 43 U.S.C. 1065 (removal of unlawful enclosures from public lands); and (9) 50 U.S.C. 220 (enforcement of the customs laws).

Thus, § 375 was enacted against a backdrop in which the presumption is that activities are prohibited unless they are statutorily authorized. In a note accompanying the first sentence of the above passage, the House Report rules out any notion of a separate Article II authority in reference to the Posse Comitatus Act. The note states in full: “The statute permits constitutional exceptions. However, there are none.” Thus, Congress’s view appears to be that the protective power is not an “exception” to the Posse Comitatus Act; it is defined in such a way so as to not even implicate it.

Note: The Office of Legal Counsel has relied on the House Report and accompanying Conference Report as authoritative guides for determining the scope of the protective power and the Posse Comitatus Act.

3. The Hybrid: Law Enforcement Only as Necessarily Incidental to Protection

Although we generally find Congress’s view satisfying, it raises one puzzle: What about the Supreme Court’s decision in In re Neagle, which held that the President did not need statutory authorization to appoint a deputy U.S. marshal to protect a Supreme Court Justice from an attempted assassination? Even if Deputy Neagle wasn’t exercising “law enforcement” authority when he shot and killed David Terry in defense of himself and Justice Field, it would be a very strange result if he had the power to shoot at Terry, but not to arrest and detain him. The point is not that Deputy Neagle had general law enforcement power; it’s that he had those powers that were necessary to discharge his (valid) duty to protect Justice Field.

We think the 1981 amendment can be read consistently with this view. As the 1981 Conference Report noted,

Nothing in this section, however, limits the inherent authority of military personnel to defend themselves or to protect federal property. Nothing in this chapter adversely affects the authority of the attorney general to request assistance from the department of defense under the provisions of 21 U.S.C. 873(b). The limitation posed by this section is only with respect to assistance authorized under any part of this chapter.

Consistent with this understanding, long-standing Defense Department policies state that it is permissible for the military to engage in at least some law enforcement activity in the protection of federal government functions:

Permissible Direct Assistance. Categories of active participation in direct law enforcement-type activities (e.g., search, seizure, and arrest) that are not restricted by law or DoD policy are …

Federal military commanders have the authority, in extraordinary emergency circumstances where prior authorization by the President is impossible and duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation, to engage temporarily in activities that are necessary to quell large-scale, unexpected civil disturbances because:
…
When duly constituted Federal, State, or local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection for Federal property or Federal governmental functions. Federal action, including the use of Federal military forces, is authorized when necessary to protect Federal property or functions. (emphasis added).

The key, in our view, is the bolded language. The question is whether the specific search, seizure, and arrest are “necessary to protect Federal property or functions.” Sending armed troops along with ICE agents on immigration raids can’t possibly meet that test, whereas stationing troops in front of a federal building and authorizing them to arrest those who attack it is. It would also be completely unprecedented to use the protective function to protect enforcement officials – and in a way that entangles the military forces in the very act of law enforcement. The key, in our view, as reflected in both the 1981 enactment of § 275 and the Department of Defense’s own long-standing view, is that law enforcement qua law enforcement is strictly prohibited. Only if the compulsory action is necessary (and incidental) to the protection of federal property or personnel can it be said to have any basis in Article II of the Constitution.

Of course, law enforcement activities can be authorized by other statutes. But we’re not at all persuaded that 10 U.S.C. § 12406 is such a statute. And it would not resolve the use of the Marines. Thus, in our view, the central legal question arising out of the use of military force in and around Los Angeles is not whether the troops are engaged in any “law enforcement-like activities,” but whether those activities are strictly necessary (and incidental) to the protection of federal property and functions. Insofar as they are not, we believe they violate the Posse Comitatus Act.

The post Posse Comitatus Act Meets the President’s “Protective Powers”: What’s Next in <i>Newsom v. Trump</i> appeared first on Just Security.

Dismantling CDC’s Global Work is Dismantling Our First Line of Biodefense

Stephanie Psaki — Fri, 20 Jun 2025 09:04:32 -0400

The United States maintains more than 750 military bases around the world—not just to fight wars, but to prevent them. That same principle has guided U.S. investment in the global footprint of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—the agency tasked with protecting the health and security of Americans—to build and “forward deploy” critical defenses against biological threats worldwide.

For decades, CDC’s global network of over 60 country offices and regional hubs have functioned as forward-deployed biodefense bases. These bases provide early detection and rapid response capabilities at the source of biological threats—before they can reach U.S. shores. Built on the foundation of longstanding U.S. health investments abroad, like the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and global polio eradication efforts, this system operates as a global early-warning system for biological threats. The system is powered by a highly trained workforce and partnerships with trusted allies who serve as America’s first line of defense against biological threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberately engineered.

This biodefense system is so central to U.S. national security, and the biological threats are so acute and constant, that the U.S. Government has worked for the last decade, across administrations, to develop a playbook for biological threat response. That playbook, finalized in the Biden administration and handed over to the Trump administration, directs CDC to lead U.S. government responses to biological threats emerging outside of the United States. CDC has exercised that role regularly, leading government-wide responses to Marburg, Ebola and Mpox outbreaks in the last six months alone. This system kept Americans safe during four years of the Biden administration, through dozens of emerging threats, many of which were unknown to most Americans.

Over the last few months, the Trump administration has weakened or eliminated the layers of the U.S. biodefense system – dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development’s programs around the world, eroding the National Security Council’s real-time coordination capability during threats, eliminating the White House pandemic office, and most recently, cancelling proactive investments in safeguards like pandemic influenza vaccines. Amid those changes, one of our strongest defenses against biological threats abroad has been the enduring partnerships and systems maintained by the CDC. However, with the release of President Trump’s budget request earlier this month, the administration signaled an intent to weaken — if not entirely dismantle — this critical safeguard that allows the U.S. to detect outbreaks at their source, leaving Americans and the world more vulnerable to biological threats.

CDC’s Biodefense Bases

The CDC’s mission is to protect the health, safety, and security of the United States. Its presence around the world is critical to delivering on that mission. Through its forward deployed biodefense bases, which we define here as global public health “bases” designed to detect threats and contain them early, the CDC doesn’t just respond to crises—it builds systems worldwide to prevent them. Those systems, which are always monitoring threats and ready to deploy, are sustained in peacetime through ongoing U.S. health investments to address HIV/AIDS, polio, measles, and other ongoing infectious disease threats.

For example, PEPFAR, which was launched in 2003 by President George W. Bush in response to the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa, has long played an essential role in sustaining CDC’s biodefense bases around the world. Since its inception, the United States has invested more than $100 billion in the global HIV/AIDS response through PEPFAR, saving 26 million lives, enabling 7.8 million babies to be born without HIV infection, and helping to build stronger health systems around the world to detect and respond to new threats. The CDC—PEPFAR’s scientific engine—delivers roughly 62% of its treatment services, strengthens laboratory systems and disease surveillance, trains public‑health workforces, drives data‑guided program improvements, and leads implementation science and evaluations. These interventions don’t just combat HIV—they fortify health systems, enhance outbreak detection, and bolster global health security. That capacity has proven essential in responding to Ebola, COVID‑19, and other emerging threats.

Through health preparedness programs in more than 80 countries, and offices in more than 60 countries, CDC has trained thousands of field epidemiologists in disease surveillance and emergency response, established biosurveillance labs, forged enduring relationships with ministries of health, and equipped local governments with the training and capacity to respond to threats when they occur.

For example, CDC has long partnered with the government of Nigeria to build their capacity to respond to biological threats. In 2023, Nigeria experienced an outbreak of anthrax, a zoonotic disease that can cause severe illness in people and animals. Drawing on CDC training, Nigeria quickly activated national response teams to coordinate across the human and animal health sectors and reduce the risk for further transmission. After containing the outbreak, Nigeria then passed on the training, working with the government of Ghana to share strategies for anthrax prevention and control.

CDC has also had a longstanding partnership with the Ministry of Health in Cambodia. So when Cambodia detected six human cases of H5N1 avian influenza in 2023 that raised suspicions of human-to-human transmission of the virus – a change that would dramatically boost the virus’ pandemic potential – they called the CDC. Within hours of the first case being detected, Cambodia began a comprehensive investigation with the support of World Health Organization and the U.S. Government. Through field epidemiology and genomic sequencing, capabilities built in partnership with the U.S. government, the Cambodian government quickly determined that the virus had not spread between people. If the results had shown human-to-human transmission, the U. S. government would have had an early warning of the next potential pandemic, and a chance to quickly contain the threat in partnership with Cambodia’s government.

There are hundreds of stories like these, most of which are never known to the American public because the threats are quickly contained at their source. This biological defense capacity is why, despite nearly a dozen Ebola outbreaks over the past decade, the U.S. has avoided even a single case of Ebola in the homeland. CDC officials often learn about outbreaks before they are made public—because local health officials trust them and call first. That trust is built over decades, not days.

What Is At Stake

The administration’s proposed budget would severely weaken this biodefense infrastructure by weakening or eliminating CDC’s forward-deployed biodefense bases. If the budget is implemented, CDC will begin to shutter its offices around the world, including their network of regional and country offices spanning more than 60 countries. Those offices are the ones that receive the first call in Nigeria, Cambodia, or anywhere else a biothreat emerges. This destruction of CDC’s global leadership would be coupled with the more than 60% cut to the State and USAID global health budget, including cutting State’s global health security budget from $700 million to $200 million, and cutting global work on tuberculosis and malaria in half. The President’s budget also proposes a 40% cut to PEPFAR, potentially eliminating or scaling back another core foundation of CDC’s presence around the world. CDC’s remaining global health security funding—flat at about $300 million—will no longer be controlled by experts, nor guaranteed to support CDC’s global operations. The CDC’s global readiness—its trained workforce, in-country and regional operations, and real-time intel—could vanish. And with it, so could our ability to stop the next outbreak at its source.

In the coming weeks and months, the Trump administration and Congress will need to decide whether to preserve or quickly rebuild layers of our nation’s biodefense system. They face two decisions: will we maintain our global public health “bases” to detect threats and contain them early—or only respond once threats hit our shores?

Maintaining these “warm” bases will require a plan of action for continuing PEPFAR, polio and immunization programs, not just in theory, but in practice through offices and active presence around the world. The question facing the administration and congress is this: will we retain the skilled workforce, flexible funding, and operational authority needed to respond rapidly to outbreaks or other biological threats anywhere in the world? If so, doing so requires maintaining warm bases worldwide built on trusted partnerships, collaborations, and enhancements to other countries’ capacity to respond to threats when they emerge. If the U.S. fails to do so, outbreaks will spread further, last longer, and the threat of imported cases of Ebola and other diseases reaching U.S. shores will increase. And the risk of a catastrophic biological event, whether naturally occurring or manmade, will grow.

A National Security Imperative

We don’t close military bases in unstable regions and hope for the best—we maintain forward deployment to prevent emergencies. The same logic applies to public health.

Our adversaries also understand the value of forward deployment against biological threats. They have learned from watching what the United States does so well. After mass cuts to the federal public health workforce earlier this year, Chinese recruiters aggressively swooped in to attract US-based scientists and researchers, advertising high salaries and positions at prestigious companies and universities. As China targets American researchers from top universities and scientists dismissed by the NIH, the United States is faced with the risk of a brain drain, and the potential to hand over our global health talent and leadership to China. As we pull back, forces like China’s Centers for Disease Control (China CDC) are moving forward by filling the funding gaps, dispatching technical experts, training local public health staff, and partnering in laboratory diagnostics and early-warning systems, ensuring China will have a head start on threats that are surely to come.

CDC’s 2024 record speaks for itself: more than 3,200 experts trained and ready to deploy, monitoring more than 30 potential biological threats daily, and supporting 44 countries to respond to Ebola, mpox, measles, cholera, and more, in partnership with more than newly 11,000 trained health professionals around the world. You can’t rebuild that overnight. And you can’t surge trust.

The post Dismantling CDC’s Global Work is Dismantling Our First Line of Biodefense appeared first on Just Security.

Time for Rightsizing: Change is Coming to the UN Counterterrorism System

Jordan Street — Fri, 20 Jun 2025 08:50:58 -0400

Diplomats at the United Nations in New York have their 2025 buzzword: “UN80.” It’s a quintessential U.N.-style acronym for the reform process to mark the 80th anniversary of the U.N. system. While it sounds like a planned and virtuous project, in reality it is a hasty restructuring to balance the books. Considering impending budget cuts from the Trump administration, virtually every part of the U.N. system is being asked to make budget reductions of approximately one third of its operating costs. For the U.N.’s counterterrorism system specifically, an area that has experienced a significant infusion of resources over the past few years, 25 years of institutional growth might be coming to an end. This actually could be positive, if done right.

The UN80 process offers an opportunity to shift sprawling counterterrorism structures that have been overwhelmingly weighted towards hard security into a an approach that fits more comfortably with the U.N.’s core purpose: focusing clearly on its core pillars of peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights and humanitarian affairs. Yet, with all reform processes, there are real risks. Namely, talks of mergers, consolidations, reductions, and relocations might lead to the weakening of the wrong parts of the U.N. counterterrorism system. To guard against this, U.N. member States — and U.N. leadership — should carefully balance proposed reforms with three clear tests:

Will the changes enable balanced implementation across the four pillars of the U.N.s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the guiding mandate for the U.N.’s counterterrorism system;
Is the new offering rooted in international law, including humanitarian law, international human rights law, and respect for the rule of law — in line with the U.N. Charter and recently reiterated by consensus in the body’s Pact for the Future;
Is the correct expertise in place to ensure that the counterterrorism work of the U.N. system does not inadvertently support harmful approaches at a national or local level that would negatively impact the U.N.s reputation.

Pieces of the Puzzle

The U.N. counterterrorism architecture is comprised of three main entities. The U.N. Office of Counterterrorism (UNOCT), established in 2017, sits within the U.N. Secretariat and has five core parts to its mandate: 1) leadership on U.N. General Assembly counterterrorism mandates, 2) coordination of counterterrorism activities across the U.N. system, 3) capacity building assistance for member States, 4) resource mobilization, and 5) ensuring that “due priority is given to counterterrorism” across the U.N. system. No part of the U.N. system has grown more quickly than the UNOCT. Beginning with just seven staff members, the contribution from the regular budget swelled 700 percent by 2025, allowing its staff to grow to 60 people. Sold to the U.N. General Assembly’s Administrative and Budgetary Committee (“Fifth Committee”) as a necessary step to put the office on more sustainable financial footing, the increase was only needed because of the influx of huge extrabudgetary resources by Qatar and Saudi Arabia into the counterterrorism work of the U.N. Despite this budget increase, evidence of effectiveness and value for money has been hard to come by.

The U.N. Counter-terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), a “special political mission “mandated by the U.N. Security Council in 2004, assists the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee in monitoring the implementation of related council resolutions, as well as conducting in-country visits to assess State compliance with these resolutions. Finally, the Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) in the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, the oldest counterterrorism entity set up in 1997, is tasked with providing substantive “capacity-building support” to member States to comply with international instruments on terrorism and delivering law enforcement and criminal justice support to States. In recent years, the Terrorism Prevention Branch has moved towards other counterterrorism work, including efforts to prevent violent extremism.

There have been many criticisms of the work of the U.N. counterterrorism system over the past few years – from U.N. member States, independent U.N. experts, U.N. entities themselves, and civil society (including some by this author). Many have questioned the work of the three main offices for their lack of engagement with civil society, focus on people-centered security or the lack of prioritization of human rights and gender in activities. Some have noted the risks – and evidence — that the U.N. counterterrorism structures and approaches too often and unnecessarily violate human rights and contribute to the closing space for civil society organizations to operate.

Oversight of the work of the wider U.N. counterterrorism system has also been severely lacking. Different parts have been criticized for working with and supporting authorities that have wielded counterterrorism mechanisms to target civil society groups, religious minorities or political opponents. Many stakeholders — U.N. member States included — have pushed for better transparency within the U.N. counterterrorism architecture. Some have been concerned that the U.N.’s counterterrorism efforts have followed funds, rather than Security Council or General Assembly mandates or the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

The current U.N. reform process — and member States involved in it — should then take all of these experiences into account.

UN80 as It Stands

Following the leak in early May of an internal document from the U.N. task force working on UN80, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres indicated plans for the “consolidation within UNOCT of all counter-terrorism activities spread in the system.” Specifically, these include:

Mergers: A potential merging of the Terrorism Prevention Branch with UNOCT is clearly in the cards in an attempt to reduce duplication and streamline mandates.
Consolidations and reductions: Failing a full merger in the event of opposition from some member States, different parts of the counterterrorism mandates might be consolidated or reduced. For UNOCT, given its recent speedy growth and its cost to the regular budget, a reduction could be likely. A decision on CTED, an entity that exists as a result of U.N. Security Council resolutions, might be made as part of the renewal process of that mandate in December 2025.
Relocations: By the end of 2026, New York may no longer be the home of the U.N.’s counterterrorism system. Transferring New York-based staff and offices to other U.N. locations could represent significant cost savings. Diplomatic chatter indicates that some U.N. member States — Turkey and Kuwait, for instance — have used this crisis moment as an opportunity to suggest hosting parts of the U.N. counterterrorism system in their countries.

Guidance for Reform

For U.N. member States wishing to see the U.N. counterterrorism mechanisms work more responsibly and effectively, the following three points should be seen as useful guidance:

Mergers With a Purpose

A merger of U.N. counterterrorism entities risks diluting some of the strengths of the system, rather than improving it. While the mandates of the Terrorism Prevention Branch and UNOCT are not so incompatible, a merger still might not be an advisable move. A June 2024 research paper I co-authored for my organization, Saferworld, reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of the Terrorism Prevention Branch. While we noted many areas where improvement is required, we found that the branch’s value comes from strong expertise among its personnel in criminal justice and rule of law, with some clear examples of relevant and impactful work. Merging these functions into UNOCT — an office with a significantly different culture and background — might lead to the loss of such expertise.

Similarly, any attempt to merge CTED — given its status as a special political mission serving a U.N. Security Council committee — with a Secretariat office will create significant challenges. CTEDs country-assessment visits are closely guarded and, despite pushes by many in civil society for better transparency, remain almost entirely closed. These country assessments provide information about States’ compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions related to counterterrorism and other gaps or shortcomings, so there is a logical argument for better coordination of these findings across the U.N. counterterrorism system. Yet many other practicalities make a merger hard to fathom.

Protecting Core Functions and Reducing the Potential for Harm

UNOCT cannot — and should not — be the home for all parts of the U.N.’s work related to counterterrorism. The majority of terror attacks occur in conflict-affected areas, and so the best offer the U.N. can make on counterterrorism is investing in prevention and strategies to address the rise of violent conflict. That means parts of the U.N. counterterrorism system should support the U.N.s work on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, rather than the other way around.

Additionally, human rights-related expertise should be part of what counterterrorism mechanisms offer, but it can in no way make up for the human rights leadership and mandate of the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Saferworld’s research has shown that too often the human rights functions that sit within U.N. counterterrorism entities are deprioritized and narrowly focused on minimal compliance with U.N. policies.

Similarly, the U.N.’s counterterrorism work related to gender — which is a key part of the U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy — cannot all be integrated within UNOCT. Ensuring UN Women remains a lead is vital to ensuring that this issue is prioritized and is the best way of maintaining a focus on the serious risks (such as reprisals and targeting) facing women-led organizations and women’s rights defenders. While it is essential that UNOCT maintains its gender and human rights expertise, these should be complementary to the institutional mandate holders — UN Women and OHCHR — rather than becoming the sole home for this work in the U.N. system. All U.N. agencies working on counterterrorism — including UNOCT — should be integrating human rights and gender perspectives into their strategies, approaches, and programs to ensure the specific needs and roles are accounted for. But if OHCHR’s and UN Women’s work related to counterterrorism is not protected, the U.N. system will lose an important accountability function, and its overall effectiveness will be diminished.

Keep Reductions in Line with Core Mandates

Underpinning the reform options that have been presented for the U.N. counterterrorism system is an acknowledgement that mandates are split across the U.N. system. In that sense, streamlining mandates related to counterterrorism to coordinate such work across U.N. organizations and programs does make sense. For the OCT, a re-examination of its mandate would be a worthwhile exercise. Offering policy guidance to the wider U.N. system and to member States and delivering accurate, transparent and timely reporting to States are all functions that should be prioritized (though it sounds basic, that has rarely happened). Beyond that, member States should be open to a conversation about what they are really getting from the rest of OCTs mandate and whether the various events, special projects, and high-level conferences represent value for money. For the Terrorism Prevention Branch, the reality is that there is little clarity about the true effectiveness of its capacity building and programming. For example, evaluations of the Terrorism Prevention Branch’s programming measure management success and outputs but cannot indicate actual outcomes (changes that have occurred as a result of the branch’s work) or whether “terrorism” is being prevented. Finally for CTED, the U.N. Security Council will need to negotiate a new mandate by the end of 2025 and make a similar assessment.

What Next?

Revised estimates for the U.N.’s program budget for the 2026 calendar year will be presented to U.N. member States in September. States will then negotiate a final 2026 budget by the end of 2025. Further reductions are likely to come during the 2027 budget process next year. There is a risk that moving a major reform so quickly will undermine the work of the U.N. Yet, for those member States that have raised skepticism about the fast growth of the counterterrorism architecture, this reform presents an opportunity to help push for some much-needed changes.

Rightsizing the U.N. counterterrorism system has the potential to create a more streamlined approach for States and communities around the world. It is critical that the new system carries out balanced implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, with a grounding in international law and with respect for human rights and the rule of law. This would hopefully be more people-centered, and less focused on hard security and more on the needs of people, rather than what one donor State wishes to do to burnish its image in New York. Such a system ultimately will benefit all those who care about ensuring the U.N. overall serves the world as it is intended to do.

The post Time for Rightsizing: Change is Coming to the UN Counterterrorism System appeared first on Just Security.

Collection: Just Security’s Coverage of Trump Administration Executive Actions

Just Security — Fri, 20 Jun 2025 00:05:41 -0400

On Jan. 20, President Donald Trump began his term with presidential actions including 26 executive orders, with more expected to follow. Just Security is covering key developments, including in concise “What Just Happened” expert explainers, legal and policy analysis, and more.

Originally published Jan. 21, 2025, and frequently updated.

A. Resources

Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions

Ryan Goodman and Audrey Balliette, Timeline: Politicization and Weaponization of Justice Department in Second Trump Administration

B. “What Just Happened” Series

Kathleen Claussen, What Just Happened: The Tariff Litigation Advances (Jun. 4, 2025)

Chiraag Bains, What Just Happened: The Trump Administration’s Dismissal of Voting Rights Lawsuits (May 27, 2025)

Dani Schulkin, Tess Bridgeman and Andrew Miller, What Just Happened: The Trump Administration’s Reorganization of the State Department – and How We Got Here (Apr. 22, 2025)

Stefanie Feldman, What Just Happened: The Trump Administration Repealed Zero Tolerance Policy for Rogue Gun Dealers (Apr. 15, 2025)

Kathleen Claussen, What Just Happened: The Trump Administration’s Latest Moves on Tariffs (Apr. 3, 2025)

Ahilan Arulanantham and Adam Cox, Explainer on First Amendment and Other Legal Issues in Deportation of Pro-Palestinian Student Activist(s) (Mar. 12, 2025)

Brett Holmgren, What Just Happened: Security and Foreign Policy Implications of Pausing Intelligence Sharing with Ukraine (Mar. 6, 2025)

Nicholas Bednar, What Just Happened: Musk-OPM Send Email to Federal Employees Asking for Five Accomplishments (Feb. 22, 2025)

Roderick M. Hills, What Just Happened: Purges at the DOJ and FBI – How Do and Don’t the Civil Service Laws Apply (Feb. 14, 2025)

Alex Finley, What Just Happened: Security Implications of Trump’s Efforts to Trim the CIA Workforce (Feb. 7, 2025)

Jonathan Hafetz and Rebecca Ingber, What Just Happened: At Guantanamo’s Migrant Operation Center (Feb. 6, 2025)

Kathleen Claussen, What Just Happened: New Tariffs on Products from Mexico, Canada, and China (Feb. 5, 2025)

Tess Bridgeman, What May Be About to Happen: Can the President Dissolve USAID by Executive Order? (Feb. 1, 2025)

Brad Brooks-Rubin, What Just Happened: Trump’s Termination of West Bank Settler Sanctions (Jan. 30, 2025)

William Banks, What Just Happened: The Framing of a Migration “Invasion” and the Use of Military Authorities (Jan. 29, 2025)

Ilya Somin, What Just Happened: The “Invasion” Executive Order and Its Dangerous Implications (Jan. 28, 2025)

Tom Ellison, What Just Happened: Trump’s Executive Actions on Environment and Implications for US Climate Security (Jan. 24, 2025)

Ahilan Arulanantham, What Just Happened: Sanctuary Policies and the DOJ Memo’s Empty Threat of Criminal Liability (Jan. 23, 2025)

Andrew Weissmann, What Just Happened: What Trump’s Hobbling Privacy Oversight Board Portends for Exercise of Surveillance Powers (Jan. 22, 2025)

Justin Hendrix, What Just Happened: Trump’s Announcement of the Stargate AI Infrastructure Project (Jan. 22, 2025)

Tom Joscelyn, What Just Happened: Trump’s January 6 Pardons and Assaults on Law Enforcement Officers By The Numbers (Jan. 22, 2025)

Mark Nevitt, What Just Happened: Unpacking Exec Order on National Emergency at the Southern Border (Jan. 21, 2025)

Tess Bridgeman and Rebecca Hamilton, What Just Happened: With ICC Sanctions (Jan. 21, 2025)

Sue Biniaz, What Just Happened: Withdrawing from Paris and other International Environmental Agreement Actions (Jan. 21, 2025)

C. Analysis and Perspectives

Ryan Goodman and Steve Vladeck, The Posse Comitatus Act Meets the President’s “Protective Powers”: What’s Next in Newsom v. Trump (June 20, 2025)

Adam Grogg and John Lewis, The Legal Defects in the Trump Administration’s Attempts to Deregulate Without Notice and Comment (Jun. 17, 2025)

Rachel Levinson-Waldman and Melanie Geller, How DHS’s New Social Media Vetting Policies Threaten Free Speech (Jun. 17, 2025)

Scott Busby and Charles O. (Cob) Blaha, How the Proposed State Department Reorganization Guts U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy (Jun. 6, 2025)

Cathy Buerger, Unequal Before the Law: How Trump’s Death Penalty Order Codifies Dangerous Speech (Jun. 6, 2025)

Suzanne Summerlin, Too Big to Be Lawful: A Federal Court Halts Mass Layoffs Across the Civil Service (Jun. 3, 2025)

Kristin A. Collins, Gerald Neuman and Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Another Reason Trump’s Birthright Citizenship Order is Unlawful (May 15, 2025)

Rebecca Hamilton, The Trump Administration’s Use of State Power: Keeping Track of the Big Picture (May 2, 2025)

Mark Nevitt, The New “National Defense Area” at the Southern Border: What You Need to Know (Apr. 29, 2025)

Harold Hongju Koh, Fred Halbhuber and Inbar Pe’er, No, the President Cannot Enforce the Law-Firm Deals (Apr. 28, 2025)

Paul M. Barrett, Justice Department Fails to Address Central Point in VOA Case (Apr. 24, 2025)

Ahilan Arulanantham, Deportation to CECOT: The Constitutional Prohibition on Punishment Without Charge or Trial (Apr. 23, 2025)

Aadhithi Padmanabhan, The Fox TV Problem with Deporting International Students (Apr. 21, 2025)

John Mikhail, Birthright Citizenship and DOJ’s Misuse of History in Its Appellate Briefs (Apr. 18, 2025)

Paul M. Barrett, Unpacking the Voice of America Litigation (Apr. 10, 2025)

Harold Hongju Koh, Fred Halbhuber and Inbar Pe’er, No, the President Cannot Issue Bills of Attainder (Apr. 9, 2025)

Francisco Bencosme and Michael Schiffer, America’s Absence in Myanmar’s Early Earthquake Response: A Moral and Strategic Failure (Apr. 4, 2025)

Marty Lederman, Remarkable Things in the Government’s Alien Enemies Act Briefs to the Supreme Court (Apr. 3, 2025)

Stephanie Psaki and Beth Cameron, Dropping U.S. Biodefenses: Why Cuts to Federal Health Agencies Make Americans Less Safe (Apr. 3, 2025)

Edgar Chen and Chris M. Kwok, The Trump Administration’s 14th Amendment Retcon: ‘Wong Kim Ark’ Does Not Limit Birthright Citizenship (Mar. 28, 2025)

Mary B. McCord, Dissecting the Trump Administration’s Strategy for Defying Court Orders (Mar. 25, 2025)

Rebecca Hamilton, The Imperative of Solidarity in Response to Assaults on Legal Services, Universities, and Independent Media (Mar. 24, 2025)

Andrew Weissmann, The New “Blacklists” Work When Law Firms Stay Silent (Mar. 24, 2025)

Katherine Yon Ebright, The Courts Can Stop Abuse of the Alien Enemies Act – The Political Question Doctrine is No Bar (Mar. 20, 2025)

Rebecca Ingber and Scott Roehm, The Trump Administration’s Recent Removals to El Salvador Violate the Prohibition on Transfer to Torture (Mar. 20, 2025)

Mark Pomar, Trump Move to Eliminate VOA, RFE/RL Ignores Lessons of Global Power (Mar. 20, 2025)

Jean Garner, Journalists Who Took Risks for US-Funded Broadcasters Threatened Anew by Trump Shutdown (Mar. 18, 2025)

Ambassador Daniel Fried, The US Government’s Self-Harm in Killing Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Mar. 17, 2025)

Faiza Patel, U.S. AI-Driven “Catch and Revoke” Initiative Threatens First Amendment Rights (Mar. 18, 2025)

Steve Vladeck, 5 Big Questions in the Alien Enemies Act Litigation (Mar. 16, 2025)

Noor Hamadeh and David McKean, Suspension of FCPA Enforcement Is Bad for U.S. and Global Business (Mar. 13, 2025)

Brian O’Neill, The President’s Declassification Power is a Double-Edged Sword (Feb. 28, 2025)

Michael Schiffer and Anka Lee, Trump’s China Tariff Now Treats Hong Kong the Same as the Mainland, a First in US Policy (Feb. 27, 2025)

Bill Frelick, The Racial Twist in Trump’s Cutoff of Refugee Admissions (Feb. 27, 2025)

Daniel Jacobson, The Trump Administration Cannot Use Award Terms and Conditions to Impound Funds (Feb. 24, 2025)

Mark Nevitt, How the Pentagon Personnel Firings Threaten Our Apolitical Military (Feb. 24, 2025)

Brian Finucane, U.S. Military Action in Mexico: Almost Certainly Illegal, Definitely Counterproductive (Feb. 20, 2025)

Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Attempt to Purge Trans Members from the Armed Services (Feb. 19, 2025)

Elizabeth Goitein and Katherine Yon Ebright, Trump’s Doubly Flawed “Invasion” Theory (Feb. 19, 2025)

Seth Binder, Sheridan Cole, and Haydn Welch, The Disastrous Costs of the Foreign Foreign Aid Freeze on US Interests in the Middle East and North Africa (Feb. 14, 2025)

Laura Booth, Can the President Dismantle the Department of Education by Executive Order? (Feb. 14, 2025)

Scott Busby, Freezing Support to Democracy and Human Rights Activists Undermines US Interests (Feb. 13, 2025)

Laura Thornton, Supporting Freedom and a Foreign Aid Freeze are Incompatible – But Perhaps the Point? A Case Study (Feb. 13, 2025)

Donell Harvin, The Need for Course Correction: The Risks of Treating Drug Cartels as Terrorist Threats (Feb. 12, 2025)

Winona Xu, As Sexual Violence Surges in Goma, US Aid Remains Crucial (Feb. 12, 2025)

16 US Human Rights Experts, Current and Former Members of UN Bodies, “The Trump Administration’s Attacks on International Law and Institutions”: Public Statement of American Human Rights Experts, Current and Former Members of UN Bodies (Feb. 10, 2025)

Simon Lomax, Greg Clough, Morgan Bazilian, Restarting US LNG Permitting Brings Geopolitical Benefits and the Potential for Climate Progress (Feb. 10, 2025)

Rebecca Hamilton, Connecting the Dots: Trump’s Tightening Grip on Press Freedom (Feb. 6, 2025)

Rachel Levinson-Waldman, The Dangerous Sweep of Trump’s Plan to Designate Cartels as Terrorist Organizations (Feb. 5, 2025)

Marty Lederman, The Most Indefensible Aspects of DOJ’s Briefs in the Birthright Citizenship Cases (Feb. 4, 2025)

Suzanne Summerlin, Federal Employee Rights: What Probationary Employees Need to Know (Jan. 31, 2025)

Faiza Patel, Trump’s Executive Order on Foreign Terrorists: Implications for the Rights of Non-Citizens (Jan. 31, 2025)

Sara Zdeb, The Real Reason Trump’s Purge of Career DOJ Officials Should Alarm You (Jan. 30, 2025)

Suzanne Summerlin, Beware the “Deferred Resignation” Offer: A Legally Dubious Prop

In Crisis With Iran, U.S. Military Officials Focus on Strait of Hormuz

Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt and John Ismay — Thu, 19 Jun 2025 13:28:01 -0400

Pentagon officials are trying to prepare for all of the ways Iran could retaliate, as President Trump hints at what he might do.

Collection: Israel-Iran Conflict

Just Security — Thu, 19 Jun 2025 01:06:03 -0400

On June 13, Israel’s military launched a series of strikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities and scientists, military sites, and leadership, marking a major escalation in ongoing tensions between the two countries.

In this collection, experts analyze critical dimensions of Israel’s strikes and responses from Iran and other actors, covering topics including nuclear diplomacy; strategic, security, and regional implications; and the legality of various actions under international law. This collection will be updated as events continue to unfold; we invite you to check back regularly for the latest.

Adil Haque, Indefensible: Israel’s Unlawful Attack on Iran (forthcoming June 19, 2025)
Brian Egan and Tess Bridgeman, Top Experts’ Backgrounder: Military Action Against Iran and US Domestic Law (updated on June 18, 2025)
Dalia Dassa Kaye, Israel and Iran: A War with No Off-Ramp (June 17, 2025)
Amichai Cohen and Yuval Shany, A New War or a New Stage in Ongoing War – Observations on June 13 Israeli Attack against Iran (June 15, 2025)
Nima Gerami, The Strategic Stakes after Israel’s Strikes on Iran (June 13, 2025)
Brian O’Neill, The Israeli Strike on Iran the U.S. Saw Coming, but Couldn’t Stop (June 13, 2025)
Kelsey Davenport, Israeli Strikes Risk Driving Iran Toward Nuclear Weapons (June 13, 2025)

The post Collection: Israel-Iran Conflict appeared first on Just Security.

Trump, Iran and the Specter of Iraq: ‘We Bought All the Happy Talk’

Elisabeth Bumiller — Wed, 18 Jun 2025 21:22:22 -0400

President Trump is pondering swift military action in Iran. There were similar expectations that the war in Iraq would be quick and triumphant.

U.S. Strike on Iran Would Bring Risks at Every Turn

David E. Sanger — Wed, 18 Jun 2025 18:27:55 -0400

The largest perils may lie in the aftermath, many experts say, just as they did in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Iran Crisis Overshadowed as Senators Squabble at Hearing

Greg Jaffe — Wed, 18 Jun 2025 18:14:50 -0400

A hearing featuring Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth exposed a major divide over the dangers of using U.S. troops domestically.

Open-Source Information Provides Powerful Evidence of Gender Crimes in Iran and Beyond

Andrea Richardson — Wed, 18 Jun 2025 08:19:46 -0400

A smartphone focuses on people clustered on a dark road, backlit by streetlights and sheltered by skinny trees. The group is protesting as part of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in Iran, which began in 2022 after Mahsa Amini, a young Iranian woman, died in police custody. The protesters are demanding fundamental political change, greater recognition of women’s rights, and an end to the violent enforcement of hijab laws by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Suddenly, the phone records the crack of three gunshots. By the third shot, the camera loses focus and appears to tumble out of its holder’s hands, capturing a thud as that person presumably hits the ground. The video, eventually uploaded to social media, will race across the internet — apparent footage of the killing of a protestor.

This video is one of millions recorded by activists and bystanders and shared to social media each year, broadcasting conflict and crisis from local communities to the broader world. Because of the potentially significant legal and journalistic value of such posts, collectives such as the Iran Digital Archive Coalition have formed to coordinate efforts to locate, verify, and amplify the stories of victims and survivors that are documented in digital spaces. In the case of the Coalition, which is composed of six leading investigative organizations with varying areas of expertise, the goal is to leverage one of the greatest strengths of digital open-source information: providing a glimpse of what is happening in countries that are difficult or impossible for foreign reporters, investigators, and others to access.

Although open-source information has proven a powerful resource for numerous investigations — from the cause of the downing of flight MH17 to contested killings in Bucha, Ukraine, to the Washington D.C. riots of January 6th — it has rarely been used to intentionally investigate gender-related crimes. As a result, our team at the Human Rights Center at UC Berkeley has been exploring how digital open-source data can be ethically and effectively deployed to strengthen investigations, prosecutions, research, and reporting on systematic and conflict-related sexual violence. Our efforts have resulted in two new outputs. One report, Gender Persecution in the Islamic Republic of Iran, illustrates how open-source information can help establish the elements of the international crime against humanity of gender persecution, for which there has yet to be a successful conviction. The second is a set of guidelines to help open-source practitioners incorporate minimum ethical standards when handling sensitive open-source data related to sexual violence.

Gender Persecution as a Crime Against Humanity

Although gender persecution as a crime against humanity was codified with the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998, there is little related jurisprudence from the International Criminal Court (ICC). It was not until 2010 that the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor first referenced gender persecution as a basis for an arrest warrant. The ICC did not formally charge persecution on the basis of gender until 2018 in the Al Hassan case, which focused on crimes allegedly perpetrated in Timbuktu, Mali from 2012 to 2013.

Valerie Oosterveld, special adviser on crimes against humanity to the ICC Prosecutor, has stated that the “difficult nature” of the negotiations that led to the establishment of gender persecution as a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute, coupled with the concomitant “opaque nature” of the resulting elements of the crime, may have served as an initial deterrent to the Prosecutor filing gender persecution cases. In an effort to encourage and strengthen investigations of gender persecution, Lisa Davis, special adviser to the Prosecutor of the ICC on gender persecution, and attorney Jaime Gher have drafted a seminal toolkit for Identifying Gender Persecution in Conflict and Atrocities. They point out that, despite over 20 years of official recognition, rarely is gender persecution documented, investigated, or prosecuted, leaving a massive gap in the effectuation of justice.

Despite the lack of accountability, gender persecution is undeniably occurring. Relying in part on open-source information, the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Iran (FFMI) issued a March 2024 report establishing that high-level officials in Iran had perpetrated gender persecution as a crime against humanity in the context of the protests and associated repression of fundamental rights, and through the Iranian government’s policies and enforcement of mandatory hijab. Similarly, our Coalition’s report spotlights 11 online-documented incidents in which Iranian forces appear to have perpetrated gender-related crimes against civilians. We conducted an in-depth analysis of these 11 incidents, selected from the many we identified, in order to underscore the powerful role that digital open-source information can play in establishing gender persecution under the Rome Statute. For example, open-source videos cited in the Coalition report establish that:

Sepideh Rashnu was targeted due to her perceived defiance against mandatory hijab and her identity as someone fighting for greater gender equality in Iran;
Zahra Haghighatian was sexually assaulted and detained by Iranian forces while peacefully protesting for the Woman, Life, Freedom movement;
Mehdi Hazrati was fatally shot and killed by Iranian forces suppressing Woman, Life, Freedom protesters; and
Numerous women were violently detained by morality police enforcing the Iranian government’s mandatory hijab

The report also illustrates how investigations into gender-related crimes are accompanied by additional and heightened ethical challenges. As a result of such challenges, our investigators spent a substantial time in the initial phases of the investigation identifying relevant principles to guide the investigation. These ethical principles and procedures reflected those in the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations, which sets minimum international standards for digital open-source investigations. The ethical principle of “do no harm,” for example, requires that the safety, integrity, and dignity of victims and survivors be prioritized throughout the investigation. For ethical guidance and legal analysis, Coalition investigators also relied heavily on the ICC’s 2022 Policy on the Crime of Gender Persecution and additional guidance provided by the Gender Persecution Toolkit.

Social media platforms continue to be an important tool for Iranian people seeking to share their experiences with an international audience. Despite this, the FFMI’s second report, released in March, noted that the Iranian government had ramped up its use of technology to surveil women and girls for lack of compliance with mandatory hijab and engaging in protests, showing how digital technologies can be a double-edged sword. As a result, we were very careful about which incidents we chose to amplify in our report. The incidents we selected from social media were those that appeared to pose minimal risk to survivors’ physical, digital, and psychosocial security. We considered the survivor’s or their family’s apparent interest in bringing attention to their experiences, as well as (in several cases) insights provided by those with direct contact with the survivors and their loved ones. Investigators did not delve further when security or ethical risks were relatively unclear.

Who Is Targeted and Why

Investigators on this project utilized an approach that considered “intersectionality,” the ways in which different forms of persecution may overlap, such as gender, class, religion, or ethnicity. This intersectional approach to our analysis led to a better understanding of the experiences of the victims and survivors. The works of Alexandra Lily Kather describe intersectionality and positionality (the relationship of the researcher or investigator to the situation they are investigating) as central pillars in the ecosystem of international criminal justice work. Priya Gopalan has similarly depicted intersectionality analysis as a potent tool to further a fundamental precept of international criminal law, finding such an analysis foundational to the conception and analysis of an investigation.

With regards to crimes carried out in Iran, the intersectional nature of the attacks on victims is apparent. All of the people featured in our report were targeted on the basis of gender-related activities According to the FFMI, however, civilians residing in Kurdish-majority or Baluch-majority regions (ethnic groups in Iran) suffered disproportionate discrimination during the Iranian government’s violent crackdown. This included enhanced targeting and suffering especially violent attacks, along with receiving harsher punishments than people from other demographics. Poorer families with fewer resources to fight state persecution have also been disproportionately victimized, and their attackers enjoy a higher rate of impunity.

Open-source information confirmed these complexities for several of the investigation’s victims. Focusing solely on gender–and not the ways in which people were also targeted on the basis of ethnicity or class–would have obfuscated the intersectional nature of the Iranian government’s crimes. The inclusion of investigators with relevant cultural and linguistic knowledge, specialized knowledge of Iran-related digital spaces, and familiarity with gender issues in Iran was imperative to identifying meaningful open-source content, but also to analyzing content in a manner that was as ethical and effective as possible.

International Guidelines for Open-Source Practitioners

To support the broader and growing interest in using digital open-source information for systematic and conflict-related sexual violence and expand these insights to contexts outside of Iran, we have been working with the Institute for International Criminal Investigations over the past two years to develop an Open-Source Pracitioner’s Guide to the Murad Code. Officially titled the Global Code of Conduct for Gathering and Using Information about Systematic and Conflict Related Sexual Violence (SCRSV), the Murad Code shares minimum standards for the “safe, effective and ethical gathering of information about SCRSV.” The Code was named after human rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Nadia Murad. Released in 2022, the Murad Code was designed to help investigators gather information about SCRSV in ways that are survivor-centered and trauma-informed, to improve the experience of survivors when participating in investigative processes. However, the Murad Code focuses on the primary means of collecting evidence in cases of sexual and gender-based violence: interviews with survivors, which assume direct contact with those most affected. It spends little time on the identification, verification, and use of digital data discovered online.

The just-released draft of the Open-Source Practitioner’s Guide is motivated by Principle 8 of the Murad Code, which directs researchers to also “gather information from other sources” including “information which is not from…survivors” as well as “indirectly sourced information” such as information from the public domain, online archives, or otherwise accessible online. The guidelines translate the principles of the Murad Code, but re-order the guidance to better mirror an open-source investigation workflow. The new draft also spotlights issues that investigators should consider and prepare for, especially during the planning and preparation phase. We hope other researchers and investigators will use the draft guidelines and share feedback about their experience, which we will then incorporate into a final version to be translated into multiple languages and formally launched later this year.

The post Open-Source Information Provides Powerful Evidence of Gender Crimes in Iran and Beyond appeared first on Just Security.

Just Security’s Russia–Ukraine War Archive

Clara Apt — Wed, 18 Jun 2025 08:15:22 -0400

Since late 2021, Just Security has published more than 300 articles analyzing the diplomatic, political, legal, economic, humanitarian, and other issues and consequences of Russia’s war on Ukraine, including many in Ukrainian translation.

The catalog below organizes our collection of articles primarily about the war into general categories to facilitate access to relevant topics for policymakers, researchers, journalists, scholars, and the public at large. The archive will be updated as new pieces are published.

We welcome readers to use this catalog to follow the unfolding situation and generate new lines of analysis. To search headlines and authors, expand one or all of the topics, as needed, and use CTRL-F on your keyboard to open the search tool. The archive also is available in reverse chronological order at the Russia-Ukraine War articles page.

Expand all Collapse all

Diplomacy

Can Trump Seize a Win in Ukraine?
by Ambassador Daniel Fried (June 5, 2025)

The Just Security Podcast: Peace Diplomacy and the Russo-Ukraine War
by Brianna Rosen and Janina Dill interview with Sir Lawrence Freedman as part of the University of Oxford's Calleva-Airey Neave Global Security Seminar Series (May 14, 2025)

The U.S.-Ukraine Agreement: Legality and Transparency
by Curtis A. Bradley, Jack Goldsmith and Oona A. Hathaway (May 6, 2025)

How to Land the Emerging Deal on Peace for Ukraine
by Ambassador Daniel Fried (April 30, 2025)

Negotiations at Gunpoint: Does U.S. Pressure on Ukraine for a Minerals Deal Amount to Unlawfully Procuring a Treaty by Use of Force?
by Jeremy Pizzi and Maksym Vishchyk (April 17, 2025)

Intelligence Sharing Is a True Measure of U.S. Strategic Realignment with Russia
by Brian O'Neill (March 26, 2025)

Putin and Trump Cannot Erase Ukraine, and Joint Efforts to Do So May Backfire
by Maria Popova and Oxana Shevel (March 14, 2025)

What Just Happened: Security and Foreign Policy Implications of Pausing Intelligence Sharing with Ukraine
by Brett Holmgren (March 6, 2025)

Trump’s Russia Reset Is Real — Here’s How Europe Should Respond
by James Batchik and Doug Klain (March 5, 2025)

Trump Administration’s Mixed Signals on Russia and Ukraine May Reflect Internal Strategic Clash
by Ambassador Daniel Fried (February 24, 2025)

Trump’s Endgame for the War in Ukraine
by Michael J. Kelly and Craig Martin (@craigxmartin) (Updated February 14, 2025)

To ‘End’ War in Ukraine, Trump Might Be Tougher on Putin Than Critics Think
by Viola Gienger (@violagienger) (November 21, 2024)

Biden’s Final Efforts on Ukraine – and Trump’s First Moves
by Ambassador Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried) (November 19, 2024)

The Just Security Podcast: NATO’s Washington Summit: Russia’s War on Ukraine Tests Alliance
by Ambassador Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried), Viola Gienger (@violagienger) and Paras Shah (@pshah518) (July 12, 2024)

At the NATO Summit, Strategy and Politics in Play
by Ambassador Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried) (July 9, 2024)

No, Trump Was Not Good for US Alliances. And Without Changes, Trump 2.0 Will Be Worse.
by Lisa Homel (@LisaHomel) and Ambassador Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried) (May 3, 2024)

A Simple US Step Can Help Protect Another Imprisoned Democracy Activist in Russia
by Natalia Arno (@Natalia_Budaeva) and Michael Breen (@M_Breen) (April 1, 2024)

The ‘Murky’ Morality of Opposition to US Support for Ukraine: A Response
by Mariana Budjeryn (@mbudjeryn) (October 10, 2023)

At the NATO Summit, Do the Right Thing for Ukraine’s — and Democracy’s — Future
by Ambassador Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried) (July 7, 2023)
Ukrainian translation: На саміті НАТО, робіть правильні речі для майбутнього України та демократії

Expert Q&A on What International Law Has to Say About Assistance to Russia’s War Against Ukraine
by Catherine Amirfar (May 2, 2023)

Western “Self-Deterrence” is Aiding Putin’s War of Aggression
By Erlingur Erlingsson (@rlingure) and Fridrik Jonsson (@FridrikJonsson) (March 15, 2023)
Ukrainian translation: Західне “самостримування” допомагає агресивній війні Путіна

To Secure Peace in Europe, Bring Ukraine into NATO
by Ambassador Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried) (March 13, 2023)

Q&A: A Ukrainian MP on National Unity and the Drive for the World’s Support
by Ukrainian MP Kira Rudik (@kiraincongress) and Viola Gienger (@violagienger) (February 22, 2023)

In War, Ukraine’s Parliament Asserts Its Democratic Role
by Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko (@GoncharenkoUa) (February 22, 2023)

The United Nations in Hindsight: The Security Council, One Year After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
by Rodrigo Saad (January 31, 2023)

Historic UNGA Resolution Calls for Ukraine Reparations
by Chiara Giorgetti (@ChiaraLawProf), Markiyan Kliuchkovsky (@kliuch), Patrick Pearsall (@Pwpearsall) and Jeremy K. Sharpe (@JKSharpe1648) (November 16, 2022)
Ukrainian translation: Історична резолюція Генеральної Асамблеї ООН закликає до виплати репарацій Україні

Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Fight Can Overcome US Skeptics
by Joshua Rudolph (@JoshRudes) and Norman L. Eisen (@NormEisen) (November 10, 2022)

UN Efforts on Ukraine, However Imperfect, Highlight Importance of International Cooperation
by Suzanne Nossel (@SuzanneNossel) (November 3, 2022)

Poland’s Judicial Reform Falls Short of EU Expectations, Complicating Cooperation Against Russia
by Kristie Bluett, Jasmine Cameron and Scott Cullinane (@ScottPCullinane) (October 3, 2022)

How Congress Should Designate Russia a State Sponsor of Terrorism
by Ingrid (Wuerth) Brunk (@WuerthIngrid) (September 27, 2022)

Mexico’s Initiative for Dialogue and Peace in Ukraine
by Ambassador H.E. Huan Ramón de la Fuente and Pablo Arrocha Olabuenaga (September 23, 2022)

Richard Gowan on Ukraine and How Russia’s War Reverberates at the United Nations
by Richard Gowan (September 20, 2022)
Ukrainian translation: Річард Гоуен про Україну та те, як російська війна дається взнаки в ООН

The UN’s Summit of the Future: Advancing Multilateralism in an Age of Hypercompetitive Geopolitics
by Richard Ponzio and Joris Larik (@JorisLarik) (September 16, 2022)

On Ukraine, Beware the Pitfalls of Interim Peacemaking Deals
by Valery Perry (July 18, 2022)
Ukrainian translation: Щодо України: остерігайтеся пасток тимчасових миротворчих угод

Russia Should Not be Designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism
by Ingrid Wuerth (@WuerthIngrid) (July 11, 2022)

Heed the Lessons From 2011 Libya to Prevail in Ukraine Today
by Ambassador (ret.) Gordon Gray (@AmbGordonGray) (June 28, 2022)

An Offer NATO Cannot (and Should Not) Refuse: Finland’s Membership
by Laleh Ispahani (@lispahani) (May 12, 2022)

Remarks at UN Security Council Arria-Formula Meeting on Ensuring Accountability for Atrocities Committed by Russia in Ukraine
by Amal Clooney (April 28, 2022)

The United Nations in Hindsight: Challenging the Power of the Security Council Veto
by Shamala Kandiah Thompson (@skandiah), Karin Landgren (@LandgrenKarin

Early Edition: June 18, 2025

Beatrice Yahia — Wed, 18 Jun 2025 08:04:33 -0400

Just Security will be on a reduced schedule on Thursday, June 19, 2025, for the Juneteenth holiday. We will not be publishing daily newsletters or articles except in the case of breaking developments. Readers may be interested in catching up on Juneteenth Reading Recommendations from members of our community, and we look forward to being back with you with full content on Friday, June 20.

Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here.

A curated guide to major news and developments over the past 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

ISRAEL-IRAN CONFLICT — U.S. RESPONSE

“We now have complete and total control of the skies over Iran,” President Trump wrote yesterday on social media. Implying U.S. collaboration with Israel’s attacks, the statement marks a contrast from Trump’s previous statements refuting claims Washington was involved in Israel’s offensive against Iran. In another post, Trump said, “We know exactly where the so-called ‘Supreme Leader’ [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] is hiding,” and urged Iran’s “unconditional surrender.” Kathryn Watson, Jennifer Jacobs, and James LaPorta report for CBS News; Ammer Madhani and Chris Megerian report for AP News; Michael R. Gordon, Tarini Parti, and Alex Leary report for the Wall Street Journal.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei today said his nation “will not surrender” and warned of “irreparable harm” if the United States joins Israel’s strikes targeting underground nuclear sites in Iran. The comments follow reports that Trump is considering joining the Israeli campaign on Tehran’s nuclear sites, with officials saying he is growing increasingly warm to the idea of using U.S. military assets. “Any American intervention would be a recipe for an all-out war in the region,” an Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson added. BBC News reports; Abbie Cheeseman reports for the Washington Post; Alayna Treene, Kevin Liptak, Kaitlan Collins, Kylie Atwood, and Natasha Bertrand report.

After meeting with his national security team, Trump yesterday spoke to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about the escalating Israel-Iran conflict, officials told Axios. Ahead of the meeting, Trump was seriously considering joining the war, U.S. officials say. Meanwhile, Israeli officials said that the Israeli government believes Trump is poised to enter the war in the coming days. Barak Ravid and Dave Lawler report.

Iran has prepared missiles and other military equipment for possible retaliatory strikes on U.S. bases in the Middle East should the United States join the Israeli campaign against the country, U.S. officials who have reviewed intelligence reports say. Julian E. Barnes, Farnaz Fassih, Eric Schmitt, and Helene Cooper report for the New York Times.

Before its attack last week, Israel shared intelligence with the United States regarding Iran’s nuclear research and alleged work on an explosive triggering system. In a gap of assessment between the allies, U.S. officials say they are not convinced the information indicates that Iran has made a decision to move forward on building a bomb – an assessment which Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard previously shared with Congress in March. Alexander Ward, Lara Seligman, and Dustin Volz report for the Wall Street Journal.

ISRAEL-IRAN CONFLICT

Israel and Iran traded fresh strikes early today as the conflict enters its sixth day. Israel said it attacked a centrifuge production site and weapons manufacturing sites overnight, while Iran said it used its hypersonic Fattah-1 missile for the first time. Meanwhile, sources say that Israel’s spy agency, the Mossad and the Israeli military worked together for at least three years to lay the groundwork for last week’s attack. The Washington Post reports.

Predatory Sparrow, an Israeli hacking group, yesterday said it attacked Bank Sepah, a major Iranian bank, marking the first significant cyberattack on critical infrastructure in the conflict. While the bank has not publicly commented on the attack, Iranian state media warned the disruptions could impact the country’s gas stations. Separately, Iran’s cyber command has ordered senior officials and their security teams to ditch IT equipment connected to telecom networks. Sam Sabin reports for Axios; Antoaneta Roussi and Dana Nickel report for POLITICO.

ISRAEL-IRAN CONFLICT — INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has praised Israel for doing the “dirty work” for other countries by striking Iran’s nuclear sites. “I can only say I have the greatest respect for the fact that the Israeli army and the Israeli government had the courage to do this,” Merz told German media at the G7 leaders’ summit in Canada. Laurence Norman reports for the Wall Street Journal.

U.S. PROTESTS RESPONSE

Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass yesterday lifted a curfew that had been imposed on the city’s downtown in the wake of immigration enforcement protests. Reuters reports.

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR

The number of people killed yesterday by Israeli tank fire as they attempted to reach aid from trucks in Gaza has been updated to 51, medics say, with a further 221 wounded. In a statement, the IDF said it is “aware of reports regarding a number of injured individuals from IDF fire following the crowd’s approach,” adding that the details of the incident are “under review” and that the IDF “regrets any harm to uninvolved individuals.” Nidal Al-Mughrabi and Hatem Khaled report for Reuters.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR — INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

North Korea will send “two military brigades [of] 5,000 people” to help with the “restoration” of Russia’s war-torn Kursk region, Moscow’s security chief and Russian state media reported today. South Korea and Japan condemned the plan, saying it was a violation of U.N. sanctions on Pyongyang. Koh Ewe reports for BBC News.

GLOBAL AFFAIRS

The EU and Australia yesterday announced they had agreed to begin negotiations on a “Security and Defense Partnership.” The pact “does not have military deployment obligations,” the statement says, focusing on cooperation in areas “such as defense, industry, cyber and counter-terrorism.” Giorgio Leali reports for POLITICO.

An Argentine judge yesterday placed former President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner under house arrest to serve a six-year prison sentence for corruption, marking a dramatic fall for one of the country’s most prominent politicians in recent decades. Nicolás Misculin and Miguel Lo Bianco report for Reuters.

India and Canada signaled a reset in their relationship yesterday by agreeing to restore high commissions in each other’s capitals. The move follows nearly two years of strained relations following Ottawa’s allegations that New Delhi was involved in the killing of a Sikh separatist on Canadian soil. Rhea Mogul reports for CNN.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi yesterday told Trump that the India-Pakistan ceasefire was achieved through direct bilateral talks between the two militaries and not U.S. mediation, according to India’s foreign secretary. The comments are in contrast to Trump’s claims last month that the South Asian neighbors reached a ceasefire following talks mediated by Washington. The White House has not commented on the Modi-Trump call at the time of writing. Shivam Patel reports for Reuters.

U.S. forces have pulled out of two further bases in northeastern Syria, Reuters reporters found, expediting a troop drawdown that the commander of U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish forces said was allowing a resurgence of the self-styled Islamic State group. John Davidson and Orhan Qereman report.

The State Department revoked the travel visas of a former president of Panama, Martín Torrijos, and a Panamanian presidential runner-up, Ricardo Lombana. Torrijos and Lombana alleged the action is a retaliation for their criticism of recent deals made between Panama and Trump. The State Department has declined to explain the revocation, saying, “Visa records are confidential under U.S. law.” Frances Robles reports for the New York Times.

U.S. special envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellog, is slated to travel to Belarus in the coming days to meet the Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko,, sources say, in what would be the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit the authoritarian state in five years. Gram Slatterly and Humeyra Pamuk report for Reuters.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

“The FBI has located documents which detail alarming allegations related to the 2020 U.S. election, including allegations of interference by the CCP,” FBI Director Kash Patel wrote in a social media post yesterday, referring to the Chinese Communist Party. Patel added he has “immediately declassified the material and turned the documents over” to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-IA) for further review.” The unsubstantiated claim, which was presented to the bureau by a confidential source in 2020 during the first Trump administration, alleges that Beijing used mass-produced driver’s licenses to be used in a mail-in ballot scheme. There has been no evidence of widespread voter fraud during the 2020 election. Ryan J. Reilly and David Rodhe report for NBC News.

A Pennsylvania man who was arrested on weapons charges at Saturday’s “No Kings” protest against the Trump administration is facing over two dozen additional charges after investigators said they found 13 homemade bombs, as well as military-style body armor vests and several drawings of grenades at his home, authorities announced yesterday. Neil Vigdor and Hannah Ziegler report for the New York Times.

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS

Federal agents yesterday detained and arrested New York City Comptroller Brad Lander after he attempted to escort an immigrant from his appearance at an immigration court. A video of Lander’s arrest shows him linking arms with the immigrant leaving court as officers, some in plain clothes and others wearing “Federal Agent” labelled vests, pushed through the crowd attempting to separate the two men. A Department of Homeland Security spokesperson said Lander was arrested “for assaulting law enforcement and impeding a federal officer.” Lander was released hours after the arrest and has denied assaulting law enforcement. New York Gov. Kathy Hochul spoke alongside Lander on his release, and said “to my knowledge” any charges had been dropped. María Luisa Paúl, Sarah Ellison, and Shayna Jacobs report for the Washington Post; Ben Kasimar and Zoë Richards report for NBC News.

A federal judge yesterday found Florida’s attorney general, James Uthmeier (R), in civil contempt of court for defying a restraining order that required state attorneys to tell law enforcement agencies to pause enforcing a newly enacted immigration law. Southern Florida District Judge Kathleen M. Williams issued a temporary restraining order in April halting enforcement of the law, which made it a state crime for “any unauthorized alien” to enter or reenter Florida, with an attached minimum nine-month prison sentence. After the injunction, Uthmeier wrote to state law enforcement agencies saying he could not prevent them from enforcing the law “where there remains no judicial order that properly restrains [them] from doing so.” In a post on X yesterday, Uthmeier wrote, “If being held in contempt is what it costs to defend the rule of law and stand firmly behind President Trump’s agenda on illegal immigration, so be it.” Frances Vinall reports for the Washington Post.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

Further reductions are planned to the Justice Department, with 1,500 positions being eliminated from the FBI, according to a department budget summary reviewed by CBS News. The Justice Department has lost 4,000 employees as part of the administration’s “fork in the road” deferred resignation program, the summary shows. Scott MacFarlane reports.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION

A federal judge ruled yesterday that transgender and nonbinary people who are either without a passport or need to renew one can request a male, female, or “X” identification marker – rather than a marker that matches their gender assigned at birth. The ruling by District Judge Julia Kobick follows Trump’s executive order in January, which rejected the notion that someone can transition from the sex assigned at birth to different gender. Michael Casey reports for

France/United States : Amarante International exec quits, exiled Albanian minister lobbying in US, new adviser for Sqope Intelligence

Wed, 11 Jun 2025 00:00:00 -0400

Paris - Amarante International's business intel deputy director to leaveNicolas Boutinot, the deputy director of Amarante International's business intelligence and [...]

France : Public radio security manager barred from working over suspected ties to Chechen Islamists

Wed, 11 Jun 2025 00:00:00 -0400

On 22 May 2025, a Paris administrative court upheld the decision to withdraw the professional licence of a security guard [...]

Law Enforcement Officials Struggle to Fulfill Trump Promises Rooted in Conspiracy Theories

Glenn Thrush, Alan Feuer and Adam Goldman — Mon, 09 Jun 2025 12:50:12 -0400

Top leaders at the Justice Department and the F.B.I. are struggling to fulfill Trump campaign promises often rooted in misinformation and conspiracy theories.

Bombing and Mass Shooting Plot at Washington State Mall Is Foiled, F.B.I. Says

Adeel Hassan — Sat, 07 Jun 2025 14:29:26 -0400

The plot, described by one official as being “as serious as it gets,” involved a plan to shoot moviegoers at a Washington State mall as they fled an explosion.

D.C. Police Officer Sentenced to Prison for Leaks to Proud Boys’ Leader

Isabella Kwai — Sat, 07 Jun 2025 08:18:44 -0400

A federal judge gave Lt. Shane Lamond an 18-month sentence for leaking details of an investigation to Enrique Tarrio, the far-right group’s former leader, and lying about it later.

As Trump Demands More Military Spending, NATO Allies Reconsider What Counts

Lara Jakes and Steven Erlanger — Fri, 23 May 2025 10:47:07 -0400

The president has long pressed European allies to pay more for their own security. So they may redefine what qualifies as security.

The U.S. Army Is Finally Pivoting Toward Future Threats

Ryan D. McCarthy — Wed, 14 May 2025 15:53:28 -0400

A new doctrine will transform the kinds of weapons America uses, how they are purchased and how fast they get into the hands of soldiers.

Hegseth’s Use of Passwords Raises New Security Concerns

Christiaan Triebert, Julian E. Barnes, Helene Cooper and Greg Jaffe — Wed, 07 May 2025 13:44:26 -0400

Revelations about the defense secretary’s passwords came after he discussed details of planned U.S. airstrikes on a messaging app.

NSO Group Ordered to Pay Meta $167 Million in Damages

Eli Tan and Sheera Frenkel — Tue, 06 May 2025 19:40:25 -0400

Meta had sued the firm, NSO Group, for using its spyware to hack 1,400 WhatsApp accounts belonging to journalists, dissidents and others.

Signal Clone Used by Waltz Suspends Service After ‘Security Incident’

Julian E. Barnes — Mon, 05 May 2025 21:07:37 -0400

The clone, TeleMessage, was the subject of a reported hack in which the contents of some direct messages and group chats were stolen.

Trump Is Breaking the Rule That Every Barroom Brawler Knows

Noah Shachtman — Mon, 28 Apr 2025 12:51:01 -0400

Don’t drop your guard while picking fights around the globe.

El uso del teléfono personal del secretario de Defensa de EE. UU. creó un riesgo de seguridad

Helene Cooper, Julian E. Barnes, Eric Schmitt and Christiaan Triebert — Fri, 25 Apr 2025 13:18:23 -0400

El número de teléfono del secretario de Defensa de EE. UU. era fácilmente accesible en WhatsApp, Facebook y un sitio de deportes de fantasía.

Hegseth’s Personal Phone Use Created Vulnerabilities

Helene Cooper, Julian E. Barnes, Eric Schmitt and Christiaan Triebert — Fri, 25 Apr 2025 09:51:16 -0400

The phone number used in the Signal chat could also be found in a variety of places, including on social media and a fantasy sports site.

Donald Trump says he knows his V-P pick, conditions Nato commitment on European treatment - The Straits Times

Thu, 11 Jan 2024 02:45:00 -0500

Video: NATO continues to support Ukraine as Russia shows no signs of seeking peace - SHAPE

Thu, 11 Jan 2024 02:40:22 -0500

Guam's lt. governor pushes for details on missile defense system - Marianas Variety News & Views

Thu, 11 Jan 2024 02:31:00 -0500

ReElement Technologies Adds Former CIA Senior Executive Kevin Higgins to Board of Directors - EIN News

Thu, 11 Jan 2024 02:01:00 -0500

Israel to face Gaza genocide charges at World Court - Reuters

Thu, 11 Jan 2024 01:46:36 -0500

Post Office scandal: TV show reignites anger over 'most widespread miscarriage of justice' in UK history - CNBC

Thu, 11 Jan 2024 01:19:17 -0500

Nick Saban somehow lived up to his own impossible standard leaving Alabama still at the top of his game - CBS Sports

Thu, 11 Jan 2024 01:09:00 -0500

Cia Smith Obituary - Latimer's Funeral Home - 2024 - Legacy.com

Thu, 11 Jan 2024 01:00:49 -0500

Swedish Defence Officials Issue War Warnings, Contemplates NATO Alliance Amidst Backlash - Outlook India

Thu, 11 Jan 2024 00:51:22 -0500