U.S. National Security and Military News Review

Expelled From the Navy: 381 Banned Books

Mon, 14 Apr 2025 13:25:39 -0400

Readers object to the Naval Academy’s removal of books from its library. Also: Measles vaccines; cutting the E.P.A.; a cost to farmers; a plea to our leaders.

The D Brief: Russian missiles kill 34 in Ukraine; Trump lashes out at CBS; Breakthrough in robotics?; Naval autonomy today; And a bit more.

Patrick Tucker and Ben Watson — Mon, 14 Apr 2025 11:01:07 -0400

A Russian ballistic missile attack killed nearly three dozen civilians and injured more than 115 others in northeastern Ukraine’s Sumy City early Sunday. President Trump’s Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg wrote on social media that the “Palm Sunday attack by Russian forces on civilian targets in Sumy crosses any line of decency.” The Wall Street Journal called it “the deadliest missile strike on Ukraine this year” while Germany’s new chancellor Friedrich Merz called it “a serious war crime, deliberate and intended.”

Trump’s response: “They [that is, Russia] made a mistake. I believe it was—look, you’re gonna ask them. This is Biden’s war. This is not my war. This is a war that was under Biden,” he told reporters on Sunday.

Latest: “38 people are receiving treatment in medical facilities in Sumy following yesterday’s Russian ballistic strike—among them, 9 children,” President Volodymir Zelenskyy wrote on social media Monday. Another “11 people, including 3 children, are in critical condition,” he added.

The Russians attacked more than a half dozen other Ukrainian cities overnight, injuring at least seven from drone attacks in Odessa, Zelenskky said.

In just the past two weeks, “the Russian army has used nearly 2,800 aerial bombs, over 1,400 attack drones…and nearly 60 missiles of various types, including ballistic ones,” Zelenskyy said. “Only real pressure on Russia can stop this. Tangible sanctions are needed against the sectors that finance Russia’s killing machine...I thank everyone around the world who understands this and supports our defense.”

Ground offensive latest: “Russian forces are in a self-perpetuating cycle, where poorly trained infantry killed or injured in failed assault attempts are replaced with similarly poorly trained infantry, who are again sent into doomed assaults,” analysts at the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War wrote Sunday, citing Russian military bloggers. “Ongoing milblogger complaints about the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine reinforce ISW’s assessment that Russian tactics will degrade Russia’s manpower and materiel resources and contribute to slowing Russian advances along the frontline,” ISW added.

Zelenskyy’s request for Trump: Visit Ukraine before agreeing to a ceasefire with Russia. “Please, before any kind of decisions, any kind of forms of negotiations, come to see people, civilians, warriors, hospitals, churches, children destroyed or dead,” the Ukrainian president pleaded on CBS News’ “60 Minutes” Sunday evening, in an interview recorded before the attack on Sumy City.

“Come, look, and then let's—let's move with a plan how to finish the war,” Zelneskyy said. “You will understand with whom you have a deal. You will understand what Putin did. And we will not prepare anything. It will not be theater.”

Zelenskyy was also asked how he felt when Trump called him a “dictator” in a notably rancorous meeting late February at the White House. He replied, “I believe, sadly, Russian narratives are prevailing in the U.S. How is it possible to witness our losses and our suffering, to understand what the Russians are doing, and to still believe that they are not the aggressors, that they did not start this war? This speaks to the enormous influence of Russia's information policy on America, on U.S. politics, and U.S. politicians.”

Trump lashed out at CBS, suggesting the network lose its broadcast license. He took particular issue with the Zelenskyy interview as well as a later segment featuring Greenland residents, writing Sunday evening on social media, “They should lose their license! Hopefully, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), as headed by its Highly Respected Chairman, Brendan Carr, will impose the maximum fines and punishment, which is substantial, for their unlawful and illegal behavior. CBS is out of control, at levels never seen before, and they should pay a big price for this. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!”

Related reading:

“Kremlin says instant results not possible after Trump demands Ukraine progress,” Reuters reported Sunday from Moscow;
And you can read about Eric Slesinger, “The Former C.I.A. Officer Capitalizing on Europe’s Military Spending Boom,” via the New York Times reporting Monday from Copenhagen (gift link).

Welcome to this Monday edition of The D Brief, a newsletter dedicated to developments affecting the future of U.S. national security, brought to you by Ben Watson and Patrick Tucker. Share your tips and feedback here. And if you’re not already subscribed, you can do that here. On this day in 2022, the Russian warship Moskva sank after a defensive attack by Ukrainian forces.

Around the Defense Department

ICYMI: The Pentagon terminated several high-dollar IT service contracts on Thursday. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth claimed the cancellations will save $5.1 billion in “wasteful spending,” for services that could be “performed by our civilian workforce” or fulfilled with “existing procurement resources.” However, that civilian IT workforce is also under threat from cuts, Lauren C. Williams reports for Defense One..

Naval autonomy is seeing its moment, with scores of contractors debuting new small, medium and large autonomous or semi-autonomous sub drones at this year’s Sea Air Space Navy conference. From Capitol Hill to the Pentagon appetite for more sea drones is rising. But big technical challenges remain, Williams reports.

Related reading:

“Navy fires security squadron commander, top enlisted sailor,” Task & Purpose reported Friday;
And the Navy’s CISO Alvin "Tony" Plater retired; read his parting message posted to LinkedIn Sunday, here.

Emerging tech

Could this breakthrough in robot manufacturing reshape global power? A new AI breakthrough to make factory robotics far more human-like could mean far faster production of weapons on the front lines. But more importantly, it could be a big next step in allowing the United States to change the dynamic on manufacturing to compete with China on new terms. Patrick Tucker has more.

Trump’s immigration, economic policies conflict with AI innovation goals. Trump “is rapidly eroding the engine of scientific innovation in America” and that will slow U.S. AI advancement, Matteo Wong argues in The Atlantic. The freezing and cutting of federal science grants, which support research in AI and help universities train top AI talent, combined with immigration policies that have targeted scientists are pushing tomorrow’s AI minds away from the United States.

Trump 2.0

Developing: Federal agencies are bracing for more mass firings as a Monday deadline forces more personnel shakeups across the federal government, the New York Times reports.

And Trump’s State Department is asking employees to report each other for alleged “anti-Christian bias,” Politico reported Friday. The effort extends from an executive order Trump signed to root out “anti-Christian bias” in the federal government. A task force formed from that executive order is expected to meet next week to discuss its findings.

Trendspotting: Military academies could soon be a “test case” for Trump’s education reforms, The Hill reported Sunday following the president’s crusade against diversity that purged books like “To Kill a Mockingbird” and “I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings” from library shelves at the U.S. Naval Academy, West Point, and the Air Force Academy. This is because “Military schools fall under an entirely different set of laws and regulations from public ones and are under the direct control of Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth,” as The Hill writes. Read more, here.

Additional reading:

“Employees swarm to second ‘deferred resignation’ offer, though some are receiving unexpected responses,” Government Executive’s Eric Katz reported Friday;
And “Trump likely to propose pay freeze for federal workers in 2026,” GovExec’s Erich Wagner reported Friday as well;
“'I cannot guarantee complete confidentiality,' VA therapists ordered to tell veterans,” NPR reported Friday;
And “Panama opposition party accuses US of ‘camouflaged invasion’,” the Guardian reported Saturday from Panama City.

]]>

France : Algeria targets interior ministry and spares DGSE in expulsion of French agents

Mon, 14 Apr 2025 10:50:00 -0400

After a brief period of détente illustrated by French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot's visit to Algeria on 6 April, the diplomatic [...]

Two Years of War in Sudan: From Revolution to Ruin and the Fight to Rise Again

Quscondy Abdulshafi — Mon, 14 Apr 2025 10:36:21 -0400

As Sudan marks two years since the eruption of war between rival military factions—the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—the country stands at a dangerous crossroads. As the war enters its third year, the army has regained control of Khartoum, as well as the central, eastern, and northern regions, while the RSF continues to dominate Darfur and pushes to seize the city of Al Fasher. Just this week, the RSF launched a new attack on civilians in Al Fasher echoing the atrocities committed in Al Geneina in 2023, this time targeting the Zaghawa ethnic group in Zamzam Camp.

Recent RSF moves to form a parallel government signal a dangerous drift toward chaotic semi-partition, threatening a prolonged conflict that would destabilize the entire Sahel and Horn of Africa regions.

Once celebrated for its inspiring nonviolent revolution in 2019 that ousted long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir, Sudan is now engulfed in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Since the conflict broke out in April 2023, more than 15 million people have fled their homes and over 30 million people need aid, including 24.6 million facing acute hunger, according to United Nations agencies. And, although reliable numbers remain unknown, by some estimates, as many as 150,000 people have been killed in the first year of fighting alone. As the country marks two years of war this week, the question that looms large is whether hope for a democratic future still lives or has it vanished amid the gunfire and violence of war?

A Legacy of Nonviolent Resistance

Sudan’s history is punctuated by moments of extraordinary civilian-led resistance. In 1964, before the independence of several African countries, Sudanese civil society, professional unions, and political opposition ousted one of the first dictators of modern Africa, General Ibrahim Abboud. It did so again in 1985, when massive demonstrations eventually led to the removal of President Gaafar Nimeiry. And, in 2019, it was a peaceful popular uprising that took down Bashir. The 2019 revolution, led by a grassroots resistance, symbolized by its chant “Silmiya” (“peaceful” in Arabic), represented a shining moment of hope. The world watched in admiration as millions of Sudanese braved bullets and beatings to demand a democratic future. Their courage led to the fall of Bashir and a brief transitional government shared between civilians and the military.

But this fragile arrangement began to unravel quickly. In October 2021, the Sudanese military, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, with help from the RSF and its commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, took control of the government in Khartoum. After the coup, however, a power struggle between the two military leaders emerged, abruptly exploding into open warfare in April 2023. The conflict ended nonviolent organizing, devastated cities, displaced millions, and pushed Sudan into chaos.

During the war, both the Sudanese army and the RSF have consistently targeted nonviolent pro-democracy activists with torture, arrest, and killing. These peaceful groups had to shift efforts from nonviolent political organizing to providing lifesaving aid in the absence of State institutions. The Sudanese army seeks to delegitimize these actors, painting them as foreign agents or insurgents affiliated to the rival RSF to justify its repression. The harm being done to these groups is not just collateral damage; it is a strategic assault on the very idea of democratic civilian governance.

Looming Partition Risks Regional Chaos

The core civic forces in Sudanese society, such as professional unions, civil society groups, and women and youth groups, who once marched peacefully for change, are now caught between conscription, displacement, or death. Sudan’s new militarized politics is pulling the nation toward fragmentation rather than a unified future, with grave consequences for the Sahel and Horn of Africa region.

The Sudanese army, in an effort to reinforce old power structures, has increasingly turned to local tribal militias and irregular insurgents, including groups such as Al-Baraa Brigades, as a counterweight to the RSF’s territorial gains in central and north Sudan. These alignments risk fueling a wider proxy war, dragging in regional actors and reigniting dormant conflicts along Sudan’s borders. Beyond Darfur and the Kordofan regions, the RSF is deeply intertwined with both ethnic and geopolitical dynamics across the Sahel. The RSF has longstanding ethnic and logistical ties to armed networks in Chad, Libya, Niger, Mali, and the Central African Republic, many of which have served as recruitment grounds and supply routes. These transnational connections allow the RSF to operate beyond Sudan’s borders, turning Darfur into a potential launchpad for instability across the region. Thus, the RSF’s calls to establish a “parallel” government, a de facto independent territory in Sudan, would not only threaten national unity but also would pose a significant threat to peace and security throughout the Sahel.

These war dynamics expose the fractured nature of Sudanese statehood, where competing visions of identity, governance, and external regional actors’ interests clash, threatening national cohesion more than ever. Sudan already experienced war-induced partition, when South Sudan became its own country in 2011. In that case, one failed State was divided into two failed States. This time, however, another partition — or establishment of semi-autonomous territories — will not only unleash new waves of genocide and mass atrocities but also destabilize the security of the broader region. The only way to break the cycle of war is to strengthen the nonviolent prodemocracy movement inside Sudan, so that military governance can someday be replaced.

Enduring Resilience

The conflict is not just a battle between two generals, it is a war on the Sudanese people and their democratic aspirations. The Sudanese civilian pro-democracy movement, despite having toppled three of Africa’s most notorious dictators, has been systematically targeted by both sides. Activists have been arrested, tortured, and in many cases, killed. Journalists have been silenced, civil society organizations shuttered, and peaceful protest banned.

The nonviolent movement has also suffered from internal divisions, fueled by the war and conflicting leadership visions and positions on the conflict. The absence of a shared vision and united front has not only undermined the movement’s credibility but also has given armed actors justification to further target it. Now more than ever, building unified leadership is essential to reviving a stronger pro-democracy movement that can carry forward the hopes and dreams of a peaceful, democratic Sudan.

Although diminished, the spirit of Sudan’s nonviolent movement has not been extinguished. After the war paralyzed the entire State system and destroyed basic means of survival, the core nonviolent groups, called the Resistance Committees, reconfigured themselves as Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), operating underground, coordinating aid, documenting atrocities, and keeping the dream of democracy alive. Working in independent and semi-isolated groups across the country, with no weapons, and few resources, the ERRs and other nonviolent groups possess moral clarity and the trust of the people they are serving, giving them more legitimacy than the Sudanese army or the RSF.

Thus, even under siege, civil resistance remains one of the most credible forces for positive change. Its resilience is rooted in its local legitimacy, its decentralized structure, and its unwavering commitment to peaceful transformation. Unlike the military factions, which thrive on coercion and division, the civilian movement draws strength from unity and a shared vision. It needs to be supported so that it can one day help shape not only a united, secure Sudan, but also a stable region.

Reviving Civic Space Starts in the Shattered Capital

Since independence in 1956, Sudan has remained an extremely centralized state, with political and administrative power concentrated in Khartoum. When war broke out in the capital in April 2023, it triggered the collapse of the entire state system. In March, the Sudanese army retook Khartoum. With RSF forces cleared from the capital, journalists were able to enter the city and collect survivors’ testimonies and document the extent of the city’s devastation. The military’s recapture of the city was followed by widespread extrajudicial killing of civilians by the army and allied militia. The military’s presence in Khartoum brings back memories of the Islamist era. This time, it is leveraging wartime fear to reassert its control.

Nevertheless, for many residents, ousting the RSF from the capital has ignited cautious hope for rebuilding obliterated infrastructure and reviving essential services. It could also open a path for revitalizing the nonviolent movement and restoring democratic aspirations. Supporting this return requires close monitoring of the nature of governance now taking shape under the military’s control. The international community must exert maximum pressure on warring parties to protect civil liberties and civic space in Khartoum. Doing so offers an opportunity to amplify the voices of Sudan’s silent majority and push for a peaceful democratic transition.

International actors must recalibrate their approach to Sudan. Efforts to end hostilities are commendable and a ceasefire would be a good first step, but it would not be sufficient. A lasting peace must reinvigorate civilian voices and lay the groundwork for civilian-led governance. Here are concrete policy actions that should be taken:

Expand and Strengthen Existing Sanctions to End Violence and Protect Civic Space: Existing sanctions by the United States, the U.N., the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada on armed actors and their affiliated businesses should be expanded to also target those responsible for violence against civic actors including journalists, resistance committees, opposition figures, and human rights defenders.

Impose Sanctions on Key External State Actors fueling the conflict: Additional sanctions should be levied by the U.N. Security Council and the United States on external State actors that sponsor the war and related pro-war illicit businesses. The United Arab Emirates, for example, is the main sponsor and business partner of the RSF, against whom Sudan submitted a case at the International Court of Justice. Egypt, on the other hand, remains a top ally of the Sudanese military by providing military and political support. Turkey has also played a destabilizing role by continuing to supply weapons to the army, prolonging the conflict. These external players have fueled the conflict, each backing opposing factions to advance their own strategic interests, making peace an increasingly elusive prospect.

Support Pro-Democracy Initiatives and Civil Society: Donors should continue to provide direct funding and logistical support to resistance committees, women, and youth-led initiatives, civil society, and independent media. This support should be flexible, allowing for safe convenings, secure communication, and local organizing.

Beyond Survival Aid to Reconstruction Where Possible: Ensure that aid reaches those in need by working with trusted local individuals and groups and implementing robust monitoring mechanisms to prevent diversion by armed groups. The aid efforts need to move beyond humanitarian assistance and support non-State pro-democracy organizations to lead sustainable food security and reconstruction of basic infrastructure, including local participatory governance systems for accountability. Reconstruction support through pro-democracy actors presents a greater opportunity to empower trusted, nonviolent leadership and reduce dependency on armed actors for survival.

Inclusive Mediation and Political Processes: Any diplomatic process must include a representative cross-section of Sudanese civil society, not just armed actors. Peace built on the exclusion of civilian voices will be inherently unstable.

A Different Future Is Still Possible

Since independence, Sudan has struggled to repair the structural damage left behind by British colonial rule. The legacy of centralized governance and deep social and regional inequalities fueled an unending saga of civil war. For decades, civilians from conflict-ridden regions in Sudan remained excluded, unable to find common ground with those in Khartoum who had never directly experienced war. The outbreak of war in Khartoum in April 2023 shattered this divide. For the first time, the violence reached the heart of the capital, leveling any illusion of distance from Sudan’s longstanding crises. The destruction has erased infrastructure, dismantled governance, and forced millions into displacement. It has taught the nation, painfully and collectively, that no one is immune.

Given the scale of suffering and the betrayal of the Sudanese people by those entrusted to guide the transition, despair among the population is understandable. But hope is not lost. It lives in camps sheltering Sudanese displaced within the country and abroad, as well as in diaspora communities and among those clinging together for survival. Most powerfully, it endures in the underground networks that deliver food, solidarity, and courage amid despair. It lives in the voices of women demanding justice despite the risks. It lives in the chants that continue to echo in the hearts of millions: “Freedom, peace, and justice.”

Sudan’s democratic future is not dead. It is under siege. And it needs allies not just in words, but in action. The world must not look away. It must stand with those who still believe a better Sudan is possible and who are risking everything to make it real.

IMAGE: Fighters loyal to the army patrol a market area in Khartoum on March 24, 2025. Sudan has been ravaged by a war between the regular army and the Rapid Support Forces paramilitaries, a conflict that has killed tens of thousands of people, uprooted 15 million and created the world’s largest hunger and displacement crises. (Photo by -/AFP via Getty Images)

The post Two Years of War in Sudan: From Revolution to Ruin and the Fight to Rise Again appeared first on Just Security.

#War #Sponsored: Using Targeted Ads to Promote Compliance with International Humanitarian Law

Rhiannon Neilsen — Mon, 14 Apr 2025 08:55:09 -0400

(Editor’s Note: This article is part of the Just Security symposium “Thinking Beyond Risks: Tech and Atrocity Prevention,” organized with the Programme on International Peace and Security (IPS) at the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict. Readers can find here an introduction and other articles in the series as they are published.)

In what appears to be a brightly colored children’s cartoon video with prancing unicorns and lullabies, bold text flashes across the screen in all caps: “We know that your child cannot read this. We have an important message to tell you as parents.” The lullaby stops, and another message appears: “40 infants were murdered in Israel by the Hamas terrorists (ISIS)… [music resumes] Now hug your baby and stand with us.”

Created by Israel’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, the video was published on the ministry’s official YouTube channel days after Hamas committed its harrowing atrocities in October 2023. The video – and others that similarly defend Israel’s bombardment of Gaza – appeared not just on Israel’s own official social media channels, but as targeted advertisements across social media, YouTube, U.S. streaming services like Hulu, TV channels featuring the 2024 Super Bowl, and children’s video games. Some of these ads featured gruesome images from the attack itself. Others, like those on Hulu, showcase a Gaza “without Hamas” – “five star hotels,” “stunning beaches,” and “charming boardwalks” – before cutting to a child holding a weapon under Hamas rule.

The apparent intent of these State-sponsored ads was to generate moral outrage and support for Israel’s “Operation Swords of Iron” in Gaza, which has displaced 90 percent of the population and killed more than 50,000 Palestinians (according to the health ministry and based on conservative estimates). According to Politico, in the initial days after the October 7th attack, the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry ran 30 such ads on X that reached 4 million users, as well as 75 ads across YouTube. Additionally, following accusations of involvement with Hamas, the Israeli Government Advertising Agency bought Google Search ads to discredit the UN’s Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) in August 2024. Leveraging the online environment further for pro-war content, Israel’s Ministry of Diaspora Affairs also paid millions of shekels ($2 million USD) to STOIC (an Israeli consulting firm) for an influence campaign targeting both U.S. lawmakers and “mostly younger, progressive Americans.” The tactics included a website that labelled U.S. universities ‘safe’ or ‘unsafe’ for Jewish students and using “hundreds of fake accounts that posed as real Americans on X, Facebook and Instagram to post pro-Israel comments.” These ads have been occurring against the backdrop of claims from pro-Israeli social media accounts of ‘Pallywood propaganda’, where Palestinians are accused of faking their suffering.

The use of social media posts and ads to build support for war is, of course, not unique to the Israel-Hamas war, which reached a (now-broken) ceasefire agreement in January 2025. In this article, I am not taking a stance on the ethics of using propaganda advocating for the resort to war – that issue is ripe for further discussion among just war theorists. Rather, my point is this: as State-sponsored messaging and targeted ads defending war unfold online, neutral international organizations must amplify their existing efforts to educate the public about the just conduct of war – including, I argue, by disseminating targeted social media ads.

Specifically, neutral international institutions, like the United Nations and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), should build on existing efforts to educate the public and fighters on the front lines via targeted online content (not just social media posts) that promote the ethics and law of conflict. Such targeted ads on social media ought to encourage compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL, or the law of armed conflict, LOAC). This should occur as soon as violence breaks out and as the conflict unfolds.

Of course, the ICRC and other organizations already do an excellent job of posting content that advocates for compliance with LOAC on their platforms. The ICRC consistently posts about IHL on its X platform, including, for instance: interviews with experts, content specific to certain crises, the cardinal principles distinction, proportionality, and precaution, and the illegality of intentionality targeting health facilities.

Moreover, the ICRC has even released an interactive film – “If War Comes to You” – which highlights war from the perspective of a civilian, soldier, and aid worker, and prompts users to learn more about IHL. Yet it is imperative that information pertaining to IHL is targeted to those who may (likely) not “follow” the ICRC, or whose algorithms may not naturally display ICRC content. Indeed, digital platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, TikTok, Snapchat, Google, and X present a hitherto neglected way to circulate targeted content about LOAC, getting IHL information behind the front lines and into individuals’ pockets.

Deploying these ads is especially relevant today, as combatants are notoriously bringing their personal devices into the battlefield, documenting their fight in real time, attempting to be humorous in war, posting potential evidence of war crimes, showcasing pictures of themselves in uniform on dating apps like Tinder, or thanking followers for donations used to buy war supplies. As combatants sit in the trenches – scrolling, posting, “liking,” taking selfies – they can be targeted with online ads that espouse the laws of war.

A Proactive Approach: Calling for Compliance with IHL

Elsewhere, I have urged States (together with NGOs, thought leaders, grass-roots organizations, and tech companies) to take proactive action to prevent and mitigate atrocity crimes via cyberspace, notably by developing and launching (what I refer to as) targeted information campaigns. These are bespoke ads or tailored messages that advocate respect for human rights and restraint from unjust violence. Similarly, targeted IHL ads could form part of such messaging campaigns that appear on social media feeds of individuals – combatants and noncombatants alike – in conflict zones.

I will return to the important questions of who develops, distributes, and pays for these ads below. Suffice to say here: social media platforms should allow such ads to appear on all relevant users’ feeds. Currently, social media users are able to adjust or “opt-out” of personalization ads on their platforms. But when it comes to ads calling for compliance with IHL, the function to “turn off,” “unfollow,” or “hide” such advertisements should be disabled. Moreover, IHL ads ought to be “prioritized” to the top of individuals’ newsfeeds during the conflict. Neutral organizations could also pay corporations to “boost” such messages and expand the targeting to “LookAlike” audiences or “doppelgängers” – users with similar traits to those already being targeted.

Because combatants bear legal and moral obligations to observe IHL, users identified as combatants – such as those who list their occupation or post content of themselves fighting – should be consistently targeted with such ads. As I note elsewhere, these targeted messages serve two functions. First, they can ideally help inoculate combatants against following illegal orders or committing atrocity crimes. Second, there is no way perpetrators could then later claim they were “unaware” that certain acts – such as mutilating corpses, inhumanely treating or abusing prisoners, or committing perfidy – are international crimes). Such targeted ads would also help bulwark against soldiers trying to assert they were simply following (illegal) orders from their superiors

While there is no parallel expectation of civilians who are not directly taking part in hostilities, those in conflict-affected areas should still receive tailor-made IHL ads to enhance their awareness of what is permissible or not permissible in war, especially when they are caught in the crossfire. This approach ensures that civilians are aware of their rights in war and can ideally help them better understand the consequences of any violations committed by armed forces.

Disseminating such IHL content is particularly urgent today given the increasing involvement of civilians in war, which makes distinguishing between civilians and combatants more difficult. Indeed, it is possible that civilians, through their online and offline activities, can become direct participants in hostilities (DPH) and forfeit their protected status – even if it is for just such time as they take a direct part in the hostilities).

Regardless of their status, any civilian user who posts about a conflict should receive IHL ads to improve their understanding of the laws that govern the means and methods of war. To be clear, it remains crucial to strictly distinguish between civilians and combatants when it comes to intentional targeting with (lethal) force. But that is wholly unrelated to the issue of who should receive information pertaining to war’s lawful conduct.

How Targeted IHL Ads Might Appear on Social Media

Much like any other social media advertisement, targeted ads regarding IHL may appear as images, videos, memes, or audio, and can be sponsored by influencers working with the ICRC or the UN. Crucially, the content must be tailored to the socio-cultural context of the conflict, rather than a top-down, Western-centric, or hegemonic projection of liberal democratic values. This ensures maximum resonance with the intended audience, rather than simply listing the laws of war. For instance, as the 2018 ICRC “Roots of Restraint” project highlights, concentrating strictly on IHL is “not as effective at influencing behaviour”; instead, the ICRC finds that “linking the law to local norms and values…gives it [the law] greater traction.” Thus, the report recommends “finding innovative and locally adapted ways to reinforce norms of humanity… including via digital media.” Using online platforms to share culturally specific translations of IHL is one such way to help promote adherence to LOAC. That said, care needs to be taken to ensure that such tailoring or translation of IHL into cultural contexts does not allow for actors to plausibly reinterpret the law in a way that suits their political agenda but is unlawful. All messaging must adhere to the central tenets of LOAC, even when it is tied to local norms and values.

If this idea sounds radical or unrealistic, a different crisis has provided proof of concept. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Meta users were consistently targeted with informational ads (especially at the top of newsfeeds) about practicing safe physical distancing, washing hands, wearing facemasks, and getting vaccinated. And whenever anyone posted content on Facebook or Instagram referencing COVID-19 or vaccines, Meta enabled an automatic popup to link readers to information from reliable sources like the World Health Organization (WHO) or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). As of April 2020, Meta also started sending “messages in News Feed to people who liked, commented on or reacted to posts with misinformation that [it] removed for violating” its policies and has since “redesigned these [messages] as more personalized notifications to more clearly connect people with credible and accurate information about COVID-19.” Creatively designed online ads promoting adherence to IHL should follow suit.

Who Designs? Who Distributes? Who Pays?

International organizations, particularly the United Nations and the ICRC – are likely to be the most credible and neutral sources for promulgating information about IHL. To be maximally effective, these messages should also ideally be relayed or reshared by influential or respected personalities, such as political, religious, or community leaders. Even celebrities and social media influencers with large followings could be involved, so long as they disclose they are working with the UN or the ICRC.

As for paying for such targeted ads, ideally social media companies should allow such IHL content (sponsored by the UN and the ICRC) to be disseminated on their platforms without charge – essentially, as a public service. Again, there is precedent for rolling out life-saving ads for free in a crisis: the COVID-19 ads noted above were largely sponsored by the platforms themselves. For instance, Meta founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg announced that the company would provide the WHO “as many free ads as they [sic] need” to “get out timely, accurate information on the coronavirus” and combat misinformation about the virus. In the same post, Zuckerberg said the company would also give “support and millions more in ad credits to other organizations,” like the CDC and the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and “[work] closely with global health experts to provide additional help.” Soon after, Google announced it would increase its original $250 million in free ads to WHO and offered an additional $340 million in free ads to small businesses in light of the economic blow from COVID-19.

Given recent developments in the technology sector, it is doubtful whether such altruism for providing public safety initiatives will be forthcoming. Unlike in 2020-2021, the voluntary cooperation of the social media platforms in allowing free targeted ads for social good now appears doubtful. Since assuming control of X, Elon Musk has utilized the platform to promote and defend current US President Donald Trump and his policies. Musk is highly unlikely to allow targeted IHL ads on X explaining that such mass expulsion or ethnic cleansing is illegal under international law. Similarly, in January 2025 Mark Zuckerberg announced Meta would be removing third-party fact-checking for posts on Facebook, Instagram and Threads in the United States, instead relying on “Community Notes” (similar to X).

But social media companies have a moral obligation to freely provide targeted ads advocating for compliance with IHL on their platforms and to prioritize pro-IHL content in areas of the world wracked by conflict. This ethical duty is especially pronounced, as tech companies of course profit from both the vulnerable population’s and perpetrators’ use of their platforms in crisis zones. Corporations absolutely know how to privilege certain content; they intentionally manipulate algorithms to encourage engagement and derive profit. The question of whether they wil

Early Edition: April 14, 2025

Weronika Galka — Mon, 14 Apr 2025 07:54:53 -0400

Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the weekend. Here’s today’s news:

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

Russian strikes killed 34 people and wounded 117 others in Ukraine’s city of Sumy yesterday, according to Ukraine’s State Emergency Service. Many of the casualties of the attack, the deadliest in the conflict this year, were residents attending Palm Sunday church services in Sumy’s center. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the strikes were carried out using ballistic missiles and cluster missiles. Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi report for CNN.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR — U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

France’s Emmanuel Macron, Poland’s Donald Tusk, Britain’s Keir Starmer, and Germany’s Friedrich Merz condemned the attack on Sumy, with Merz accusing Moscow of committing a war crime. Asked about the attack, President Trump said it was “terrible” and that he had been “told [Russia] made a mistake.” The U.S. Special Envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, condemned Russia’s Palm Sunday attack on Sumy, saying the strike “crosses any line of decency.” Eliza Gkritsi reports for POLITICO; Patrick Jackson reports for BBC News.

U.S. and Ukrainian officials on Friday discussed the latest U.S. proposal for a critical minerals deal, with little progress amid an “antagonistic” atmosphere, according to a source. A Treasury spokesperson said the discussions were “technical in nature.” Andrea Shalal reports for Reuters.

GLOBAL AFFAIRS

The Rapid Support Forces and other Sudanese paramilitaries killed the entire staff of the last medical clinic in west Darfur’s famine-stricken Zamzam camp in an assault that killed at least 100 people this weekend, the Relief International aid group and the U.N. said on Saturday. The paramilitaries also destroyed the central market in Zamzam along with hundreds of makeshift homes in the refugee camp, the aid group added. Declan Walsh reports for the New York Times; Samy Magdy reports for AP News.

At least 52 people were killed in fighting in east Congo between Friday and Saturday, the country’s Ministry of Interior said on Saturday. The Congolese government and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels traded blame for the killings. Justin Kabumba and Jean-Yves Kamale report for AP News.

Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa won re-election in yesterday’s national vote, according to figures released by the country’s National Electoral Council. Noboa’s opponent, Luisa González, said her campaign “does not recognize the results” and vowed to seek a recount. Gonzalo Solano and Regina Garcia Cano report for AP News.

The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs will reduce its global workforce by 20% and scale back operations in Cameroon, Colombia, Eritrea, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, and Zimbabwe amid a severe funding crisis, agency head Tom Fletcher announced on Friday. Mohammed Tawfeeq reports for CNN.

Member states of the U.N. International Maritime Organization on Friday agreed to a global deal to tax carbon emissions from ships. The Trump administration withdrew from the talks on the draft agreement, set to be formally adopted in October, and said it could reciprocate against any fees imposed on U.S. ships. Mikhail Klimentov reports for the Washington Post.

The last remaining opposition party in Hong Kong took a key step towards disbanding itself yesterday in face of pressure from China and a national security crackdown, senior party officials said. James Pomfret and Jessie Pang report for Reuters.

Tanzania’s main opposition has been disqualified from elections due later this year over failing to sign a code of conduct, a senior election commission official said on Saturday. The party’s leader was charged with treason last Thursday for allegedly seeking to disrupt the vote. Reuters reports.

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR

An Israeli air strike yesterday has incapacitated the last fully functioning hospital in Gaza City by extensively damaging its emergency room and reception area. Although no casualties were reported, at least one child died in the rushed evacuation of patients, according to a Jerusalem church that runs the facility. The IDF said they had struck a Hamas “command and control center,” an allegation that the militant group denied. Abeer Salman, Dana Karni, Ibrahim Dahman, and Tim Lister report for CNN.

Israel will soon “vigorously” expand its offensive throughout most of Gaza, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Saturday, adding that the IDF had completed the takeover of a “security zone” cutting off the city of Rafah from Khan Younis in the territory’s south. Separately, a U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights spokesperson on Friday said that the U.N. is increasingly concerned that the cumulative impact of Israel’s actions on Palestinians in Gaza “appears to be inflicting … conditions of life increasingly incompatible with their continued existence as a group.” Alys Davies reports for BBC News; Reuters reports.

A missing Palestinian Red Crescent paramedic who went missing during Israel’s attack on 15 humanitarian workers in late March is detained by Israeli authorities, the rescue service and the Red Cross said yesterday. Nidal Al-Mughrabi reports for Reuters.

Explosions at a U.N. guesthouse in Gaza that killed a European aid worker and severely wounded five others last month were very likely caused by two Israeli tank shells, according to expert analysis of images of the scene obtained by the Washington Post. Louisa Loveluck, Meg Kelly, Imogen Piper, and Abbie Cheeseman report.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Preliminary diplomatic talks between U.S. and Iranian officials over Tehran’s nuclear program on Saturday were “very positive and constructive,” the White House said in a statement. Iran sought sanctions relief in exchange for limits on its nuclear program during the negotiations, sources add. According to Iranian state television, U.S. Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff briefly spoke directly with Iranian leaders during the talks, set to continue on April 19. Chantal Da Silva reports for NBC News; Benoit Faucon, Michael R. Gordon, and Laurence Norman report for the Wall Street Journal; Jon Gambrell reports for AP News.

Smartphones and other electronics are exempt from reciprocal tariffs but are included in “the semiconductor tariffs which are coming in probably a month or two,” Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said yesterday. Trump yesterday indicated he would announce the tariff rates on semiconductor imports next week and announced a national security trade probe into the sector. Jeff Mason, Doina Chiacu, and Nathan Layne report for Reuters; Gregory Svirnovskiy reports for POLITICO.

The State Department official who oversaw the dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Pete Marocco, has left the agency, according to a senior Trump administration official. The departure was not Marocco’s choice, another official added, and it was not immediately clear if he would leave the administration or assume a different role. Brian Schwartz and Alexander Ward report for the Wall Street Journal.

The United States and Saudi Arabia are on a “pathway” to reaching an agreement on cooperating to develop a Saudi civil nuclear programme, Energy Secretary Chris Wright said yesterday. Pesha Magid reports for Reuters.

HOUTHI DEVELOPMENTS

Suspected U.S. airstrikes around Yemen’s rebel-held capital Sanaa killed at least six people and wounded 26 overnight into today, the Houthis said. The group also claimed it shot down another U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone. Jon Gambrell reports for AP News.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

Pennsylvania state authorities yesterday arrested who allegedly set fire to the mansion of Gov. Josh Shapiro (D) early on Sunday, forcing Shapiro and his family to evacuate. The man was charged with attempted murder, arson and terrorism, the Dauphin County District Attorney’s Office said early today. Edgar Sandoval, Jeremy W. Peters, and Mike Ives report for the New York Times.

A military judge on Friday threw out the confession of a man accused of conspiring in the 9/11 attacks, ruling the statements were the product of a campaign of torture and isolation carried out by the CIA. Carol Rosenberg reports for the New York Times.

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS

The United States has deported another 10 people to El Salvador amid the Trump administration’s crackdown, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said yesterday, ahead of President Nayib Bukele’s planned White House visit today. Tara Suter reports for the Hill.

The Trump administration will end Temporary Protected Status for more than 10,000 people from Afghanistan and Cameroon, the Homeland Security Department announced on Friday. Hamed Aleaziz reports for the New York Times.

The Trump administration hopes to deport 1 million immigrants during Trump’s first year back in office, according to current and former federal officials. The administration is negotiating with as many as 30 countries to take deportees who are not their citizens, two officials added. Maria Sacchetti and Jacob Bogage report for the Washington Post.

The office of the U.S. attorney for New Jersey is investigating Gov. Phil Murphy (D) and state Attorney General Matt Platkin for not cooperating with federal immigration authorities, the office’s interim leader Alina Habba announced late on Thursday. Daniel Ham reports for POLITICO.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

Trump on Friday issued a memorandum directing the military to assume temporary jurisdiction over a 60-foot wide strip of land along the border in California, Arizona, and New Mexico. The move would empower U.S. troops to detain people attempting to illegally enter the U.S. within the stretch of land. Myah Ward reports for POLITICO.

Kirkland & Ellis, A&O Shearman, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, Latham & Watkins, and Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft law firms agreed to provide free legal work for causes favored by Trump, the White House said on Friday. The series of agreements brings a total of pro bono legal work for conservative causes the firms pledged to trump to almost $1 billion. Eric Tucker reports for AP News; Sam Baker reports for Axios.

Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has appointed William Ruger, a former Charles Koch Institute vice president and skeptic of military action against Iran, as the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration, congressional officials say. Ruger will be responsible for, amongst other matters, compiling the President’s Daily Brief intelligence update. Hans Nichols reports for Axios.

The Justice Department will continue its prosecution of two executives at the voting machine company Smartmatic who were charged last year in an alleged bribery scheme, government lawyers said. Trump’s allies claimed the voting machines made by the company, which has not been accused of wrongdoing in the case, were used for election fraud in the 2020 election. Jeremy Roebuck reports for the Washington Post.

The Trump administration has overridden the objections of a senior Social Security Administration executive, Greg Pearre, to purposely labelling 6,100 living immigrants as dead. According to sources, Pearre told Scott Coulter, the SSA’s new Musk-backed chief information officer, that the plan was illegal, cruel, and risked declaring the wrong people dead, before being walked out by security guards. Hannah Natanson, Lisa Rein, and Meryl Kornfield report for the paper, published in the January issue of the International Journal of Extreme Manufacturing, lays out a transformative vision of AI-driven additive manufacturing, or AAM.

Today’s factory robots only are capable of a set number of rigid movements, are difficult to adapt to new tasks, and require highly specialized places on production floors. They can’t see when they are lined up incorrectly, or when they make mistakes.

The new system—developed by an international team of researchers from California State University, Northridge; the National University of Singapore; NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory; and the University of Wisconsin-Madison—uses highly-skilled engineers to train robots in a much fuller range of human-like movements, enabling them to perceive and (on a basic level) understand what they are doing. When combined with 3D printing technology, the framework opens up the possibility of complete end-to-end manufacturing of electronics, like the small drones re-shaping the battlefield in Ukraine.

But it also addresses a key question at the root of the overarching power struggle between the United States and China: how to increase the manufacturing strength of the U.S.

[[Related Posts]]

Before President Donald Trump made re-shoring manufacturing a core focus of his presidency, the Biden White House undertook a series of different policy moves with the same goal—including the use of smaller and more gradual tariffs accompanied by grants and other incentives.

The Pentagon has launched several initiatives to reshore production of things like microelectronics, citing China's dominance in those sectors as a strategic liability. The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, which allocates over $52 billion for domestic semiconductor manufacturing, reflects bipartisan recognition that industrial capability underpins military and economic strength. Without secure, domestic access to critical technologies, the U.S. risks operational delays, compromised weapons systems, and diminished deterrence capacity in future conflicts.

But the United States suffers from a critical lack of skilled workers to meet those goals. And institutes like NIST, as well as industry heads, forecast that even with government investment, building that workforce would take at least seven years.

Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnik said this month that robotics and automation could play a key role in a U.S.-led manufacturing renaissance. And several American robotics companies are pushing for a national strategy to promote manufacturing automation.

However, the current state of factory robotics lags behind hopes for a quick transition to factory automation. A 2019 report from Boston Consulting Group points out the obvious: manufacturing robots lack the adaptiveness and dexterity of human workers, and robots lack the problem-solving abilities that are still key to actually producing things. That’s changed little since 2019, as revealed by the controversies and embarrassing public demonstrations of the Optimus robot developed by Tesla. Questions about whether Optimus is indeed autonomous or just an elaborate human-controlled puppet point to larger uncertainties about exactly how to make truly humanistic robots.

That’s why this new paper is so significant. Traditional manufacturing methods, even robots, “need a lot of well-trained engineers,” said co-author Bingbing Li of California State University, Northridge. And even the most advanced 3D printers often require manual steps for design input, process selection, or post-processing.

The paper’s AAM vision includes end-to-end autonomy: from computer-assisted design model preparation and nesting to scheduling, process optimization, and post-print machining—all managed by a fleet of collaborating robots or drones.

This integration will be particularly important for manufacturing in outer space, hence the interest and support from NASA. Li said he’s also been in contact with military contractors and the Defense Department’s office of Operational Testing and Evaluation for a defense-related project that could begin in May, if final approvals are granted.

AAM relies heavily on what the authors call sensor-integrated design: the use of many sensors of visible light, heat, and other phenomena to create a sort of perception in a software “brain.”

That brain, which differentiates tomorrow’s factory robots from today’s, will have four layers: a “knowledge layer” at the base of the model collects data from sensors, simulations, and past operations. A “generative solution layer” uses AI tools like large language models and knowledge graphs to model decision-making. An “operational layer” implements decisions on hardware, software, and robotic systems; and a “cognitive layer” empowers machines with agency, allowing them to reason, act, and even reflect.

“Within this [cognitive] layer, AI agents act as high-level controllers, assessing the skill pool in the operational layer to select appropriate skills for task execution based on the current state,” the authors write. “These agents are responsible for planning and executing optimal actions, engaging in a lifelong learning process that enhances their expertise through continuous reflection and learning.”

That process of learning is similar to the way humans interact with large language models. At first, the results are generic and error-prone, but over time, the relationship between the trainer and the machine produces a type of human-like intelligence that can be replicated across multiple robots.

“We hope to minimize the human operation down to or close to zero, because the whole process itself, we want to automate,” Li said.

The degree to which some manufacturing processes can be automated will depend greatly on the complexity of the thing that is being produced and how quickly AI systems can learn to adapt to new, unexpected events. Li said human experts will still play a crucial role in that process, but more akin to supervisors than operators. Instead of doing the manual tasks beyond a robot’s ken, the human will help the robots develop, improve, and validate ways to deal with the unexpected.

Ideally, the AI would become smart enough to actually consider how to improve on human designs, via what the authors call “generative design tools,” including diffusion models, 3D reconstruction, and neural radiance fields. NeRFs extrapolate depth and volume from pictures, the same way the brain does, to automate the design and creation of 3D objects from mere sketches or photos.

“These advancements pave the way for 3D content creation, potentially bringing us closer to the realization of ‘What you think is what you get,’” the authors write. “By exploring vast design spaces, these tools generate innovative solutions that traditional methods might overlook.”

In a military context, this means a soldier in the field could scan a broken part and an AI-enhanced system could redesign and print a replacement with minimal oversight—a power that could vastly reduce manning and logistics needs at the front.

The Defense Department, including DARPA, have increasingly emphasized secure, scalable, and on-demand manufacturing for contested logistics environments. The AAM method of closed-loop manufacturing using multiple sensors, feeding data to a layered intelligence, offering a roadmap for not only smarter production but resilient, adaptive manufacturing capabilities that could redefine the industrial front lines.

But beyond bases, the framework shows a path forward for moving manufacturing back to the United States. That has implications for the broader race with China, which wields its industrial capacity not only for economic dominance but to produce vast weapons stockpiles.

Then-Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante noted this challenge in October 2023: “Today, the U.S. is in a technological and economic race to maintain its manufacturing edge, particularly as it concerns critical defense systems, such as satellites, advanced munitions and communications technologies.”

But the advancement also highlights other serious challenges standing in the way of a more automated manufacturing future, namely that China is the market-share leader in key components that robots need, such as sensors and actuators. Additionally, China has much more access to the materials that would be required to print and build products—including weapons—in robot-run factories.

Robots will enable the United States to build more things. But they won’t build themselves.
]]>

Armenia/Azerbaijan/France : Information wars in the Caucasus

Mon, 14 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0400
Between Yerevan and Baku, the battle for influence is in full swing, with disinformation campaigns being waged by both sides. Meanwhile, the traditional allies and opponents of both countries are caught in the crossfire. [...]

Saudi Arabia : Saudi's naval champion Sofon hiring in Europe

Mon, 14 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0400
Riyadh has big plans for its future naval industry and is reaching outside its borders to build it. Intelligence Online has learned that the Saudi authorities poached Cezary Cierzan, a former director of Polish defence group Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ) [...]

China/France/Russia/United States : DGSE screening, US naval intelligence, China's anti-corruption drive, Paris-Moscow skirmish

Mon, 14 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0400
France - DGSE speeds up clearance procedures to boost recruitmentAt a time when French intelligence services are struggling to recruit, [...]

Azerbaijan/France : Legal wrangling between Paris and Baku intensifies

Mon, 14 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0400
The trial begun in January of the French-British national Martin Ryan, who was arrested in Baku on 4 December 2023 [...]

Syria : Syria's private security boom

Mon, 14 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0400
A recent spate of clashes across Syria has not deterred Damascus from cultivating business and diplomatic ties. The government led [...]

Europe : Frontex wants its own intelligence data fusion system

Mon, 14 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0400
It was on page 16 of an internal document from [...]

Endorsement by Mayor Adams Appears to Lift Sales of Kash Patel’s Book

Dana Rubinstein and Jonah E. Bromwich — Sun, 13 Apr 2025 11:42:20 -0400
The F.B.I. director saw sales of his book about the government’s “deep state” rise by nearly 800 percent after Mayor Eric Adams lavished praise on it.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal On Fear

Stanley McChrystal — Sun, 13 Apr 2025 06:00:08 -0400
America has always known fear. But today’s fear is different. It has been cultivated.

Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions

Just Security — Sun, 13 Apr 2025 00:02:19 -0400

This public resource tracks legal challenges to Trump administration actions. If you think we are missing anything, you can email us at lte@justsecurity.org. Special thanks to Just Security Student Staff Editors Anna Braverman, Isaac Buck, Rick Da, Charlotte Kahan, and Jeremy Venook, and to Matthew Fouracre and Nour Soubani.

The Tracker is part of the Collection: Just Security’s Coverage of the Trump Administration’s Executive Actions. Readers may also be interested in signing up for our free Early Edition roundup of news and our end-of-day newsletter with Just Security articles from the day (We respect your privacy. We do not use your email address for any other purpose except to automatically send you the requested email.)

The Tracker was first published on Jan. 29, 2025 and is continually updated. Last updated April 13, 2025.

Total number of cases tracked: 188 (including 4 closed cases)

Topic Executive Action Case Name Complaint Date Filed Case Summary Last Update

Immigration and Citizenship Executive Action: Alien Enemies Act removals (Presidential Proclamation 10903) G.F.F. v. Trump (S.D.N.Y.)

Case No 1:25-cv-02886 Habeas petition and Class complaint

Motion for TRO 2025-04-08 Overview: Plaintiffs are two Venezuelan nationals (proceeding under pseudonym) in immigration custody in New York. They have filed a habeas petition asking the court to stop the government from removing them from the United States the Alien Enemies Act Presidential Proclamation, and to declare the Proclamation unlawful. The case has been brought on behalf of themselves and a class of all other persons similarly situated, to include all noncitizens from Venezuela in immigration custody in the Southern District of New York, who were, are, or will be subject to the Proclamation.
The court has temporarily blocked the Defendants from removing the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated in the Southern District of New York through Apr. 23, 2025.

Case Summary: On March 15, 2025, President Donald Trump published a Presidential Proclamation titled “Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of The United States by Tren De Aragua” (Proclamation), which sought to authorize removal of noncitizens from Venezuela who are deemed to be “enemy aliens” under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA).
Petitioners are two Venezuelan men who have been arrested and detained by immigration authorities, and allegedly face imminent deportation pursuant to the Proclamation.
Petitioners argue that the removal process established under the Proclamation is unlawful. They argue that such process is ultra vires under the AEA, as the AEA only authorizes removals during a declared war or invasion of the United States by a foreign nation or government, and further requires additional process prior to removing noncitizens. They also argue that the removal process violates various provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, including those that establish procedures and mechanisms for, as well as protections against, removal (including sending someone to a country where they are more likely than not to face torture). Finally, they argue that the removal process violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the right to habeas corpus.
Petitioners have brought their petition and complaint on behalf of a similarly situated class, including all noncitizens in immigration custody who were, are, or will be subject to the Proclamation.
Petitioners have requested that the court certify the class, grant a writ of habeas corpus to Petitioners that enjoins Defendants from removing them pursuant to the Proclamation, and declare the Proclamation unlawful.

Update 1: Starting on Apr. 8-11, the court certified the class and granted a temporary restraining order preventing their removal from the district or the United States.

2025-04-11

Immigration and Citizenship Executive Action: Alien Enemies Act removals (Presidential Proclamation 10903) J.A.V. v. Trump (S.D. Tex.)

Case No. 1:25-cv-00072 Habeas petition (Apr. 9, 2025)

Emergency Motion for TRO (Apr. 9, 2025) 2025-04-09 Overview: : Plaintiffs are three Venezuelan nationals (proceeding under pseudonym) in immigration custody in Texas. They have filed a habeas petition asking the court to stop the government from removing them from the United States the Alien Enemies Act Presidential Proclamation, and to declare the Proclamation unlawful. The case has been brought on behalf of themselves and a class of all other persons similarly situated, to include all noncitizens from Venezuela in immigration custody in the Southern District of Texas, who were, are, or will be subject to the Proclamation. The court has temporarily blocked the Defendants from removing the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated in the Southern District of Texas through Apr. 23, 2025.

Case Summary: On March 15, 2025, President Donald Trump published a Presidential Proclamation titled “Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of The United States by Tren De Aragua” (Proclamation), which sought to authorize removal of noncitizens from Venezuela who are deemed to be “enemy aliens” under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA).
Petitioners are three Venezuelan men who have been arrested and detained by immigration authorities at El Valle Detention Center in Texas, and allegedly face imminent deportation pursuant to the Proclamation.
Petitioners argue that the removal process established under the Proclamation is unlawful. They argue that such process is ultra vires under the AEA, as the AEA authorizes removals only during a declared war or invasion of the United States by a foreign nation or government, and further requires additional process prior to removing noncitizens. They also argue that the removal process violates various provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, including those that establish procedures and mechanisms for, as well as protections against, removal (including sending someone to a country where they are more likely than not to face torture). Finally, they argue that the removal process violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the right to habeas corpus.
Petitioners have brought their petition and complaint on behalf of a similarly situated class, including all noncitizens in immigration custody in the Southern District of Texas who were, are, or will be subject to the Proclamation.
Petitioners have requested that the court certify the class, grant a writ of habeas corpus to Petitioners that enjoins Defendants from removing them pursuant to the Proclamation, and declare the Proclamation unlawful. Petitioners filed an emergency application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) due to being in imminent danger of removal to another country.
On April 9, 2025, Judge Fernando Rodriguez granted petitioners’ TRO on an ex parte basis and blocked Defendants from transferring, relocating, or removing petitioners and any other person they claim are subject to removal under the Proclamation from the El Valle Detention Center where Respondents are currently being held. Absent further action, the TRO will be in place through Apr. 23, 2025. 2025-04-09

Immigration and Citizenship Executive Action: Alien Enemies Act removals (Presidential Proclamation 10903) Zacarias Matos v. Venegas (S.D.N.Y.)

Case No. 1:25-cv-00057 Habeas petition 2025-03-15 Overview: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers tried to remove Daniel Enrique Zacarias Matos, a Venezuelan national who is detained at the El Valle Detention Facility, from the United States. Zacarias Matos filed a petition to prevent his removal from the US unless and until he receives a final removal order. The Government asserts that the Alien Enemies Act authorizes his removal. The court has issued a preliminary injunction and set a hearing to assess evidence of the government’s claim that he is a member of the Venezuelan TdA gang.

Summary: Daniel Enrique Zacarias Matos brought a habeas petition to prevent Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers from removing him from the United States unless and until he receives a final removal order. The Government states that the Alien Enemies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 21, authorizes his removal based on the March 15 Presidential Proclamation.
ICE officials tried to remove Zacarias Matos, a Venezuelan national who is detained at the El Valle Detention Facility, from the United States on Mar. 14, but they were allegedly unable to do so due to a problem with the flight.
Zacarias Matos claims that the attempt to remove him violates 8 U.S.C. § 1229a of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, and asked the Court to enjoin his imminent removal unless and until a removal order is entered against him.
Update 1: On Apr. 7, Judge Fernando Rodriguez granted a preliminary injunction and set an evidentiary hearing for May 5 on whether the petitioner is a member of TdA. 2025-04-07

Immigration and Citizenship Executive Action: Alien Enemies Act removals (Presidential Proclamation 10903) J.G.G. v. Trump (D.D.C)

Case No. 1:25-cv-00766

(D.C. Cir No. 25-5067)

Supreme Court docket 24A931 Petition

Motion for TRO 2025-03-15 Overview: President Trump issued a presidential proclamation purporting to invoke the Alien Enemies Act to allow for summary removal of alleged members of the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua (TdA) gang. The White House publicly released the proclamation on the afternoon of Mar. 15. Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit arguing the 1798 statute does not apply to these circumstances, and the judge provisionally agreed issuing a temporary block to any removals until further hearings. The Court of Appeals upheld the judge’s ruling on appeal. The district court issued two Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs) against the government on Mar. 15 that have been extended through Apr. 12.

Summary: On Mar. 14, President Trump signed a Proclamation purporting to invoke the authority of the Alien Enemies Act to summarily deport Venezuelan nationals alleged to be members of the Tren de Aragua (TdA) gang.
In the early hours of Saturday, Mar. 15, five Venezuelan nationals in U.S. immigration custody brought a proposed class action lawsuit challenging the government’s action on the ground that the Alien Enemies Act does not provide authority for such removals; that the removals would be in violation of immigration statutes governing deportation proceedings and the Administrative Procedure Act, in addition to a violation of habeas corpus. The Plaintiffs submitted an emergency application for a temporary restraining order asking the court to block any removals from the United States.
In an emergency hearing on Mar. 15, Chief Judge James Boasberg, first ruling from the bench, certified a class of “all noncitizens in U.S. custody who are subject to the Mar. 15, 2025 Presidential Proclamation,” and granted the request for a temporary restraining order to block removals of any class members from the United States.
Update 1: The same day, Mar. 15, the government submitted a notice of appeal to the D.C. Circuit. The judge issued a verbal order, in a ruling from the bench, and a written TRO that evening.
Update 2: On Mar. 17, Defendants moved to vacate the TRO.
Update 3: On Mar. 18, Chief Judge James Boasberg issued a minute order requiring Defendants to submit a declaration explaining what time the flights that left U.S. airspace prior to the filing of the TRO departed and landed, when the individuals aboard left U.S. custody, and the number of people aboard subject to the President’s Proclamation.
Update 4: On Mar. 19, Defendants filed a motion to stay Chief Judge Boasberg’s March 18th minute order, arguing that they required more time to invoke the state secrets privilege, avoid disclosure of sensitive information, and prevent harm to foreign relations.
Update 5: On Mar. 19, Chief Judge Boasberg issued an order permitting Defendants an additional day to respond to the Mar. 18 Order, but expressing skepticism about their stated intention to invoke the state-secrets doctrine.
Update 6: On Mar. 19, Plaintiffs filed a motion in opposition to Defendants’ motion to vacate the TRO.
Update 7: On Mar. 20, Chief Judge Boasberg issued an order requiring Defendants to show cause for its failure to comply with the TRO, and it also granted Defendants’ delay to invoke the state-secrets privilege.
Update 8: On Mar. 24, Chief Judge Boasberg issued a memorandum opinion granting Plaintiffs’ TRO.
Update 9: On Mar. 25, Defendants filed a notice invoking the state-secrets privilege in response to the Mar. 18 minute order.
Update 10: On Mar. 26, Plaintiffs filed a Notice that they intended to file a new Motion for Preliminary Injunction on Friday, Mar. 28, to incorporate “additional factual material so that there is a more complete record.”
That same day, the D.C. Circuit. in a 2-1 decision, denied Defendants’ motion to stay the TRO.
Update 11: On Mar. 27, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to extend the TROs set to expire on Mar. 29 for 14 days to Apr. 12, claiming that good cause exists to extend the TROs.
Update 12: On Mar. 28, the Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court asking to vacate the district court’s order and to issue an administrative stay.
Update 13: On Mar. 28, the Defendants filed an opposition to the motion to extend the TRO, claiming that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ claims and that the Plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits.
That same day, the Court ordered the extension of the TROs until Apr. 12.
Update 14: On Mar. 28, Plaintiffs submitted a motion and memorandum for a preliminary injunction with exhibits including an “Alien Enemy Validation Guide,” allegedly used by the government.
Update 15: On Mar. 31, the Plaintiffs filed a direct contact with migrants, a possible violation of federal law.

The memo directs the Interior Department to allow the Defense Department to have jurisdiction over portions of federal land known as the Roosevelt Reservation, excluding any Native American reservations.

By creating a military buffer zone that stretches across the U.S.-Mexico border in Arizona, California and New Mexico, it means any migrant crossing into the United States would be trespassing on a military base, therefore allowing active-duty troops to hold them until U.S. Border Patrol agents arrive.

National and military experts have raised concerns that giving control over the land to the military could violate the Posse Comitatus Act, an 1878 law that generally prohibits the military from being used in domestic law enforcement.

The Friday memo instructs its “phased” implementation within 45 days, and says it could be expanded over time.The memo is directed at the secretaries of the departments of Defense, Interior, Agriculture and Homeland Security.

“The complexity of the current situation requires that our military take a more direct role in securing our southern border than in the recent past,” according to the memo.

Friday’s announcement comes ahead of a report that is due to Trump by April 20 from the secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security with recommendations on whether or not to use the Insurrection Act of 1807 to aid in mass deportations.

The memo states: “At any time, the Secretary of Defense may extend activities under this memorandum to additional Federal lands along the southern border in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor, and other executive departments and agencies as appropriate.”

The memo also says that it’s part of an executive order Trump earlier this year signed, “Clarifying the Military's Role in Protecting the Territorial Integrity of the United States.”

That executive order is one of five that lay out the use of military forces within the U.S. borders and extend other executive powers to speed up the president's immigration crackdown.
]]>

Trump Directive Calls for Turning Border Strip Into ‘Military Installation’

Maggie Haberman, Eric Schmitt and Hamed Aleaziz — Sat, 12 Apr 2025 12:29:00 -0400
The plan would put a strip along the southern border under Pentagon control, allowing the military to detain migrants for trespassing on a military base until Border Patrol agents could arrest them.

Military Judge Throws Out Sept. 11 Case Confession as Obtained Through Torture

Carol Rosenberg — Sat, 12 Apr 2025 11:22:42 -0400
The critical question of whether the prisoner’s 2007 interrogations could be used at his capital trial has shadowed the case for years.

The state of naval autonomy

Lauren C. Williams — Sat, 12 Apr 2025 08:00:00 -0400
NATIONAL HARBOR, Md.—Dozens of onlookers gathered on a pier overlooking the Potomac River, shivering in the cold wind to see a small, 24-foot long vessel speed around without a captain.

It was Corsair, the smallest offering from robot-boat startup company Saronic, demonstrating how well it could maneuver in choppy waters with other craft passing by. And while it drew the largest crowd of the day, it wasn’t the only autonomous or semi-crewed vessel docked just outside of the Sea-Air-Space conference this week: Maritime Robotics, Textron Systems, and Ghostworks’ optionally-crewed Minerva all had a mooring. Project Perfect Storm was also there.

Paired with high-profile uncrewed undersea vehicle announcements from Anduril, HII and others, the expanded waterside showcase this year highlighted the Navy’s growing calls for more robots in maritime operations—both in the air and at sea.

It’s been a long time coming for Rep. Trent Kelly, R-Miss., who chairs the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.

“The Navy has talked about it, talked about it, talked about it, but they’ve taken no actions to actually do this,” Kelly said of fully embracing the use of uncrewed maritime systems. “And I think we, as industry, and we as Congress, need to think ‘there are some platforms that can be both—can be either [crewed or uncrewed]—depending on the mission. So we absolutely have to focus there.”

Last year, Adm. Lisa Franchetti, then the chief of naval operations, outlined a 15-year path for regularly incorporating uncrewed systems as standard in maritime operations. That sentiment was bolstered by the CNO’s 2024 Navigation Plan, which highlights robotic and autonomous systems as key to increasing naval fleet capabilities. And Navy leaders are looking ahead to incorporating uncrewed tankers—the MQ-25—with aircraft carriers later this year after long delays with the program.

Yet there's an appetite for more, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.

[[Related Posts]]

During his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee onWednesday, Adm. Samuel Paparo, the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told lawmakers the command requires “sustained investment” in “autonomous and artificial intelligence-driven systems” and other technologies “to maintain credible deterrence.”

In written testimony, he said “expanded acquisition of additional autonomous aerial systems, AI-driven undersea vehicles, and enabling technologies for full deployment will provide critical capability in the Indo-Pacific.”

The Navy is also testing two torpedo-tube launch and recovery underwater vehicle systems—HII’s Remus 600 called “Yellow Moray” and L3Harris’ “Rat Trap” or Iver4—with the United Kingdom, as part of the trilateral AUKUS agreement.

“We've tested them on both Los Angeles- and Virginia-class submarines. We currently have [USS] Delaware deployed with the Yellow Moray system. And the [Royal Navy’s] Astute-class, over the last five or six months has tested the UK version or variant of those systems as well,” Vice Adm. Rob Gaucher, the commander of Naval Submarine Forces, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and Allied Submarine Fleet, said during a panel discussion.

But the Navy’s hybrid fleet isn’t yet a reality.

The Navy isn’t new to the concept of uncrewed or autonomous systems. The idea started to take shape with the Navy’s 2021 Unmanned Campaign Framework, which outlined how the service wanted to use the systems.

The document was an “entry salvo on how it might work, but it never really matured to the point of execution,” John Mustin, the president of Saildrone, which makes autonomous vehicles for oceanographic and bathymetric surveys and defense and maritime domain awareness applications, told Defense One on the show floor.

In the years since, there’s been a greater acceptance of the reality that a naval fleet must have uncrewed systems.

“We will continue to build ships, submarines, and airplanes, no question. But we also know that we're going to incorporate unmanned systems, some of which are autonomous—not all are, but many of them will be,” said Mustin, who was previously the vice commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command and commander of the Navy Reserve.

“It could be as much as a third to a half of the total number of platforms. And the benefit of autonomy is they don't need to be big and you don't need a lot of people on it,” he said.

And fewer people means lower costs for training, and potential lives saved.

“When I look at a $2 billion destroyer that has 350 people on it, and I think of the overhead associated with the training that is required to man—from an O-5 commanding officer to an E-1 line handler,” Mustin said. “The benefit here is we provide all of the operations and maintenance. So you just get the benefit of the capability.”

So if the benefits of autonomous systems are clear, what’s the hold up? Charles Fralick, Leidos’ chief technology officer, said the Navy’s reticence is not because the technology isn’t there, but because there’s uncertainty about how to deploy them.

“A small underwater vehicle or small surface vehicle [or] small air vehicle—they are wonderful pieces of hardware today capable of doing many really interesting things, as you've seen in Ukraine. But the issue is, you have to get them to the point that they need to be used, and you need to be able to support them where they are deployed,” he said.

Smaller uncrewed systems have limited ranges and power, which stunts their ability to maintain communications at great distances.

“That means recharging underwater vehicles, refueling surface vehicles and air vehicles, and having the communications infrastructure. And so that's the piece that the Navy has been starting to come to grips with,” Fralick said.

Larger platforms are easier to deploy, can handle military communications, and have long ranges and high reliability, he said, but come with their own challenges.

Rear Adm. William Daly, the Navy’s director of surface warfare, recently questioned the service’s need for large autonomous ships, arguing instead for a medium-sized vessel that can be versatile and produced quickly. Lawmakers also doubt the need for large USVs.

Medium-sized USVs can do just about everything the large ones can—like contested logistics and carry weapons—except really heavy lifting. But there’s still that deployment problem, Fralick argued.

“[It’s] not just getting the things from point A to point B, where they can be used, but it's also supporting them once they get out there,” he said.

That is, a USV that’s hundreds of feet long will likely require some of the same specialized maintenance that causes backlogs and delays with warships, whereas smaller platforms can be made faster and cheaper.

“I think it's the Navy optimizing the balance between production efficiency, cost, and capability,” he said. “We will eventually get to large USVs in Navy service. But there's no ultra-compelling demand signal right now because we can satisfy most of the needs with the MUSVs” and smaller.

Challenging tides ahead

There are challenges besides policy to thoroughly weaving uncrewed systems into the fleet from the Defense Department’s complicated acquisition system, which the Trump administration has vowed to reform. Namely, limited manufacturing capabilities and contested communications.

“You still want command and control folks ashore or afloat to be able to reach out and touch these platforms and reprogram them in extremis,” such as if they’re surrounded by dozens of ships, Fralick said. “To have reliable communications no matter what scenario we're in is very important, and we're making good progress in that area. Five years ago, 10 years ago, that was a real issue.”

Another tech challenge is how well the systems can see or perceive their surroundings.

“Most builders of autonomous surface platforms use radar as their primary sensor,” he said. “Radar is good in many situations; if you have calm seas or you're not in a wartime footing where you can radiate from the radar, they're pretty good.”

Fralick believes in having layered solutions—optical, LiDAR, and also AI—to produce “a fused perception picture.”

“We have been a little slow in making progress in that area in the community,” he said. “But that's got to grow at a more rapid pace to ensure that we have confidence in our ability to operate in contested environments, in all weather conditions, because the worst possible outcome with an autonomous platform is that it collides with a pleasure boat and kills people.”

A water taxi with passengers ferried by as Corsair effortlessly made shapes, trailed by a manned safety craft. It was impressive to see, but also a reminder of why there’s been hesitation on full-scale adoption.

“We've got to make sure that doesn't happen. The autonomy is good enough…It's going to take something really unusual, like a deliberate attempt, collision by another vessel, for us to hit a platform. It's very safe, but it's only as good as the perception systems,” Fralick said.

There’s also a need for systems to detect and track other vessels at a distance. Watching Corsair cut through the wind-made waves on the Potomac became more difficult the further away it got from the pier, until it was identifiable mostly by its foamy wake.

“Even with the naked eye, if you see a vessel several miles away, unless it's very large, you have a hard time telling what it is until it gets much closer. We need the ability to do that more quickly and with confidence on board our autonomous platforms,” he said.

Of course, there are different levels of autonomy—from the kind that presses the brakes to avoid a crash to the kind that does everything on its own, even if there’s the ability for human override.

“They're not quite at the point where they're going to allow an autonomous platform to do everything, culminating in the launch of the missile. We're not quite there with the trust level yet,” Fralick said. “That's coming, but that requires a lot of testing to ensure the safety of civilians and other platforms that aren't adversaries. That needs extra care and attention, and it's going to take some time until the Navy is comfortable with that.”
]]>

Digest of Recent Articles on Just Security (Apr. 7-11, 2025)

Just Security — Sat, 12 Apr 2025 07:58:45 -0400

Symposium: Regulating Social Media Platforms

Leveraging International Standards to Protect U.S. Consumers Online, No Congress Required
by Anna Lenhart

Enabling a Thriving Middleware Market
by Luke Hogg and Renee DiResta

Israel-Hamas War

New Israeli Guidelines Threaten to Eliminate Humanitarian Action in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Almost Entirely
by Eitan Diamond

Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions (Updated)

Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions
by Just Security

Trump Executive Actions / Analysis & Perspectives

No, the President Cannot Issue Bills of Attainder
by Harold Hongju Koh, Fred Halbhuber and Inbar Pe’er

Unpacking the Voice of America Litigation
by Paul M. Barrett

State Department / Visa Revocations

Visa Revocations Disregard South Sudan War Risks, Overlook U.S. Communities’ Embrace of Refugees
by Rebecca Hamilton and Jon Temin

United States / Nuclear Testing

Nuclear Testing Is a Relic. Resuming It Would Be Reckless.
by Shawn Rostker

Russia Sanctions / Business

In Potential Russia Sanctions Removal, Diamonds Illustrate the Complexities
by Brad Brooks-Rubin

Netherlands / Civilian Harm

The Netherlands Apologizes for Involvement in Hawija Airstrike and Lays Out Further Reforms
by Megan Karlshoej-Pedersen

International Law

Balancing State Security and Peace and Security in Outer Space: What Role for International Law on the Use of Force?
by Chris O’Meara

There is No Immunity for the International Criminal Court to Respect
by Chile Eboe-Osuji

FISA Section 702

The Dangerous Foreign Intelligence Exception Loophole in the Hasbajrami Decision
by Hannah James

The post Digest of Recent Articles on Just Security (Apr. 7-11, 2025) appeared first on Just Security.

F.B.I. Suspends Employee on Patel’s So-Called Enemies List

Adam Goldman — Sat, 12 Apr 2025 00:18:11 -0400
The employee was a longtime counterintelligence analyst who had worked on the F.B.I.’s investigation examining Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential election.

Trump Directive Calls to Turn Border Land Into ‘Military Installation’

Maggie Haberman, Eric Schmitt and Hamed Aleaziz — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 22:24:36 -0400
The plan would put a strip along the southern border under Pentagon control, allowing the military to detain migrants for trespassing on a military base until Border Patrol agents could arrest them.

Canceled: Pentagon terminates IT service contracts

Lauren C. Williams — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 19:05:55 -0400
The Pentagon wants to cut several IT contracts with tech consulting firms in an effort to reduce duplicative spending and increase efficiency by relying on the defense civilian workforce, according to an April 10 memo.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the termination of several IT services contracts with the Defense Health Agency, Air Force, and Navy, saying the work could be “performed by our civilian workforce” or fulfilled with “existing procurement resources.”

Additionally, the memo ends a contract with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency for “IT Helpdesk Services that are duplicative with service capabilities of our existing DISA workforce.”

Hegseth said the terminated contracts “represent $5.1 billion in wasteful spending,” according to the memo.

The Defense Information Systems Agency is responsible for running defense networks worldwide, as well as IT services and White House communications. The agency has about 7,500 civilian employees, 1,600 active-duty military personnel from across the services, and more than 11,000 defense contractors, according to a 2024 accounting document.

[[Related Posts]]

The agency has also previously been targeted for elimination due to growing budget costs. The Pentagon’s relationship with DISA is integral for everyday and wartime communications. But its largely civilian—and very technical—workforce could also conflict with the Trump administration’s efforts to reduce the size of the federal government.

Moreover, the Defense Department writ large has suffered from a dearth in technical expertise, particularly when it comes to cybersecurity.

Hegseth’s IT service memo follows recent guidance for defense agencies and components to submit proposals to “reduce or eliminate redundant or non-essential functions and include adjusted civilian manpower levels that reflect these projected changes,” Deputy Defense Secretary Stephen Feinberg wrote in an April 7 memo. “Every role must now meet a simple test: If this position didn't exist today, and we were at war tomorrow, would we create it? If the answer is no, it should be consolidated, restructured, or eliminated.”
]]>

F.B.I. Suspends Bureau Employee on Patel’s So-Called Enemies List

Adam Goldman — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 18:29:45 -0400
The employee was a longtime counterintelligence analyst who had worked on the F.B.I.’s investigation examining Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential election.

U.S. Military Removes Commander of Greenland Base

Qasim Nauman — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 17:40:16 -0400
Although the military did not say why the colonel had been dismissed, it said it would not tolerate any subversion of President Trump’s agenda.

Who’s In and Who’s Out at the Naval Academy’s Library?

John Ismay — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 17:08:00 -0400
An order by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s office resulted in a purge of books critical of racism but preserved volumes defending white power.

Miami Art Dealer Is Charged With Selling Fraudulent Warhols

Julia Jacobs — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 16:48:32 -0400
The dealer, Leslie Roberts of Miami Fine Art Gallery, was accused of using fake invoices and forged authentication documents to make the works appear legitimate.

El ejército de EE. UU. destituye a la comandante de la base de Groenlandia

Qasim Nauman — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 16:48:07 -0400
La decisión se dio luego de la visita del vicepresidente de EE. UU. a finales de marzo. El ejército no dio razones, pero señaló que no toleraría ninguna subversión de la agenda del presidente Trump.

There is No Immunity for the International Criminal Court to Respect

Chile Eboe-Osuji — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 15:33:07 -0400

The contributors of the commentaries “Why the ICC Should Respect Immunities of Heads of Third States” (hereafter the “First Piece”) and “Time to Revisit the ICC’s Position on Head-of-State Immunity?”(hereafter the “Second Piece”) are seriously mistaken. Perhaps, the sum of their commentaries boils down to the following argument made towards the end of the First Piece: “In a time when the rule of law is under pressure and grave international crimes dominate the news, one could think that the ICC should step up, not down. But international courts must respect international law, also in dire times. The ICC’s denial of immunity to Heads of third States does not. The ICC’s insistence to pursue such cases puts it on the wrong side of the law in cases where the Court is unlikely to achieve anything but a notable erosion of its authority and legitimacy.” [Emphasis added.] The International Criminal Court (ICC)’s caselaw on immunity is entirely consistent with international law. The contributors’ theses are at odds with it in all the important ways.

The contributors add no fresh insight into the discourse on immunity. They merely rehash in new submissions old arguments that have been amply addressed in earlier pieces—in a rather tedious game of “whack-a-mole.” Their arguments have been addressed by a large body of scholarship, including here and in greater detail here. It is indeed such incomplete analyses that compelled the publication of my new book “End of Immunity: Holding World Leaders Accountable for Aggression, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity” (2024). The purpose of the book is to show that the norm which rejects immunity for heads of State and government was neither a footnote nor an accidental development in the history of international law. The Allies’ determination to try the Kaiser—as recalled in the book in great detail—effectively launched a profound international law reform that intentionally and specifically rejected immunity for even heads of State and heads of government. That norm is currently reflected not only in the Rome Statute but also in every international legal instrument on the subject from 1945 until today. It is known as Nuremberg Principle III—a principle of international law affirmed by the UN General Assembly pursuant to resolution 95(I) of 1946.

The British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and his French counterpart Georges Clemenceau were the two statesmen who masterminded that law reform. Confronted in 1918 with the question whether there was precedent in international law for prosecuting a head of State before an international tribunal, Lloyd George said: “With regard to the question of international law, well, we are making international law, and all we can claim is that international law should be based on justice.” [See Eboe-Osuji, “End of Immunity” (2024), p. 69, emphasis added.] That was a clear declaration of an intention to make law in the indicated way. For his part, Clemenceau insisted that “people everywhere would be satisfied” if the Kaiser could be prosecuted. “They will feel that justice will in future be done in the case of Kaisers [i.e. emperors] and Kings just as much as in the case of common men.” [See Eboe-Osuji, “End of Immunity” (2024), p. 94.] That was a clear determination to apply international law to heads of State as it is applied to ordinary people.

Lloyd George’s Attorney-General F. E. Smith (the future Lord Chancellor Birkenhead) put the objective of the law reform in the following memorable terms: “[T]he most effective deterrent of all is that for all ages men who are tempted to follow the wicked and the bloody path which the Governors of the Central Empires have trodden during the last four years, shall have present before their eyes, not a picture merely of the brilliant and meretricious glamour of military success, but also the recollection that in this great conflict punishment attended upon crime.” [See Eboe-Osuji, “End of Immunity” (2024), p 84.]

Not even the contributors’ arguments concerning the ICC’s jurisdiction over officials of States that didn’t consent to that jurisdiction reveal fresh insight into the operations of international law. Germany gave no consent in 1919, when article 227 of the Versailles Treaty publicly declared that Kaiser Wilhelm II must stand trial before an international criminal tribunal. To the contrary, Germany vigorously protested those provisions. Count Von Brockdorff-Rantzau, Germany’s Foreign Minister and head of delegation at Versailles, described the treaty as an imposition that amounted to “a peace of violence and not of justice.” “We are required,” he further protested, “to admit that we alone are war guilty; such an admission on my lips would be a lie.”

Similarly, Germany and Japan gave no consent, as a matter of law, when their surviving senior State officials (who composed the wartime governments of their respective States) were tried and punished by the Nuremberg and the Tokyo tribunals. Such a consent could not reasonably be read into Germany’s instrument of surrender at the end of World War II; and Germany was not a party to the London Agreement and the Charter of the Nuremberg tribunal.

It is true that Japanese representatives surrendered to the Allies, pursuant to the Potsdam Declaration, and subordinated their Emperor and government to the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. But that surrender came only after the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—a fortnight after the threat of “prompt and utter destruction” of Japan that the Allies issued in the Potsdam Declaration.

The coercive circumstances of these documents are apparent enough. Their legal effect in conveying proper consent can only be appraised in light of the norms of international law now codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, saying as follows:

“The expression of a State’s consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be without any legal effect.” (Article 51, emphasis added.)

“A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.” (Article 52, emphasis added.)

Yet, the nugatory effect of coercion on Germany’s and Japan’s consent in relation to the Versailles Treaty and the charters of the Nuremberg and the Tokyo tribunals doesn’t mean that those instruments lacked validity in international law for what they aimed to do. That is to say, their validity is to be found elsewhere in international law than in a meaningful theory of consent from Germany or Japan. That validity is to be found rather in the customary international law doctrine that always accepted the right of States or of the international community to exact punishment for transgressions of preservative norms of international law. Some modern scholars have acceptably suggested ius puniendi as a serviceable terminology for the idea. The discussion summarizing that doctrine of international law, as a matter of the ICC’s jurisdiction over officials of States not party to the Rome Statute may be found here. Since the ICC is the permanent progeny of the Nuremberg and the Tokyo tribunals, the ICC’s jurisdiction over officials of States not party to the Rome Statute is as valid in international law as were the respective jurisdictions of the Nuremberg and the Tokyo tribunals over German and Japanese officials.

“Criticism” of the Al-Bashir Appeals Judgment

In the book “The Sleepwalkers” (2012), Christopher Clark noted how certain assertions about the pugnacious tendency of imperial Germany were “[r]epeated mantra-like at every possible opportunity” so that they “merged to form a new virtual reality—a way of making sense of the world.” That is the seeming stratagem adopted by commentators like the contributors of the First Piece and the Second Piece: they appear to consider that all that is needed to undermine the authority of the ICC’s Al-Bashir appeal judgment (which rejected immunity for heads of State and government) is to advertise repeatedly—in vague language—at every opportunity—that the judgment had been “criticized.” Seldom is any effort made to engage at all or accurately with any specific point of such criticism, let alone demonstrate superior reasoning that reveal the supposed flaw.

Nor is there any effort made to acknowledge that just as the judgment was “criticized” by some scholars, so also was it welcomed and applauded by many scholars. (I was honored to serve as the presiding judge in the appeal.) It is not necessary here to worry the fact that the commentator who fired the very first shot of “criticism” against the Al-Bashir Appeal judgment had not actually read the judgment before he wrote a less than two-page blogpost that mischaracterized the judgment and attacked it in what many including the commentators of the First and Second pieces have continued to cite as a valid commentary on the judgment. As he wrote in that short blogpost of May 6, 2019, “I will wait for the full judgment before offering a proper analysis.” [Emphasis added.]

It is enough to recall the observations of Robert H. Jackson in the course of the negotiation of the terms of the London Agreement and the Nuremberg Charter during the summer of 1945: “I have no expectation that any rule we could formulate would avoid the criticism of some scholars of international law …” Jackson was then a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and understood that judges could not hope to do justice according to their conscience and understanding of the facts and the law if they labored under constant worry of potential scholarly criticism.

Indeed, academic criticisms of judicial decisions is an ageless phenomenon, which Sir Robert Megarry famously satirized in his Miscellany-At-Law (1955):

In the cloistered calm of Cambridge

I write books about the law,

Criticising Oxford colleagues,

Making points they never saw.

In a peaceful Cambridge college,

Far remote from active law,

I dissect the courts’ decisions —

I of course detect the flaw … .

All of which is to say, there is rarely a judicial decision of average import that does not attract academic criticism. Such criticisms or “controversy” do not diminish the authority of the resulting case law. Quite the contrary, they only underscore the importance of the judgment.

Consistency of the Al-Bashir Appeal Judgment with International Law

Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) codifies the norm that decisions of courts of law and concurring scholarship of the most eminent jurists of the various nations are a subsidiary source of international law.

And, indeed, the Al-Bashir appeal is fully consistent with the scholarship of the modern era’s most eminent international scholars of the various nations—on the subject of immunity of heads of State and government. Those eminent scholars whose scholarship validated the judgment include Sir Robert Jennings (a former Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge and former President of the International Court of Justice), Sir Arthur Watts (one of Britain’s foremost international law jurists who with Jennings co-edited Oppenheim’s International Law, a classic treatise of international law), Antonio Cassese (a former professor of international law at the University of Florence and former President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and former President of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon), Professor Otto Triffterer, Professor (emeritus) Alain Pellet, Professor (emeritus) Roger S Clark, and Professor (emeritus) John Dugard, Professor Gerhard Werle, Professor Florian Jeßberger, Professor Leila Sadat, Professor Paola Gaeta, Professor Herman van der Wilt, Professor Claus Kreß, Professor Charles Jalloh, Professor Jia Bingbing, and Professor David Scheffer. See here and here.

In the nature of things, an ICC Appeals Chamber judgment in Al-Bashir that might have pleased the contributors of the First and the Second pieces (and other critics of the judgment) might inversely have brooked the disapproval of the scholars listed in the paragraph above.

As regards judicial decisions as sources of international law, the “critics” of the Al-Bashir appeals judgment never mention that at the time of its delivery, the judgment was the last in a series of judgments and decisions of international courts and tribunals in which a minimum of 40 judges in one form or another came to the same conclusion as did the judges of the ICC Appeals Chamber. See here and here.

Commentators such as the contributors of the First and Second pieces whose outlooks are unsettled by the judgment of the ICC Appeals Chamber in Al-Bashir are in the habit of alleging—mostly opaquely—that “State practice” may not support the norm accentuated by the judgment, especially regarding the ICC jurisdiction over leaders of States not parties to the Rome Statute. Often enough these commentators almost never specify what they mean by “State practice”; and when they do, they never fully account for all the relevant State practice. What is then left to be seen in their reference to “State practice” are occurrences such as South Africa’s failure to arrest President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan; Jordan’s similar failure to arrest the same man; Brazil’s suggestion that the ICC should not exercise jurisdiction over President Vladimir Putin; the suggestions of a former government of France, the administration of President Joe Biden and Friedrich Merz (the incoming Chancellor of Germany) that ICC should not exercise jurisdiction over Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu because he is their ally.

But, a claim of “State practice” shouldn’t be a flotsam in the sea of free-wheeling discourse in international law—detached from the doctrinal purpose. Properly understood, State practice has a purpose—it is an element of formation of customary international law. For State practice to serve that purpose, it must be seen not only as “consistent” but also motivated by observance of law rather than the mere extension of political succour to friends and allies. As students are taught in introductory course in public international law, the fuller expression of the idea is “consistent practice of states accepted as law” (emphasis added)—or “a general practice accepted as law” in the words of article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute (emphasis added). The caselaw of the ICJ insists that “[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.” [Emphasis added. See, for instance, North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 44, para. 77; see also Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2019, p. 95, para. 149.]

Where there has been settled State practice—such as the settled practice expressed in Nuremberg Principle III which is repeated in all instruments of international law since 1945—there can be no contrary “State practice” if such contrary “practice” is inconsistent (in relation to itself) or not generally accepted or is motivated by politics.

Can we then truly speak of “State practice” that undermines ICC’s anti-immunity norm when Putin ultimately did not attend BRICS meetings in South Africa and Brazil specifically because of the ICC arrest warrant? See here and here and here.

In light of the proper understanding of State practice as meaning consistent, general or settled practice of States, what contrary “State practice” is these commentators speaking of when 93 States (including Brazil, Jordan, and South Africa) issued a joint statement of support of the ICC in June 2024, as a direct reaction to threats made against the Court following Prosecutor Karim Khan’s request for the Court’s arrest warrants against Netanyahu and his former colleague Yoav Gallant; when many States, including South Africa, Jordan, and Brazil, insist that the leaders of Israel must be subjected to investigation and prosecution at the ICC; when Josep Borrell the Foreign Policy Chief of the European Union insisted that the ICC’s arrest warrant against Netanyahu and Gallant must be respected; and, when Biden, the governments of France (see here and here) and of Germany announced that it is correct to prosecute Putin and his colleagues at the ICC?

Conclusion

The analyses two of which I am addressing here are almost entirely silent on the legitimacy of conduct that apparently violates known norms of international law—even as they criticize the jurisprudence of an international institution precisely created to conduct judicial inquiry into such criminal conduct. Some may see a level of gaslighting in that aptitude. It is not enough to equivocate in terms that

Justice Dept. Lobbies for Release of Ex-F.B.I. Informant Accused of Lying About Bidens

Glenn Thrush and Devlin Barrett — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 14:34:55 -0400
It was the latest in a series of moves to scrap or soften punishments against President Trump’s supporters, including members of the violent mob that attacked the Capitol.

Air Force Academy Stops Considering Class Diversity in Admissions Process

Karoun Demirjian — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 14:17:17 -0400
The Justice Department said in a filing Friday that the academy changed its policy to adhere to an executive order issued in January by President Trump.

The D Brief: New CJCS; Contracts, cancelled; Europe pledges Ukraine aid; Report: China avows Volt Typhoon; And a bit more.

Ben Watson, Bradley Peniston, and Lauren C. Williams — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 11:18:43 -0400
After a two-month vacancy, President Trump has secured his preferred top military advisor. Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Dan Caine was confirmed as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a 60-25 late-night Senate vote. Caine has extensive F-16 piloting experience, and he served as a counterterrorism advisor under President George W. Bush as well as a special operations commander in Iraq after Bush’s 2003 invasion.

The president fired Caine’s predecessor, Air Force Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr., in February as part of Trump’s crusade against diversity. “Trump appointees have said diversity policies by the Biden administration had resulted in promoting unqualified officers,” the Wall Street Journal reports. But despite Caine’s experience, “he does not meet prerequisites for the [Joint Chiefs] job set out in a 1986 law, such as being a combatant commander or service chief,” the Associated Press reminds readers. As a result, Trump had to submit a waiver to congress claiming “such action is necessary in the national interest.”

“The Senate’s lopsided 60-25 vote approving General Caine, who is retired, was expected,” the New York Times reports. This is because “the majority of [Democrats] appeared to view him as perhaps the best possible option, given the circumstances.”

New: As part of its cost-cutting efforts, the Pentagon just terminated more than $5 billion in “non-essential” IT contracts with Deloitte, Booz Allen Hamilton and others, the Defense Department announced (PDF) Thursday.

“The contracts appeared to be wide-ranging cuts to consulting services for the Navy, the Air Force, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Defense Health Agency,” Reuters reports.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth now wants the Pentagon’s rattled and shrinking civilian workforce to handle the IT work, he instructed in a memo. The job will fall to the Defense Information Systems Agency, which has in the past been targeted for elimination due to growing budget costs, and whose largely civilian—and very technical—workforce could conflict with Hegseth’s efforts to shrink his department.

Hegseth also said he cancelled “another set of 11 contracts across DoD components for consulting services that support Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI), Climate, Covid-19 response, and non-essential activities.” According to Hegseth, “these terminations represent $5.1 billion in wasteful spending,” he said in his memo.

Related:

“See How Government Spending Is Up Even as Musk Touts Savings,” via the Wall Street Journal, reporting Friday (gift link);

“Trump White House budget proposal eviscerates science funding at NASA,” Ars Technica reported Friday;

“Long-sought goal of better Pentagon buying may finally be within reach,” Defense One’s Patrick Tucker and Jennifer Hlad reported Friday in a trendspotting piece;

And in commentary, “Trump’s defense-acquisition executive order hits the right notes,” Jeffrey Nadaner—Govini senior vice president and a former Pentagon industrial-policy chief—wrote Thursday for Defense One.

Hegseth declined to attend today’s meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which was co-hosted by the UK and Germany in Brussels. Trump’s Pentagon chief instead chose to watch virtually.

Background: “U.S. leadership of the contact group had provided a lifeline of arms and materiel for Ukraine’s armed forces, but…[t]he Trump administration has not announced any new aid for Ukraine since Inauguration Day, even though roughly $3.85 billion remains untapped, according to the Pentagon,” the New York Times reports.

The Brits announced about $580 million in more military aid to Ukraine, Reuters reported from Brussels. “The funding will provide repairs and maintenance to vehicles and equipment as well as radar systems, anti-tank mines and hundreds of thousands of drones,” the wire service writes.

And Ukraine’s European allies together pledged more than $20 billion in military aid on Friday, the Associated Press reports from Belgium. For what it’s worth, “NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said last week that Ukraine’s backers have provided around $21 billion so far in the first three months of this year,” and “European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said Friday that more than $26 billion have been committed,” AP writes.

Occupation watch: “Children throughout occupied Ukraine are taking part in the ‘Zarnitsa 2.0’ military-patriotic game—a revived Soviet-era war game aimed at training youth in basic military skills in eventual preparation for service in the Russian military,” analysts at the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War reported Thursday. “‘Zarnitsa 2.0’ is part of a wider Russian ecosystem operating throughout occupied Ukraine with the explicit purpose of militarizing Ukrainian children, indoctrinating them against their Ukrainian identities, and training them to fight for the Russian military against their fellow Ukrainians,” ISW writes.

New: Trump’s Ukraine envoy Steve Witkoff “traveled to Russia on Friday and is expected to meet President Vladimir Putin” ahead of a possible meeting with Trump sometime later, Axios reports.

Related reading: “Plunge in Oil Prices Threatens Russia’s Vast Spending on Ukraine War,” the New York Times reported Thursday from Berlin.

The U.S. military just fired its Greenland base commander just hours after Military-dot-com reported she had recently “sent out an email to the base distancing it from [Vice President JD] Vance’s criticism of Denmark and its oversight of the territory” during his shortened visit on March 28.

Pentagon spox: “Actions to undermine the chain of command or to subvert President Trump's agenda will not be tolerated at the Department of Defense,” SecDef Hegseth’s assistant Sean Parnell said on social media.

Rewind: During his visit on March 28, Vance was joined by second lady Usha Vance, as well as Trump’s national security adviser Mike Waltz, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, and Sen. Mike Lee of Utah. The five Americans “visited the Pituffick Space Base, the northernmost U.S. military installation, in Greenland” on a visit that had to be “scaled back after an uproar among Greenlanders and Danges who were not consulted about the original itinerary,” CBS News reported at the time.

“While there, the vice president blasted Denmark for its handling of the island, saying the U.S. base in Greenland is less secure than it was decades ago because of Denmark's stewardship,” according to CBS. The next day, Trump told NBC News, “We’ll get Greenland. Yeah, 100 percent,” and added he would not rule out the use of military force.

Reaction: “Col. Susan Meyers, the commander of the 821st Space Base Group who also oversees the Pentagon's northernmost military base, sent a March 31 message to all personnel at Pituffik seemingly aimed at generating unity among the airmen and Guardians, as well as the Canadians, Danes and Greenlanders who work there, following Vance's appearance,” Thomas Novelly of Military.com reported Thursday.

In her email, Meyers said she’d “spent the weekend thinking about [Vance]'s visit—the actions taken, the words spoken, and how it must have affected each of you. I do not presume to understand current politics, but what I do know is the concerns of the U.S. administration discussed by Vice President Vance on Friday are not reflective of Pituffik Space Base,” Meyers wrote.

Space Force reax: “Commanders are expected to adhere to the highest standards of conduct, especially as it relates to remaining nonpartisan in the performance of their duties,” unnamed service officials said in a statement linked to Parnell’s social media post.

Additional reading:

“Space Force's intelligence ‘marketplace’ gets funds to expand,” Defense One’s Audrey Decker reported Thursday from Colorado Springs;

See also, “The Dangerous New Civil-Military Bargain: Trump’s Demands for Loyalty Will Weaken the U.S. Armed Forces,” via Marquette University’s Risa Brooks, writing this week in Foreign Affairs;

And for some weekend reading, “She left Salesforce for a hot defense-tech startup—then faced a culture of drugs, guns, and abuse,” via the San Francisco Standard reporting this week on allegations surrounding the Wilmington, Delaware-based Second Front.

Welcome to this Friday edition of The D Brief, a newsletter dedicated to developments affecting the future of U.S. national security, brought to you by Ben Watson with Bradley Peniston with Lauren C. Williams. Share your tips and feedback here. And if you’re not already subscribed, you can do that here. On this day in 2001, China released the detained crew of a U.S. Navy EP-3E ARIES II signals intelligence aircraft that had been forced to land in Hainan, China after a collision with a J-8 interceptor aircraft over the South China Sea 10 days earlier.

Trump 2.0

Supreme Court rebukes Trump administration, orders efforts to return deported migrant. Ten days after U.S. officials blamed the transport of Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia to prison in El Salvador on “administrative error,” SCOTUS issued an unsigned but apparently unanimously supported order seeking his return. “To this day,” Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote, “the government has cited no basis in law for Abrego Garcia’s warrantless arrest, his removal to El Salvador or his confinement in a Salvadoran prison. Nor could it.” (NYT, Reuters)

Related reading:

“ICE director wants to run deportations like ‘Amazon Prime for human beings’” the Guardian reported Wednesday from Todd Lyons’s speech at this week’s Border Security Expo in Phoenix;

“Inside a Powerful Database ICE Uses to Identify and Deport People”: 404 Media reports on the Palantir-created database that filters people by hundreds of categories: scars, location data, immigration status, eye color, and more;

“DOJ Leader Removed After Bondi Saw Front Office Biden Portrait,” Bloomberg reported Thursday.

Etc.

Chinese President Xi Jinping just fired his army’s second-highest-ranking officer in what the Financial Times described Thursday as “the most dramatic act of his military anti-corruption campaign and first firing of a general in that role in six decades.”

China admitted to hacking U.S. infrastructure in a secret December meeting. At a Geneva summit with outgoing Biden-administration officials, a Chinese official reportedly acknowledged “that Beijing was behind...years of intrusions into computer networks at U.S. ports, water utilities, airports and other targets,” the WSJ reported on Thursday.

The admission “startled American officials used to hearing their Chinese counterparts blame the campaign, which security researchers have dubbed Volt Typhoon, on a criminal outfit, or accuse the U.S. of having an overactive imagination.”

Why admit now? “The Chinese official’s remarks at the December meeting were indirect and somewhat ambiguous, but most of the American delegation in the room interpreted it as a tacit admission and a warning to the U.S. about Taiwan, a former U.S. official familiar with the meeting said.” More, here.

Lastly this week: Haiti is using armed drones to fight gangs. Washington Post: “With the capital of Haiti on the cusp of falling to gangs, authorities in the crisis-racked Caribbean nation” are using lightweight armed drones, whose “emergence has also alarmed analysts, aid workers and other rights groups, who say their use in Haiti’s densely populated capital, Port-au-Prince, adds fuel to a combustible conflict, endangers civilians, complicates the delivery of aid and may violate international law.” Read on, here.
]]>

France : French intelligence implicates Le Monde journalist in execution of Mossad and DGSI informant

Fri, 11 Apr 2025 09:42:00 -0400
The closing sentences of the final indictment on 31 March by the Paris Public Prosecutor's Office calling for a criminal [...]

Enabling a Thriving Middleware Market

Luke Hogg — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 09:00:09 -0400

Editor’s Note: This article is part of Regulating Social Media Platforms: Government, Speech, and the Law, a symposium organized by Just Security, the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, and Tech Policy Press.

Middleware, third-party software that serves as an intermediary between users and platforms, offers a potentially promising solution to counter the concentrated power of centralized social media platform governance. Middleware, in this context, refers to open, third-party products and services that are composable—meaning they allow multiple providers to be mixed and matched for specific use cases, allowing users agency over the overall user experience. One example of this was the app BlockParty, which let users nuke trolls from their feeds on X by configuring settings in BlockParty’s easy-to-use interface. Although middleware may serve as a user agent for many purposes, scholars who study the impact of concentrated platform power on democracy and society have speculated about middleware’s potential benefits for increasing user agency over content curation and moderation specifically. In giving users more agency over the content that they see—or the content they wish to avoid–middleware might encourage a more pluralistic and democratic digital ecosystem.

For the still-nascent middleware market to flourish, however, incentives must be aligned, regulatory barriers addressed, and platform cooperation encouraged. Here, we outline key steps necessary to cultivate a viable middleware market, balancing innovation with user protection and regulatory clarity. The insights presented here are derived from a paper we co-authored for the December 2024 Georgetown University McCourt School of Public Policy and Foundation for American Innovation whitepaper, titled “Shaping the Future of Social Media with Middleware.”

Paths to Middleware Adoption

A few short years ago discussions of social media middleware policy focused largely on how to compel large platforms to cooperate. But lately, recent technological trends and user adoption of protocol-based social media communities (such as Bluesky or the Fediverse, which use open technical standards – or protocols – that allow different apps to connect and share content across a common network) suggest that middleware adoption now has the potential to follow one of two paths: via integration within centralized platforms or via the expansion of decentralized, federated networks.

In a centralized adoption model, dominant platforms such as Meta, YouTube, or X (formerly Twitter) would incorporate middleware services into their existing ecosystems – offering a proliferation of third-party services like BlockParty, meeting different user needs (imagine something like an app store, but on a social media platform). This model can quickly scale middleware adoption by leveraging large user bases and established infrastructures, but it also risks allowing major platforms to maintain significant control over middleware providers. X somewhat notoriously altered the terms and costs for third-party access to its API, effectively shutting down many third-party services built on top of the platform. Meta has had unfortunate experiences with unethical third-party providers such as Cambridge Analytica, which improperly obtained user data to build U.S. voter profiles. The resulting scandal is one reason Meta trended toward becoming more closed rather than open over time. However, in a departure from its normal “walled garden” approach, it has recently integrated its platform Threads with ActivityPub, a common, open standard for decentralized social networking.

Alternatively, a decentralized adoption model assumes continued growth of federated networks like Mastodon and Bluesky, where middleware services are built into inherently open ecosystems. This approach offers greater user autonomy and less reliance on corporate gatekeepers but, on this path, middleware faces challenges in achieving widespread adoption and long-term sustainability; funding models for protocol-based social media remain an open question. Additionally, although Bluesky already offers third-party labelers (moderation tools) and feeds (curation experiences), it is unclear how many users are aware of them. Broad user adoption of middleware will likely require some education, and less-resourced platforms may be less well-equipped to manage a middleware marketplace while focused on their own growth challenges.

For middleware to gain widespread adoption, policymakers should focus on creating conditions that allow middleware services to function effectively within both centralized and decentralized adoption paths. Reducing liability risks for platforms that integrate middleware services and fostering a regulatory environment that supports competition will be essential steps in this process.

Reducing Legal and Regulatory Barriers

Some of the most significant recent regulation of large technology platforms has come from Europe. The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) has set a precedent by mandating interoperability and data portability, requiring dominant platforms to provide greater openness. The EU’s Digital Services Act complements these measures by requiring that users have more control over the content they see, and mandating greater transparency in algorithmic processes. The United Kingdom and Australia have also introduced regulatory initiatives that emphasize competition and user choice. Momentum, therefore, may be driving toward middleware as a solution that centralized platforms will embrace. However, European regulatory success has been mixed. The DMA has faced significant challenges and malicious compliance from incumbent platforms, and its critics argue that it is overreaching and particularly burdensome for smaller tech companies.

Whether and how the Trump administration might align with these efforts remains uncertain, but fostering a middleware-friendly ecosystem will require clear standards for interoperability and platform openness.

Jurisdiction over middleware-related public policy is currently spread across multiple federal agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Department of Commerce, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and the U.S. Copyright Office. For example, the FTC has jurisdiction over unfair and deceptive practices that could be used to challenge companies that change interoperability rules, while the FCC, which already oversees broadly analogous interoperability requirements in the telecommunications space, could bring its expertise to platforms. Although the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy aims to coordinate federal technology policies, the reality is that these agencies operate with different, and sometimes conflicting, mandates, creating a fragmented regulatory environment and potentially stifling innovation.

A more unified regulatory approach could reduce uncertainty, streamline compliance, and foster an ecosystem that better supports middleware development. However, given the unlikelihood of creating a new agency, a more feasible approach would be to enhance coordination among existing regulators. The FTC could address antitrust concerns, the FCC could promote interoperability, and the Department of Commerce could support innovation through trade policies and the development of technical standards. Even here, slow rulemaking and legal challenges could hinder progress. Ensuring agencies have the necessary authority, resources, and expertise will be critical.

A soft-law approach, modeled after the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) AI Risk Management Framework, might be the most feasible option. A Middleware Standards Consortium could help establish best practices and compliance frameworks. Standards development organizations (SDOs) such as the Internet Engineering Task Force or the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), are well-positioned to lead this effort, given their experience crafting internet protocols that balance innovation with stability.

For example, a consortium of SDOs with buy-in from NIST could establish standards for API access, data portability, and interoperability of several key social media functionalities. This approach has the added benefit of providing guidance and incentives without rigid mandates. However, voluntary standards alone may not suffice—dominant platforms could delay adoption or manipulate processes to maintain control. To counteract this, policymakers could offer regulatory incentives, such as reduced liability for compliant platforms.

Finally, current legal uncertainties may also stymie middleware development. It is presently unclear whether middleware providers qualify for Section 230 protections, legislation that protects platforms from liability for content posted by users, particularly if they engage in curation or filtering. Similarly, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Section 1201, which restricts the circumvention of digital access controls, might require amendment to exempt middleware providers, allowing them to modify content presentation without legal risk. Addressing these legal barriers through exemptions or clarifications would provide a clearer path for middleware innovation while safeguarding user protections.

Whether through centralized platform adoption or decentralized networks, middleware has the potential to redefine digital interactions by enhancing user choice and competition in the digital ecosystem. Policymakers should lay the groundwork to assist the development of a more open and democratic online future.

IMAGE: Visualization of middleware (via Getty Images)

The post Enabling a Thriving Middleware Market appeared first on Just Security.

The Netherlands Apologizes for Involvement in Hawija Airstrike and Lays Out Further Reforms

Megan Karlshoej-Pedersen — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 08:29:59 -0400

On March 14, 2025, the Dutch Cabinet released a comprehensive letter to parliament with detailed commitments on further strengthening its approach to civilian harm mitigation. The commitments were made in response to the late-January publication of a damning report by the Sorgdrager Commission on the Dutch airstrike in Hawija, Iraq in 2015 that killed at least 70 civilians. The Commission outlined a series of systematic errors that contributed to the civilian toll of the airstrike, presenting valuable lessons for both the Dutch government and the coalition set-up – particularly in relation to intelligence sharing between allies.

In his letter to parliament, Dutch Defence Minister Ruben Brekelmans accepted all recommendations made by the Sorgdrager Commission, highlighting both the significant changes that the Netherlands has already made since the Hawija airstrike, and laying out additional reforms to address remaining concerns.

In the weeks since the release of the letter, developments have highlighted the urgent need for continued scrutiny in the Netherlands; in late March, the Minister announced that the Dutch post-strike video of Hawija, which the military claimed had been overwritten the day after the strike because it showed nothing important, had been found at a military base. Far from insignificant footage, the video clearly showed that the industrial area had been unintentionally “completely wiped out” and the residential area surrounding it “destroyed and badly damaged.” The Commission has responded by stating they will modify the conclusions in their report, while also calling for a hearing with those involved in the airstrikes under oath. The Minister of Defence has announced that there will be an external investigation into the context of the re-appeared video.

The Netherlands should promptly release the Hawija airstrike footage publicly to enhance transparency and accountability. At the same time, the Netherlands’ potentially offers a model of reform that allied nations can adapt and implement in their own civilian harm mitigation practices.

Apologizing for Harm

The Minister’s letter to parliament includes an apology for the harm caused to civilians in Hawija in 2015. This point is hugely important as survivors in Hawija, many of whom had lost loved ones, homes, and livelihoods, spent years unsure about who had conducted the airstrike as the Dutch Ministry of Defense kept its involvement secret. Even after Dutch responsibility was revealed, research by peacebuilding organisation PAX, the Intimacies of Remote Warfare Programme at Utrecht University, and the Iraqi NGO al-Ghad, showed that citizens of Hawija repeatedly requested an apology for the harm they had suffered. Yet while the Dutch Ministry of Defense admitted responsibility for the strike, no such apology followed. Rather than the individual reparations preferred by those affected, the Dutch government also made a “voluntary donation” to the International Organisation for Migration and the United Nations Development Programmes, leading to development projects in Hawija. These have received criticisms on the lack of engagement with local stakeholders and a lack of connection between the harm caused and the services offered in response.

In his response to the Sorgdrager Commission report, Minister Brekelmans acknowledged the Commission’s report that community-based compensation to those affected in Hawija came “too little and too late.” This aligns with the findings of independent NGOs and civilians in Hawija, who have long found that the Dutch compensation did not align with the wishes of those affected and did not lead to the intended improvement in Hawija. While the Ministry of Defense maintains that individual compensation payments will likely still not be possible in this case, it is encouraging that the Minister emphasizes that the Ministry will review whether additional resources can be made available – and, importantly, that local authorities will be involved in decision-making, based on the lessons of the past. This is also strengthened by an apology that the Defense Minister conveyed on behalf of the Cabinet to the Mayor of Hawija in March.

The Dutch Minister of Defense should build on the strength of this new approach, by communicating their apologies directly to those affected by the 2015 strike and working with local organisations and survivors of the airstrike to understand their preferences for future reparations in Hawija. In response to the letter released last month, PAX found that the apologies of the minister were well-received – and that those affected wish for a Dutch delegate to apologise directly to them, in person.

National Approaches to Intelligence in International Coalitions

Beyond offering this important apology for their involvement in the 2015 airstrike, the Minister’s letter to Parliament commits the Dutch government to several significant improvements. One of the key findings in the Sorgdrager Commission report was that the Dutch military conducted the strike on Hawija despite having access to no intelligence of their own, no Dutch intelligence capability to verify American information, and no Dutch military lawyer present to advise the Dutch Red Card Holder. The Coalition was entirely trust-based, meaning that the Americans and the other partners in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance would select and develop the targets, which would then be passed to other national partners for execution. In effect, this meant that non-Five Eye partners were asked to conduct lethal airstrikes without full access to the relevant intelligence before – or even after – the airstrike. The Dutch military had been aware that this would be a challenge and had created doctrine to address this challenge in late 2014; but this did not lead to any practical changes, leaving the Dutch reliant on the Americans.

In their response, the Ministry of Defense acknowledges both that their staffing was insufficient, leaving significant gaps, and that they should have been more transparent to parliament on the limits of their own intelligence position. At the same time, as Brekelmans acknowledges in his letter to parliament, states such as the Netherlands who are not part of the Five Eyes will likely remain reliant on others for intelligence. As the new U.S. administration seeks to roll back their own commitments and systems for mitigating harm to civilians – in spite of new civilian harm allegations emerging in mid March 2025 in a series of major strikes in Yemen – the Dutch (and every other European ally), should consider the risk of continuing to rely on American intelligence to mitigate harm to civilians.

In the months following the 2015 Hawija airstrike, the Dutch intelligence position and legal advice were improved by placing the right people in the right headquarters. All states should learn from this and, as a national minimum, should have personnel available to verify the intelligence presented to them, and a legal advisor (LEGAD) available to national decision makers. In the current climate, this is more important than ever.

Reporting on Civilian Harm

On the morning of July 3, 2015, as the suspicion of civilian harm was spreading among those involved in the airstrike, and the Americans were launching their own post-strike assessment that would find civilian harm “plausible,” the Dutch detachment commander filing out the Dutch After-Action Report (AAR) ticked a box saying “no” to the suspicion of civilian harm, because he had not seen “hard evidence.” This meant that other transparency and accountability mechanisms did not kick into action. It took four years for investigative journalists to prove Dutch involvement, and only then did it become public knowledge that the Dutch were responsible for significant civilian harm. On this, the Dutch Ministry of Defense acknowledged their mistake;

“For too long, the lack of clarity about whether there were civilian casualties and the precise nature of the damage has been used as a reason for not being transparent about this. When it comes to the balance between transparency on the one hand and correct and precise information provision on the other, it is sometimes important to be transparent even when there is no certainty yet. Based on the report, the cabinet judges that your House should have been informed immediately when the suspicion of civilian casualties arose, even when there was no certainty about this yet.”

This statement reflects years of advocacy led by independent civilian harm monitoring group Airwars and others on the importance of transparency, particularly in the face of complex information environments. As years of incident-based documentation efforts by groups like Airwars have shown, it is possible to identify harm allegations even in contested information spaces and it is vital that complex information environments are not used to excuse a lack of transparency.

To further address this in the Dutch context, the Dutch have created a “transparency test” to evaluate on a running basis what information can be released. This will be applied before, during, and after military operations to ensure that there is always as much transparency as possible. This system now faces a significant test in the case of the post-strike footage of Hawija, with the Sorgdrager Commission calling for the footage to be released not just to select parliamentarians, but to the public, to ensure that “transparency and truth-finding are then actually put into practice.”

Seeking Clarity in Future Coalitions

Finally, in their letter to parliament, the Dutch Ministry of Defense announced a new program of seeking “Letter of Intent” from the countries that the Netherlands regularly collaborate with militarily. This will seek clarity on key elements of civilian harm mitigation before coalitions are commenced, including agreements reporting on civilian casualties. This is valuable both in the clarity it will add to future coalitions, and in ensuring that mechanisms to address civilian harm remain high on the agenda for military actors. This is a major step forward, and reflects a marked change from the status quo of the Coalition set up in the war against ISIS, where the collective Coalition set up meant that individual states rarely invested in their own civilian harm tracking and response mechanisms.

The response to the Sorgdrager Commission report comes in the context of wider developments in the Dutch Ministry of Defense; just hours before the letter was released, the Ministry also released the outcome of a year-long engagement with Airwars reviewing the largest number of civilian harm allegations potentially relating to Dutch actions in the war against ISIS. This process reflects steps towards transparency taken by the Ministry, in a marked change compared to the opaque systems described by Sorgdrager at the time of the Hawija strike and in the years that followed.

The recent release of footage from the Dutch Hawija incident underscores the urgent, ongoing need for the implementation of commitments made by the Dutch Ministry of Defence towards stronger transparency, accountability, and responsiveness. Moreover, the reforms the Netherlands has undertaken in recent months demonstrate promising practices that allied nations should emulate as they strengthen their own oversight and accountability frameworks.

Airwars is currently working on a comprehensive analysis of the report together with civil society partners, due to be released later this year

IMAGE: The Binnenhof (Dutch Parliament) in the Netherlands (via Getty Images)

The post The Netherlands Apologizes for Involvement in Hawija Airstrike and Lays Out Further Reforms appeared first on Just Security.

Early Edition: April 11, 2025

Weronika Galka — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 07:54:27 -0400

Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the past 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

China today increased its tariffs on U.S. imports to 125%, responding to President Trump’s earlier decision to hike duties on Chinese goods to 145%. European stock markets were trading down this morning in response to the new tariffs. In his first public comments on the escalating trade war, President Xi Jinping said Beijing is “not afraid” of “any unjust suppression.” Nectar Gan reports for CNN; Anna Cooban reports for CNN; Reuters reports.

Trump yesterday threatened to impose additional tariffs and other sanctions on Mexico over a long-running dispute about provision of water under a 1944 treaty on the utilization of the Rio Grande, Colorado, and Tijuana rivers. Chris Cameron and Emiliano Rodríguez Mega report for the New York Times.

Chinese officials indirectly acknowledged Beijing was behind a series of cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure in a secret December meeting, sources say. The officials linked the intrusions into computer networks at U.S. ports, water utilities, airports, and other targets to Washington’s policy of support for Taiwan, the sources added. Dustin Volz reports for the Wall Street Journal.

U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff is expected to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow today, according to a source. Separately, the U.S. and Russian delegations both described yesterday’s latest round of talks on normalising the work of their diplomatic missions as “constructive.” Barak Ravid reports for Axios; Jonathan Spicer reports for Reuters.

Iran wants to explore an interim nuclear agreement before pursuing negotiations over a comprehensive deal during tomorrow’s negotiations with the United States, sources say. Iran’s “red lines” in the talks include “threatening language” and “excessive demands” on the nuclear program and Iranian defense industry, Tehran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency reported yesterday. Barak Ravid reports for Axios; Alireza Hajihosseini and Nadeen Ebrahim report for CNN.

The EU will delay the adoption of retaliatory tariffs against the United States for 90 days to “give negotiations a chance,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said yesterday. Andrew Jeong, Katrina Northrop, Michael E. Miller, and Leo Sands report for the Washington Post.

The Trump administration is divided on how to respond to recent battlefield gains by an Islamist insurgency in Somalia, with some State Department officials proposing shuttering the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu and withdrawing most U.S. personnel as a security precaution while National Security Council officials prefer to double down on U.S. operations in the war-torn country, sources say. Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt report for the New York Times.

At least five children and three adults with cholera died in South Sudan after walking hours trying to reach the nearest remaining health facility in the wake of aid cuts by the Trump administration, the Save the Children charity reported this week. Eve Sampson reports for the New York Times.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

The U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Bridget A. Brink, is leaving her post, the State Department announced yesterday. It was not immediately clear whether Brink resigned voluntarily or was asked to step down, or what the date of her departure would be. Constant Méheut reports for the New York Times.

Ukraine has told the United States that curbs on the size of its armed forces or on its military’s overall readiness would be a “red line” in negotiations to end the war with Russia, a senior Ukrainian official said. Putin has previously said he wants the size of Ukraine’s army to be limited. Anastasiia Malenko reports for Reuters.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy yesterday accused Russia of “systematically recruiting” soldiers from China to fight for Russia in Ukraine. Beijing has previously said it is investigating the reports of the Chinese troops fighting in the war while asserting its neutrality. Isabel Coles reports for the Wall Street Journal.

SYRIA

Turkey and Israel have started talks to defuse growing tensions over influence in Syria, with the governments of both countries confirming that a meeting between military and security officials took place on Wednesday in Azerbaijan. Carlotta Gall reports for the New York Times.

Syrian Kurds are set to demand a federal system in post-Assad Syria that would give them regional autonomy and security forces, a senior Kurdish official said. The decentralised vision of governance is opposed by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Orhan Qereman reports for Reuters.

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR

Israel will include the city of Rafah in its so-called “security zones” in Gaza, Defense Minister Israel Katz has said. According to the U.N., two-thirds of Gaza has been designated as “no-go” zones or placed under evacuation orders since the start of Israel’s renewed offensive. David Gritten reports for BBC News.

“We are getting closer” to a deal to free the remaining hostages and re-establish the ceasefire, Trump said during a Cabinet meeting yesterday. Israeli officials say that the likelihood of reaching a deal in the next two weeks has increased significantly, but significant gaps remain. Barak Ravid reports for Axios.

The Israeli government’s increased involvement in the hostage release and ceasefire talks has caused a “significant difference in momentum” from when Israel’s negotiating team was led by intelligence chiefs David Barnea and Ronen Bar, according to sources involved in the talks. Alex Marquardt and Jeremy Diamond report for CNN.

The Israeli military has fired Air Force reservists who called for the return of remaining hostages even if the move would require an immediate ceasefire, according to a statement from the IDF. In a letter published yesterday, hundreds of Air Force reservists and retirees argued that the IDF is fighting a war that “mainly serves political and personal interests and not security interests.” Eugenia Yosef and Jeremy Diamond report for CNN; Dov Lieber reports for the Wall Street Journal.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

The Senate early today voted 60-25 to confirm retired Lt. Gen. Dan Caine as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, filling the vacancy created by Trump’s firing of Gen. Charles Brown Jr. Andrew deGrandpre and Kelsey Ables report for the Washington Post.

The House yesterday passed legislation that would require people to prove that they are U.S. citizens when they register to vote. Voting by non-citizens is already illegal in federal elections. Michael Gold reports for the New York Times.

The Justice Department will review its case against Alexander Smirnov, a former FBI informant convicted of lying about the Biden family’s ties to Ukraine, DOJ prosecutors said in a court filing yesterday. Hannah Rabinowitz reports for CNN.

The Newsmax channel defamed Dominion Voting Systems by falsely accusing the voting machine-producing company of rigging the 2020 presidential election, a judge ruled Wednesday, weeks before a jury trial of the issue scheduled to begin on April 28. Marshall Cohen reports for CNN.

A House committee yesterday dropped its probe for information from Northwestern University over its law school’s representation of pro-Palestinian protestors, a lawyer representing the Committee on Education and the Workforce said in a court hearing on the legal clinics’ challenge to the probe. Karen Sloan reports for Reuters.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

Sudan accused the United Arab Emirates of violating the Genocide Convention by supporting paramilitary forces in its Darfur region during a hearing at the International Court of Justice yesterday. The UAE described Sudan’s accusations as “baseless and politically driven.” Niamh Kennedy, Nadeen Ebrahim, Zeena Saifi, and Avery Schmitz report for CNN.

Taiwanese prosecutors today for the first time charged a Chinese ship captain with intentionally damaging undersea cables, after a series of sea cable malfunctions alarmed the island’s officials. Yimou Lee and Ben Blanchard report for Reuters.

Israel yesterday released a Palestinian who was jailed at 13 over a terrorism conviction and developed schizophrenia while serving more than 9 years in prison, the former prisoner’s lawyer said. Mahmoud Illean and Melanie Lidman report for AP News.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

The U.S. military yesterday announced it had removed Col. Susannah Meyers as the commander of the U.S. Space Force Pituffik base in Greenland, adding it would not tolerate any actions that “undermine the chain of command or subvert” Trump’s agenda. According to a Military.com article linked in the Pentagon statement, Meyers sent an email to the base staff distancing herself from Vice President JD Vance’s remarks following his visit. Qasim Nauman reports for the New York Times; Thomas Novelly reports.

The Trump administration this week told Marvin Richardson, the second-ranking official at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, to retire or be fired, multiple sources say. According to sources, Richardson had been serving as the agency’s de facto head and ran its day-to-day operations. Perry Stein reports for the Washington Post.

The Trump administration has tightly restricted the number of people who have access to the President’s daily intelligence brief, sources say. Katie Bo Lillis, Kylie Atwood and Zachary Cohen report for CNN.

The Social Security Administration this week entered the names and Social Security numbers of more than 6,000 immigrants into a database used to track deaths, according to sources and records reviewed by the Washington Post. The move effectively cancels the group’s Social Security numbers, erasing their ability to use financial services like bank accounts and credit cards, receive benefits, or work legally in the United States. Alexandra Berzon, Hamed Aleaziz, Nicholas Nehamas, Ryan Mac, and Tara Siegel Bernard report for the New York Times; Lisa Rein, Hannah Natanson, and Maria Sacchetti report.

Trump on Wednesday instructed federal agencies and their assigned DOGE teams to repeal regulations inconsistent with his priorities without providing advance notice or opportunity for the public to comment on the repeals. The memo cites the 2024 Supreme Court Loper Bright ruling, which critics say does not give Trump the power to repeal regulations retroactively. Hassan Ali Kanu reports for POLITICO.

The Homeland Security Department has recently enlisted the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to conduct welfare checks on children and young people who came to the United States without their parents, Trump administration officials confirmed. Marianne LeVine, Maria Sacchetti, Jeremy Roebuck, Carol D. Leonnig, and Ellen Nakashima report for the Washington Post.

Trump is planning to announce new deals requiring several of the nation’s top law firms to offer legal support for some of his favored causes, sources say. Although it is not clear what firms have entered the agreements, according to sources Kirkland & Ellis, Latham & Watkins, and Simpson Thacher & Bartlett all had discussions with Trump aides in recent days. Ben Protess, Maggie Haberman, and Michael S. Schmidt report for the New York Times.

The Education Department’s Office of Inspector General plans to conduct a series of reviews into the agency’s recent mass layoffs, according to a letter seen by NBC News. El

Balancing State Security and Peace and Security in Outer Space: What Role for International Law on the Use of Force?

Chris O'Meara — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 07:52:12 -0400

The militarization of outer space remains at the top of the international agenda. Tests of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons have fuelled fears over the weaponization of space, and the prospect of space being a source and place of armed conflict is a very real concern. Against this background, the U.N. General Assembly’s newly minted Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space is holding its first substantive session this week. Continuing its longstanding focus on the issue, and building on the work of previous OEWGs, the General Assembly has tasked the new OEWG to submit recommendations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

These U.N. efforts are laudable and must be supported. After all, space debris resulting from ASAT weapon use threatens other satellites in orbit, many of which underpin the operation of human societies and the functioning of global economies. Conflict in space could, therefore, have catastrophic effects on civilians and State interests, both on Earth and in space. Regulating military activities in space benefits us all. However, despite the importance of satellites and the need to protect space from the effects of military activities, multilateral attempts that have sought to restrain the escalating weaponization of space have largely failed. The OEWG endeavors and other multilateral attempts to limit or ban ASAT weapon use face an uphill battle, therefore, especially in the current geo-political climate. While we wait for any State consensus on this issue, we must look to existing international law and how it can be applied to address this pressing threat to international peace and security, while at the same time recognizing that states will act to defend themselves on Earth and in space.

To this end, the publication in 2024 of The Woomera Manual on the International Law of Military Space Activities and Operations constitutes a valuable contribution to clarifying the current state of international law regarding military operations in space. I had the pleasure of attending the recent UK launch of the Manual and I applaud its ambitious aim “to provide the first comprehensive, detailed analysis of the existing legal regime of space.” There is no doubt that it advances our understanding of the legal regulation of military activities in space by setting out 48 Rules, which are said by the authors to reflect how international law regulates military activities during i) peace time, ii) times of tension and crisis, and ii) armed conflict.

The Manual has already been the subject of discussion on Just Security and other fora (see, e.g., here and here) and my intention is not to provide a comprehensive review. For my part, despite the Manual’s important contribution to our understanding of how international law applies to military activities in space, much more can be said on the limitations that the law places on States acting in self-defense in space, including by using ASAT weapons. My purpose, therefore, is to focus attention on the huge potential for international law on the use of force, typically referred to as the jus ad bellum, to address the fears over ASAT use and the militarization of space. This body of law, grounded in U.N. Charter and customary international law, is the subject of my recently published article for the Leiden Journal of International Law, entitled “Self-defence in outer space: anti-satellite weapons and the jus ad bellum.”

On the topic of self-defense in space, the Woomera Manual does address the jus ad bellum in its Rules pertaining to “times of tension and crisis” and advances our understanding of the applicable law. Notably, its consideration in Rule 23 of the “armed attack” trigger for the right of self-defense for the purposes of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is commendable in how it applies to satellites and other objects targeted in space. In contrast, however, consideration of how the jus ad bellum applies to ASAT use in self-defense is relatively light touch (more on this below). Similarly, much of the attention in the literature regarding ASAT use has focused on the targeting rules of international humanitarian law (IHL). This focus is entirely understandable. IHL is the “go to” body for targeting decisions, as it governs how states conduct hostilities, including laying down targeting rules that apply to ASAT weapon use during situations of armed conflict. It is axiomatic that these IHL rules apply equally to all belligerents and regardless of a State’s reason (lawful or otherwise) for entering into hostilities.

Yet, despite the undisputed importance of IHL for considering issues of State security and international peace and security in space, my argument is that the separate question of legality under the jus ad bellum, which speaks to why States are using force in their international relations, is equally important. The legal justification for States using force against satellites and what limitations apply as a result of that justification must also be appraised (separately, and in addition, to IHL) to establish the legality of targeting satellites. Most notably, absent State consent to use force against one of its own satellites or UN Security Council authorization authorising a State to use force, any actions against satellites that constitute a threat or use of force require justification as lawful acts of self-defense. Otherwise, such conduct will breach Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as an unlawful use of force.

This important issue of States using defensive force against satellites is the focus of my recent article. My argument is that, without a multilateral ASAT weapons control treaty, the jus ad bellum, alongside IHL, must be viewed as an essential part of the current international law framework limiting the use of ASAT weapons. As with IHL, the jus ad bellum was not originally conceived of as applying beyond the Earth’s atmosphere, but its rules can be interpreted and applied in a meaningful way to space, setting out limits regarding when and how states may lawfully target satellites using ASAT technologies, even in self-defense.

The principal jus ad bellum rules discussed in my article are the requirements of necessity and proportionality, which apply to the entirety of a defensive military operation to condition the exercise of the right of self-defense so that force (against satellites or otherwise) is contained and confined purely to the defensive. Although Rule 26 of the Woomera Manual acknowledges these requirements, relatively limited attention is given to how necessity and proportionality are operationalized in the specific context of self-defense in space. Beyond some high-level observations, the continued application of these requirements to defensive military operations is not explored in detail. Indeed, the Manual’s thematic structuring – which presents the Rules relating to military activities during i) peace time, ii) times of tension and crisis, and ii) armed conflict – may give the impression that the jus ad bellum ceases to apply once an armed conflict is underway, with legal regulation thereafter becoming the sole preserve of IHL.

Perhaps this lack of attention to how self-defense is constrained in space is a result of a perceived lack of space-specific State practice and opinio juris. Regardless, this is an opportunity lost when considering that other core jus ad bellum issues, like the meaning of an “armed attack,” are subjected to much more detailed commentary in the Manual. As I argue, the fact that jus ad bellum necessity and proportionality apply to the entirety of a defensive military operation means that ASAT weapon use in self-defense must comply with the targeting rules of IHL and (additionally and separately) with the targeting rules of the jus ad bellum. I examine these rules in detail, drawing on my existing research on necessity and proportionately and applying it to the space context.

As a general premise, given the unique nature of the space environment and the importance of satellites to the functioning of states and human societies, jus ad bellum compliance means that ASAT weapon use in defensive military operations is heavily restricted, and may even be denied in all but the most extreme circumstances of self-defense. First, beyond requiring that resort to force in self-defense is an exceptional and limited response to a genuine situation of emergency, I argue that jus ad bellum necessity operates to restrict which type of ASAT weapon may be used against satellites. Dual use or multiple owner/user satellites pose particular challenges for military planners from the perspective of necessity. I conclude that, depending on the ASAT technology used, defending states that only target satellites that are i) solely owned, operated, or used by the aggressor State, ii) exclusively military, and iii) factually connected with the armed attack, will most likely comply with jus ad bellum necessity.

Even if it is deemed necessary to target a satellite using an ASAT weapon, jus ad bellum proportionality is likely to act as a strong limitation on whether or not a satellite may lawfully be targeted in self-defense and might even preclude entirely the targeting of certain types of satellites. Jus ad bellum proportionality restricts how much total force a State may use in a military operation to achieve a legitimate defensive purpose and has particular significance in space. This is due to the nature of certain satellites (those that provide services to both military and civilian users) and the essential services that they provide (including global positioning, navigation, and timing services). The physical characteristics of space also mean that there are serious consequences to targeting defensively all kinds of satellites. The risk of enduring space debris caused by damage to or destruction of a satellite is a factor that is peculiar to the space environment and poses a major risk to satellites and the essential services that they provide to states and civilian populations.

States seeking to abide by the tenets of jus ad bellum proportionality must approach targeting satellites with any form of ASAT weapon with extreme caution. I argue that alternatives to ASAT weapons that cause physical damage and destruction should generally be preferred to avoid the problems of space debris, including resulting civilian harm and impinging unduly on third party interests (including neutrality, sustainability of the space environment, and international peace and security more generally). Weapons that only temporarily destabilize or render dysfunctional satellites, or electronic jamming or spoofing devices that are limited to interfering with or falsifying the transmission of signals to and from satellites, are most likely to comply with jus ad bellum proportionality. The same is true for targeted and limited cyberattacks on satellite-related computer networks. I also conclude that jus ad bellum proportionality logically requires that targets of self-defense should generally be confined to Earth. Where satellites are targeted, however, in addition to IHL targeting limitations, the jus ad bellum requires that the methods employed to neutralize satellites be strictly controlled to minimize harm to civilians and to third party interests and to avoid conflict and the escalation of conflict in space.

The authors of the Woomera Manual do not suggest that their work is the end of the story when it comes to how international law applies to military activities in space. On the contrary, one of the Manual’s great strengths lies in its candid recognition of the limits of current legal clarity. Where a lack of State practice means that the law does not provide answers, the Manual refrains from “filling the gaps” by projecting an academic opinion of what the law should be. The Manual leaves it to states as lawmakers to fill these gaps (or not) over time. In the context of a dynamic lawmaking environment, the authors express the desire that the Manual prompts states to engage with the issue of legally regulating military activities in space. I share this worthy goal and hope that my own work contributes to such engagement.

In considering how jus ad bellum necessity and proportionality apply to the use of ASAT weapons in self-defense, I hope that States and other interlocutors will engage with the subject of restraining military activities in space, even when States act legitimately to defend their national security in space. Such engagement allows the law to develop and for greater legal certainty and predictability to arise as a result. A clearer understanding of jus ad bellum necessity and proportionality directly addresses pressing international concerns regarding the weaponization of space and the fear of wars between States in that domain. Adherence to these requirements allows States to protect their vital space assets while also addressing State concerns regarding space debris, civilian harm, and avoiding conflict in space. As we all rely on satellite-based services in our daily lives, greater clarity regarding legal restraints on warfare in space benefits us all, as well as contributing more generally to securing international peace and security on Earth and in space.

IMAGE: Orbit of remains of Funyen 1C satellite and other debris from ASAT test by China. This image is a work of a U.S. military or Department of Defense employee, taken or made as part of that person’s official duties. As a work of the U.S. federal government, the image is in the public domain in the United States (via Wikimedia Commons).

The post Balancing State Security and Peace and Security in Outer Space: What Role for International Law on the Use of Force? appeared first on Just Security.

Senate Confirms Dan Caine as Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

Helene Cooper — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 03:37:50 -0400
Lt. Gen. Dan Caine will serve as the senior military adviser to President Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.

Long-sought goal of better Pentagon buying may finally be within reach

Patrick Tucker and Jennifer Hlad — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 02:05:58 -0400
Calls to overhaul the Pentagon’s buying process go back decades—to the Revolutionary War, one former congressman joked—from defense secretaries from William Perry to Donald Rumsfeld to Robert Gates to Ash Carter. An executive order signed late Wednesday evening is the latest, perhaps the most ambitious—and just maybe, the one with the best chance for success.

President Donald Trump’s order calls upon the Defense Department to “rapidly reform our antiquated defense acquisition processes with an emphasis on speed, flexibility and execution.” It mandates greater use of Other Transaction Authorities (via vehicles such as the Adaptive Acquisition Framework), a review of internal regulations and requirements that slow down buying, better training for acquisitions officials, and a review of major programs.

Many of these measures are not new. They are a recognition of a fact first observed by venture capitalist Marc Andreesen in The Wall Street Journal in 2011: “Over the next 10 years, I expect many more industries to be disrupted by software, with new world-beating Silicon Valley companies doing the disruption in more cases than not.” That’s the world in which most of us live. But the Pentagon has relied on slow-moving practices and processes to protect itself from wide-scale commercial software adoption, to being devoured. That’s changing. The mandate to prioritize the use of commercially available solutions signals why reform may be closer than ever.

More and more of what the Defense Department does depends on information technology. The department’s joint all-domain command and control efforts reflect an understanding that faster connections, collection, and processing of data are the key to success on the battlefield, particularly against a peer adversary. Software is now the future of hardware, too, fundamentally changing how quickly and cheaply the military can develop new ships, aircraft, rockets, and satellites through processes like digital twinning and capabilities like artificial intelligence.

Unlike in previous decades, the key technologies the DOD relies on “are primarily being driven by the private sector,” making it more critical that companies feel like they can easily do business with the Pentagon, former Republican congressman Mac Thornberry told Defense One in February.

[[Related Posts]]

And by prioritizing that commercial tech, the Pentagon will open up more options to buy or contract for things that already exist, rather than try to build them itself.

That prioritization is already happening in some pockets of the Defense Department. One is the Navy’s Program Executive Office for Digital Services, or PEO Digital. Defense One spoke to an official who highlighted how the office is able to convince Navy stakeholders to drop costly investments in building things that a technology company is already making better and more cheaply. PEO Digital also already uses alternative contract vehicles like OTAs to do so. That’s enabling them to move new capabilities into use far more quickly.

One of the office’s key pilot projects the official expects to scale up this year involves using artificial intelligence to automate workflows for acquisition. That could potentially reduce the money the Navy spends on teams having to look through proposals, pitches, and information requests for things like classified information and conflicts of interest. And the costs of that are not small, the official said.

So how much does the new method save? “It depends on the scale of how big those teams are…But if you're taking a manual process, this is someone's 40-hour work week for 52 weeks a year, and this is turning into a process that can be done in like 30 seconds,” they said.

The manner in which PEO Digital develops and scales these sorts of technologies is a model for the rest of the Defense Department.

As the official explained, PEO Digital didn’t simply dump a large language model on workers and tell them to use it. Rather, during the pilot phase, workers not only used but trained the model on the special knowledge that is core to what they do. In essence, they become not just testers, but also engineers of a tool that can be expanded for much greater use across the Navy.

PEO Digital's methods also achieve one of the other goals set forth in the order: establishing performance-based metrics to tell officials how well the tool is working. The office uses World Class Alignment Metrics, which are common in business, to measure things like operational cost and customer satisfaction in a way that the Defense Department currently does not.

That’s actually a huge reason why so many defense programs are over-budget and late, said Govini CEO Tara Murphy Dougherty. Testing, evaluation and validation “has become a sclerotic process with many, many steps. What we see all the time, since we work with so many PEOs, is that even traditional vendors—we might say they're not performing on the program, but they're moving forward, they will have upgrades, tech additions, new components to add into the system, ready before the previous version has even completed testing.”

But pockets within the Pentagon are already implementing a new approach that looks much more like the way a successful business adopts new technology, Murphy Dougherty said, such as the Army’s next-generation command-and-control program, which has adopted an approach of, “We're going to measure the results in that moment, not test it later on,” she said.

Adm. Sam Paparo, leader of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has called for “innovation by subtraction, removing bureaucratic obstacles within our system that impede progress—every unnecessary review, every duplicative process that damages our readiness.” The Pentagon needs “procurement at the speed of combat, not at the speed of committees,” he said in remarks at the Honolulu Defense Forum. “We must push authority down, accept prudent risk, and trust people to deliver.”

The new executive order takes steps to address that, calling for the incentivization of risk-taking and innovation by the defense acquisition workforce.

But while changing the Pentagon’s culture to accept more risk is necessary for change, there are other issues involved, former DIU head Mike Brown told Defense One in February.

“The three things that are interconnected in acquisition are requirements, acquisition, and budgeting. So people talk about acquisition reform, but it's almost like you can't do something there if you don't fix requirements and budgeting. They're kind of an integral system,” Brown said.

The current budget process is “the single biggest inhibitor we have to modernizing the force,” he said. “Three years to get a budget done, and it’s not done on time. We have continuing resolutions. And then the granularity of 1,700 line items managed by congressional staffers is not strategic, and it’s not oversight. It’s micromanagement. So we need to have a more flexible system.”

The executive order doesn’t address all acquisition problems, because some require congressional action.

One is the size limitations of OTA contracts, which are far smaller than the costs to programs. Another is the way Congress allocates the Defense Department’s budget, Murphy Dougherty said, with some funds earmarked for testing, other for acquisition, and so on. What would make far more sense, she says, would be for the deputy defense secretary, or the services secretaries working with teams in research and engineering, testing, buying, and sustainment, to more quickly move money from testing to prototype development or scaling, depending on the specifics of the program.

Another problem with the order, said Jerry McGinn, executive director of the Baroni Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University, is that it’s “light on details regarding follow-on production, scale, and sustainment—areas where the defense industrial base struggles the most, and the biggest challenges should a major conflict break out.”

But overall, Murphy Dougherty said, the order is a good step toward achieving a long-sought goal.
]]>

Azerbaijan : Baku Winter Park business centre, the headquarters of Azerbaijani influence campaigns

Fri, 11 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0400
In the heart of Baku, the Winter Park Plaza business centre bustles with activity. Apart from foreign businessmen, including members of the German-Azerbaijani Chamber of Commerce and the German international cooperation agency GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), one finds [...]

France : French military intelligence's unequal perks scheme sows discord

Fri, 11 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0400
Though they might be called the same thing from one service to another, the allowances and bonuses paid out to [...]

Lebanon : How Bank Audi enabled Mikati and Salamé clans to make secret deals

Fri, 11 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0400
One, Najib Mikati, is a billionaire and prominent Lebanese political figure, the other, Riad Salamé, is in prison after running [...]

Pakistan : The Karachi defence firm dabbling in Russian inflatable decoys and Taiwanese drones

Fri, 11 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0400
Karachi-based Universal Smart Military Systems (USMS) is one of many small private defence companies in Pakistan favoured by the country's [...]

Space Force's intelligence ‘marketplace’ gets funds to expand

Audrey Decker — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 19:38:22 -0400
COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo.—A Space Force program that buys commercial satellite imagery and analytics has seen success across combatant commands—and with a plus-up from Congress, the service hopes to give commands more information and new tools.

Called Tactical Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Tracking, or TacSRT, the program began as a pilot in 2023. It provides a “marketplace” where military customers seeking timely intelligence can ask a question and then industry competes to provide answers.

The tool has been used to support a wide range of missions, from tracking illegal fishing and monitoring humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to supporting the construction of the Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore pier in Gaza and the withdrawal of forces from air bases in Niger.

The results “speak for themselves,” Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman said, noting how the TacSRT team in U.S. Southern Command, in collaboration with partner nations, “has supported detection and tracking of narcotic operations. It's led in-theater humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. It's even countered malign influence, helping Peru to identify and defeat interference and jamming of PeruSAT from China and Russia.”

Congress gave the Space Force an additional $40 million last month in the continuing resolution deal to buy more TacSRT services, which was a “congressional vote of confidence” in the service’s moves to harness commercial kit, Saltzman said Wednesday at the Space Symposium here.

To keep pace with demand, service is building out its “Tap Lab”—the TacSRT tools, application and process lab—to develop new tools and techniques that commands can use, said Col. Rob Davis, the program executive officer of space sensing.

“We continue, in that more developmental space, to do ad hoc support through that development, still experimental space, to answer questions that combatant commands have. So they'll ask a question—border monitoring, human activity in this region, area interest—things like that, and we can provide that information back to them. They feed that information into their other processes to be able to make sense of it, and understand the battle space,” Davis told reporters Wednesday.

Commercial companies have been advocating for more TacSRT funding, but Space Force efforts to buy from commercial providers have been wrapped up in jurisdictional challenges over who has the authority to buy commercial information. The National Reconnaissance Office is in charge of buying ISR imagery from commercial providers, while the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency purchases analytic products.

Since “day one,” the Space Force has been trying to avoid duplicative efforts, Davis said, but the program is still maturing and building its processes to coordinate requests from commands.

“We have close, working relationships with our counterparts in NGA,” he said.

Vendors are eagerly awaiting for the Space Force and intelligence community to come to an agreement over who buys what, an agreement that is in the “final stages,” according to Breaking Defense.
]]>

Trump Deploys Justice Dept. to Scrutinize Ex-Officials and Perceived Foes

Charlie Savage, Maggie Haberman, Jonathan Swan and Michael S. Schmidt — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 19:06:06 -0400
A presidential decree instructing the Justice Department to scrutinize whether a former official broke the law crosses a new line.

Do You Receive Health Care at the V.A.? We’d Like to Hear from You.

Nicholas Nehamas — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 18:04:11 -0400
The New York Times is covering the different ways the V.A.’s health system is changing under President Trump. We want to know if you, or someone you know, have been affected.

Under Trump, Gun Agency Remains Rudderless and Leaderless

Glenn Thrush — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 15:41:55 -0400
The A.T.F. has been hit by the departure of key career officials, the diversion of agents from core duties to immigration enforcement and from what amounts to a campaign of indifference.

Trump’s defense-acquisition executive order hits the right notes

Jeffrey Nadaner — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 13:14:42 -0400
President Trump’s April 9 executive order, “Modernizing Acquisitions and Spurring Innovation in the Defense Industrial Base,” hits the right notes and endorses the right approaches. After decades of ever-new studies, commissions, and legislation to streamline the defense acquisitions process—followed by halting and sporadic Defense Department implementation—it is encouraging to see a commander-in-chief directly tell the Pentagon to get on with it.

The executive order recognizes that DOD has, for too long, failed to embrace fully the more flexible rules and tools it already has on the books. These include other transaction authorities, commercial solutions openings, and the Adaptive Acquisition Framework launched during the first Trump administration.

The order builds on Secretary Pete Hegseth’s March 6 memo, “Directing Modern Software Acquisition to Maximize Lethality,” which requires the Pentagon to make CSOs and OTAs the default acquisition mechanism for buying defense software, not the exception.

The order also takes aim at the 30-year-old Joint Capabilities and Integration Defense Systems—better known as JCIDS—for validating military requirements, which, combined with traditional Pentagon and Congressional budget cycles, usually takes an absurd number of years to get a new weapons capability approved and funded. In all, energetically implementing the order’s direction to “eliminate or revise any unnecessary supplemental regulations or any other internal guidance” should shrink the 1,500-page Defense Federal Acquisitions Regulations to a fraction of its length.

Not mentioned in the order, but consistent with its spirit and direction, is the long-ignored Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, which requires DOD to buy commercially available products using industry-standard contracting mechanisms—that is, fixed-price contracts. FASA has been the law of the land for more than 30 years, but has been rarely heeded, leaving the U.S. military with substandard IT and taxpayers with inflated bills. It has also effectively barred the door to many innovative software and hardware companies. The Pentagon's enforcement of FASA for rapid access to commercial technologies would, in many cases, obviate the need to work around the current system via special pathways or novel authorities.

Combined with the bold reforms proposed in the FoRGED and SHIPS bills, we may be finally transforming the way our nation develops, funds, procures, produces, and sustains weapons of war. Using the capabilities of the commercial sector, where nearly all software innovation originates, is critical to that effort, as the defense secretary’s software acquisition memo recognizes.

Recently, the Pentagon has embraced AI from non-traditional commercial firms to great effect for intelligence, targeting, and other combat operations. However, its adoption has been much slower on the logistics side of the house.

In fact, too often DOD professionals who acquire bleeding-edge technologies for the warfighter do so using primitive spreadsheets, emails, conference calls, and other semi-manual processes; or, at best, a kludgy government IT deployment that falls far short of what a commercial developer would provide—or a commercial customer would tolerate.

Consequently, DOD program officers are in a constant state of playing catch-up, dealing with obsolete parts, supply chain gaps, and the near-impossible task of disintermediating foreign suppliers. For all the caveats about military systems being fundamentally different, there’s no tenable reason why the procurement and maintenance of defense equipment can’t be a lot closer to the way Caterpillar orchestrates its supply chain or Walmart restocks its shelves.

These applications are, in fact, available to the Pentagon—already developed, tested, and validated—through the dynamism of the commercial sector. We’re talking about AI-enabled platforms that track the availability, sourcing, and risk profile of parts, components, and materials across the globe. Consider that in recent weeks, soldiers in Army Futures Command exercises used real-time data and AI-powered workflows for live inventory tracking and predictive demand planning. It’s long past time for the supply chain to be connected fully to the kill chain as a matter of routine: from sensors to shooters to sustainment.

A massive, federal multi-year, multimillion-dollar IT construction effort—with the usual cost growth, schedule slip, and disappointment—isn’t necessary. Taking this traditional route would be industrial-level malpractice given the availability of commercial software-as-a-service applications ready to go on contract signing day. It is also—as mentioned earlier—legally unsupportable, given the law’s clear guidance to use commercially available products as a matter of course.

Given that nearly 1,200 of the Pentagon's 2,000 or so acquisition programs are business systems, the Defense Department has a historic opportunity to shed costs and improve operational efficiency across the board.

It is also a fleeting opportunity, as new leaders in the executive branch and Congress are aligned on not just the need for root-and-branch acquisitions change, but on the basic elements of that change: from traditional government cost-plus contracts to commercially-standard fixed-fee contracts; from bespoke federal contractor and FFRDC enterprise IT installations with lagging upgrades to turnkey software-as-a-service that improves continuously and avoids “vendor lock”; and from the failed process-driven behaviors of the last several decades to outcome-driven incentives and accountability that are the business norm.

The proof of real change—versus another passing flirtation with acquisitions reform—will come at the working level, with the choices made by contracting officers and program managers across the Pentagon and within the services. It will require not just the right rule sets and technologies, but also leaders within the institutional military who will drive and empower their organizations to pursue those changes and make them stick. It will also require judging those leaders by their ability to shorten lead times, reduce downtimes, and dramatically expand production.

Consider that heading into World War II, the United States didn’t have much of a defense acquisitions system—really just a handful of mid-level supply and logistics officers. However, as recounted by historian Arthur Herman, it had men like Franklin Roosevelt and William Knudsen—then CEO of General Motors — who unleashed the creativity and productivity of American industry to generate prodigious quantities of armaments.

Then, in the early years of the Cold War, patriots fiercely devoted to results, like Adm. Hyman Rickover and Gen. Bernard Schriever, combined organizational genius and an iron will to create America’s nuclear submarine and ballistic missile forces. They did so in a fraction of the time and budget that a middling modernization program requires today. Experience, expertise, and sheer longevity were essential factors. Rickover led the Navy’s nuclear enterprise for nearly three decades; Schriever effectively oversaw the Air Force’s space and ballistic missile forces for more than a decade.

By comparison, acquisition leaders today, in keeping with the military’s career management system, will rotate through Program Manager or Program Executive Officer billets every two to three years—sometimes less. Just as an acquisition officer begins to get savvy to the nuances of a complex program, he or she will move on to another assignment.

More than any other “workforce” reform, doubling the length of uniformed and civilian program office tours is apt to improve acquisition outcomes. It should be possible for a sharp colonel to begin managing a fledgling development program, then see promotion to one- or two-star general as the program progresses to low-rate then full-rate production, testing, and fielding.

Language that extends acquisition management tours can be incorporated into the implementation plan for the executive order, which the Pentagon owes the White House in 60 days. As China routinely conducts massive military exercises to simulate the blockade or invasion of Taiwan, the time for incremental measures is long past. With the president, the defense secretary, and both sides of the Congressional aisle impatient for action, we have no reason to wait any longer.

Jeffrey “Jeb” Nadaner is senior vice president of Govini. He has served as deputy assistant defense secretary for industrial policy from 2020 to 2021.
]]>

The D Brief: New defense EOs; Somalia concerns; Ukrainian’s advice for US; Spies target fired feds; And a bit more.

Ben Watson and Bradley Peniston — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 11:18:46 -0400
Trio of executive orders seek to improve defense acquisition, exports, and shipbuilding. On Wednesday, President Trump released a flurry of ten EOs and memos, including one to modify his market-tanking tariff scheme and another about showerheads. Three defense-related orders focus on:

Acquisition: Aims to “reform our antiquated defense acquisition processes with an emphasis on speed, flexibility, and execution” and to “modernize the duties and composition of the defense acquisition workforce” and encourage them to take risks. An accompanying statement says all major defense acquisitions programs will be reviewed under the new order, and those “more than 15% behind schedule or 15% over cost will be scrutinized for cancellation.”

Arms exports: Seeks to bolster U.S. arms exports by reducing regulation and increasing government-industry cooperation. It sets a 90-day deadline for a plan to use “accountability metrics to improve transparency in defense sales, and moves the exportability requirement to be “earlier in the acquisition cycle.” Note: U.S. arms exports have set new records in the past two years, but there are signs that Trump’s ally-hostile policies will reduce global demand for American weapons.

Maritime dominance: Aims to “revitalize and rebuild domestic maritime industries and workforce to promote national security and economic prosperity.” It sets a Nov. 5 deadline for a plan to do this. It also sets a 45-day deadline for “recommendations to increase the number of participants and competitors within United States shipbuilding, and to reduce cost overruns and production delays for surface, subsurface, and unmanned programs”—with separate lists of recommendations for the Army, Navy, and Coast Guard.

There’s much more in each of the orders; start by reading this report from Defense One’s Jennifer Hlad and Bradley Peniston.

Also from the White House: “Trump Signs Orders Punishing Those Who Opposed His 2020 Election Lies,” the New York Times reported Wednesday.

Update: The Trump administration can once again fire all probationary employees after a second court ruling in as many days found those challenging the dismissals did not have standing to sue. That includes employees at the Defense Department, GovExec’s Eric Katz reports.

Background: Most recently hired, or in some cases recently promoted, employees the Trump administration fired across government in February were being reinstated back into their jobs after two courts found the terminations were conducted unlawfully. The Defense Department had fired 364 probationary employees when the stays came down, officials said in March.

But on Wednesday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit paused one of the injunctions that had ordered those rehirings. That followed the Supreme Court on Tuesday also issuing a stay on a related case that had blocked the firing of 16,000 federal workers. In those cases, the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court found those bringing the suits did not have standing to make their challenges. Both cases will still hold hearings on the merits of the claims. Read more, here.

Welcome to this Thursday edition of The D Brief, a newsletter dedicated to developments affecting the future of U.S. national security, brought to you by Ben Watson and Bradley Peniston. Share your tips and feedback here. And if you’re not already subscribed, you can do that here. On this day in 1863, the nuclear-powered attack sub USS Thresher (SSN-593) sank during dive tests in the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 129 of her crew.

Trump 2.0

New: Army Secretary Dan Driscoll is now the acting ATF director, Reuters reported Wednesday. FBI Director Kash Patel had been serving in the same acting role at ATF. But he was “removed” from that dual role some time around the end of February for unclear reasons, though a Justice Department official said “it had nothing to do with his job performance.”

“This puts a defense leader—with an already large job—in charge of a domestic law enforcement agency,” AP reports, while emphasizing, “U.S. defense officials have historically tried to maintain a strict divide between military forces and law enforcement.” “As the temporary head of ATF, Driscoll will lead efforts within the Department of Justice to investigate federal offenses related to firearms use and sales, as well as illegal sales of explosives, alcoholic beverages and tobacco products,” Leo Shane II of Military Times reports.

Developing: Trump’s national security team worries Somalia could be on the brink of collapse, the New York Times reports as the terrorist group al-Shabaab continues to make battlefield gains.

Where that comes from: “some State Department officials to propose closing the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu and withdrawing most American personnel as a security precaution,” but others “in the National Security Council, are worried that shutting the embassy could diminish confidence in Somalia’s central government and inadvertently incite a rapid collapse,” officials told the Times.

Worth noting: The U.S. military in the region has been burning through ammunition attacking the Houthis in Yemen under what SecDef Hegseth has called Operation Rough Rider.

Where to go from here is unclear, the Times reports. Especially since last week, Trump’s top counterterrorism adviser, Sebastian Gorka “convened an interagency meeting at the White House to begin to grapple with an approach...The meeting is said to have ended without any clear resolution.” Read on (gift link), here.

More reading:

“Space Force preps ‘international space strategy’ as US-ally ties fray,” and that’s coming within weeks, Defense One’s Audrey Decker reports;

“Will Space Force shift contracts to commercial? ‘Everything’s on the table,' official says,” Decker reports from the Space Symposium in Colorado;

“Confronted with ‘eye-opening’ costs, SecNav vows to root out waste.” John Phelan, who is learning on the job, says a business approach will fix things, Lauren C. Williams reports from the Sea-Air-Space conference;

“Marine Corps to field counter-drone systems to dismounted units,” in the wake of a September flyoff, Meghann Myers reports.

Ukraine

Kyiv’s former top military commander has some advice for the U.S. military: Ukraine’s battlefield-management system known as DELTA deserves recognition as a centralized interface for contemporary, software-dependent warfare, argues Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, writing Thursday for Defense One.

“Data, AI, drones, and their management have become the norm, forcing new tactics, equipment, and systems that can adapt quickly against an evolving enemy,” Zaluzhnyi writes. Due to so much incoming information—human reports, open-source intelligence, satellite imagery, drone video feeds, cellphone video clips, cyber data, and more—“Western militaries have slumbered too long” because they’ve been “Lulled by decades of multi-domain dominance.” Russia’s Ukraine invasion has shown that those days are over, Zaluzhnyi says.

Enter Ukraine’s DELTA system, which he calls “an ecosystem of military products” that is “more straightforward than the American Palantir battle-management system.” In this way, Zaluzhnyi argues, DELTA “offer[s] an advantage against a larger yet information-deficient opponent.” Notably, “DELTA uses AI to swiftly sort through the data and give leaders a comprehensive picture of the battlefield and beyond,” he says. “This includes a repository of identified and proposed targets ready for deployment to the appropriate friendly strike or cyber platforms.”

Why it matters: “Meeting adversaries armed with mass-deployed, attrition-optimized autonomous weapons they may end up as the proverbial victims of the German WW2 Blitzkrieg,” the general says. “Fortunately, they have a gift of immeasurable value: Ukraine’s hard-won expertise, forged in a grueling fight for survival.” Continue reading, here.

New: The Kremlin and Trump’s White House carried out a prisoner swap arranged by the two countries’ spy agencies with mediation by the UAE, the Wall Street Journal reported Thursday.

For the U.S., Russia released Ksenia Karelina, a dual national who lived in Los Angeles but was arrested last February while visiting her grandparents in the mountain city of Yekaterinburg. She was later convicted of treason because she’d donated less than $60 to a New York-based nonprofit called Razom for Ukraine. U.S. authorities have called the case “absolutely ludicrous,” the Associated Press reports.

Russia received Arthur Petrov, who “was arrested in Cyprus in August 2023 at the request of the U.S. on charges of smuggling sensitive microelectronics to Russia and extradited to the U.S. a year later,” AP reports.

CIA Director John Ratcliffe is credited with negotiating on behalf of the U.S. “I’m proud of the CIA officers who worked tirelessly to support this effort, and we appreciate the Government of U.A.E. for enabling the exchange,” he told the Journal.

Etc.

Spies from China and elsewhere are trying to draw in unwitting current and former U.S. federal employees, Nextgov reported citing a document (PDF) the National Counterintelligence and Security Center released Tuesday.

The spies are “posing as consulting firms, corporate headhunters, think tanks, and other entities on social and professional networking sites,” the document says. It reminds workers with security clearances that they must protect classified information even after they leave government service. Read more, here.

By the way: The UK’s military chief, Adm. Sir Tony Radakin, just visited China for the first time in a decade, the British Times reports. “He gave an unprecedented speech to future Chinese military commanders at the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defence University in Beijing on Wednesday,” and he spoke privately with “General Liu Zhenli, a member of China’s Central Military Commission and chief of staff of the CMC joint staff department,” the Times reports, noting there is currently “an escalating trade war between the US and China.”

For your radar: By the end of the month, “the Royal Navy flagship, HMS Prince of Wales, will depart for the Indo-Pacific via the Mediterranean as the head of a deployment involving 12 nations.” More, here.
]]>

U.S. National Security and Military News Review

Expelled From the Navy: 381 Banned Books

The D Brief: Russian missiles kill 34 in Ukraine; Trump lashes out at CBS; Breakthrough in robotics?; Naval autonomy today; And a bit more.

Around the Defense Department

Emerging tech

Trump 2.0

France : Algeria targets interior ministry and spares DGSE in expulsion of French agents

Two Years of War in Sudan: From Revolution to Ruin and the Fight to Rise Again

A Legacy of Nonviolent Resistance

Looming Partition Risks Regional Chaos

Enduring Resilience

Reviving Civic Space Starts in the Shattered Capital

A Different Future Is Still Possible

#War #Sponsored: Using Targeted Ads to Promote Compliance with International Humanitarian Law

A Proactive Approach: Calling for Compliance with IHL

How Targeted IHL Ads Might Appear on Social Media

Who Designs? Who Distributes? Who Pays?

Early Edition: April 14, 2025

Armenia/Azerbaijan/France : Information wars in the Caucasus

Saudi Arabia : Saudi's naval champion Sofon hiring in Europe

China/France/Russia/United States : DGSE screening, US naval intelligence, China's anti-corruption drive, Paris-Moscow skirmish

Azerbaijan/France : Legal wrangling between Paris and Baku intensifies

Syria : Syria's private security boom

Europe : Frontex wants its own intelligence data fusion system

Endorsement by Mayor Adams Appears to Lift Sales of Kash Patel’s Book

Gen. Stanley McChrystal On Fear

Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions

Trump Directive Calls for Turning Border Strip Into ‘Military Installation’

Military Judge Throws Out Sept. 11 Case Confession as Obtained Through Torture

The state of naval autonomy

Digest of Recent Articles on Just Security (Apr. 7-11, 2025)

Symposium: Regulating Social Media Platforms

Israel-Hamas War

Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions (Updated)

Trump Executive Actions / Analysis & Perspectives

State Department / Visa Revocations

United States / Nuclear Testing

Russia Sanctions / Business

Netherlands / Civilian Harm

International Law

FISA Section 702

F.B.I. Suspends Employee on Patel’s So-Called Enemies List

Trump Directive Calls to Turn Border Land Into ‘Military Installation’

Canceled: Pentagon terminates IT service contracts

F.B.I. Suspends Bureau Employee on Patel’s So-Called Enemies List

U.S. Military Removes Commander of Greenland Base

Who’s In and Who’s Out at the Naval Academy’s Library?

Miami Art Dealer Is Charged With Selling Fraudulent Warhols

El ejército de EE. UU. destituye a la comandante de la base de Groenlandia

There is No Immunity for the International Criminal Court to Respect

“Criticism” of the Al-Bashir Appeals Judgment

Consistency of the Al-Bashir Appeal Judgment with International Law

Conclusion

Justice Dept. Lobbies for Release of Ex-F.B.I. Informant Accused of Lying About Bidens

Air Force Academy Stops Considering Class Diversity in Admissions Process

The D Brief: New CJCS; Contracts, cancelled; Europe pledges Ukraine aid; Report: China avows Volt Typhoon; And a bit more.

Trump 2.0

Etc.

France : French intelligence implicates Le Monde journalist in execution of Mossad and DGSI informant

Enabling a Thriving Middleware Market

Paths to Middleware Adoption

Reducing Legal and Regulatory Barriers

IMAGE: Visualization of middleware (via Getty Images)

The Netherlands Apologizes for Involvement in Hawija Airstrike and Lays Out Further Reforms

Apologizing for Harm

National Approaches to Intelligence in International Coalitions

Reporting on Civilian Harm

Seeking Clarity in Future Coalitions

IMAGE: The Binnenhof (Dutch Parliament) in the Netherlands (via Getty Images)

Early Edition: April 11, 2025

Balancing State Security and Peace and Security in Outer Space: What Role for International Law on the Use of Force?

Senate Confirms Dan Caine as Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

Long-sought goal of better Pentagon buying may finally be within reach

Azerbaijan : Baku Winter Park business centre, the headquarters of Azerbaijani influence campaigns

France : French military intelligence's unequal perks scheme sows discord

Lebanon : How Bank Audi enabled Mikati and Salamé clans to make secret deals

Pakistan : The Karachi defence firm dabbling in Russian inflatable decoys and Taiwanese drones

Space Force's intelligence ‘marketplace’ gets funds to expand

Trump Deploys Justice Dept. to Scrutinize Ex-Officials and Perceived Foes

Do You Receive Health Care at the V.A.? We’d Like to Hear from You.